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The Mark and the Knowledge 
And God said, r7 have put the mark on him and now 
I am going to put the knowledge." 
And old Doc Hines said, rrDo you think you are a 
nigger because God has marked your face?" 
"Light in August" 

The Transcendental Imagination: The Mark as Focus 
Every unique object in the physical world bears some visible or 
invisible mark by which it may be distinguished from its closest 
kind. Without contradicting the founding fathers who made an 
American literature possible, Americans from the time of the first 
explorers have considered themselves unique; we have not inter­
preted the equality of all men to mean that all men are identical. 
Even such individual and original difference, however, holds no 
semantic meaning apart from the concept of similarity. When con­
temporary linguists refer to the "marked" case, they imply the exis­
tence of a logically bounded semantic or syntactic context within 
which a particular word or construction achieves its relative distinc­
tion. When Kenneth Burke formulated his Grammar of Motives, he 
argued that "to tell what a thing is, you place it in terms of some­
thing else. This idea of locating, or placing, is implicit in our Very 
word for definition itself: to define, or determine, a thing, is to mark 
its boundaries."1 
But marking involves more than classifying objects and distin­
guishing among individuals; it describes a process by which we not 
only learn about each other but also communicate that knowledge. 
This process, what I've termed "marking," involves both noticing 
and attributing. Therefore, in asking the paradoxical yet familiar 
question, what is "American" about American literature, we may 
consider that the exploration of the new world and the literature 
that recorded that exploration (roughly from Cooper onwards) have 
marked trails that turn the literary critic into a pathfinder. The 
notch on the tree that reads "American" tells us not that we have 
arrived at the end but that we have not lost the trail. When explor­
ers, historians, and inheritors all join in a search for an American 
identity (which the act of defining America as a democracy did not 
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resolve), they indicate, by marking, that the concept of similarity 
(among individuals who join together in order to form a community) 
has no social or political meaning apart from the concept of differ­
ence. 
The fiction of social and metaphysical isolation, as I will define it 
in this study, provides the context within which American literature 
becomes "American." Of course, even this distinction is only rela­
tive, for studies of outcast and scapegoat individuals have abounded 
since the Old Testament. Americans did not invent the theme of 
social difference, and yet the marked character—solitary, excom­
municated, expatriate—becomes a significant concern for our best 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century novelists. What relationship 
exists between the artist and the social outcast in American fiction 
or between the social phenomenon of lynching and the creation of a 
literary work? If a novel does more than reflect and report, if it 
becomes not simply the record of a search for American identity but 
a means of searching, then the novel itself becomes an American 
problem: how to write one? how to read one? 
In my study of American fiction, I have been intrigued by the 
novelist's frequent choice of the mark or brand as his central sym­
bol. A survey that includes Stephen Crane's Henry Fleming in The 
Red Badge of Courage and Henry Johnson in "The Monster," Edith 
Wharton's Ethan Frome, Henry James's John Marcher, Sherwood 
Anderson's Wing Biddlebaum and other characters in Winesburg, 
Ohio, Fitzgerald's Jay Gatsby, Hemingway's Jake Barnes, Flannery 
O'Connor's "grotesques," and marked outsiders in Mark Twain and 
Richard Wright only begins to suggest the range of the American 
novelist's concern with stigma. It might prove illuminating to 
examine each of these works and others in order to demonstrate the 
significance of the theme that links them; certainly a literary histo­
rian could write a comprehensive study of social deviance in the 
American novel. My method in this book, however, has been to 
choose a few representative texts that clearly emerge, on any list of 
major American novels, as studies of marking, and then to interpret 
the fictional societies each work creates. In each of these texts— 
Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, Melville's Moby-Dick, Faulkner's 
Light in August, and Ellison's Invisible Man—the principle of exclu­
sion by which a community creates and affirms its own identity 
finds its artistic correspondence in the process of selecting names 
and symbols by which the fictional narrator expresses and trans­
cends social and metaphysical isolation. 
The recurrent focus on marked characters may profitably be de­
scribed as both the method and the consequence of the American 
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transcendental imagination. In each of these four novels, the nar-
rator's attempt at aesthetic resolution depends on, and derives from, 
the social, religious, and political transcendence of the outcast fig­
ure. I have chosen the phrase "transcendental imagination" deliber­
ately, because, although the philosophical foundations of American 
transcendentalism remained nebulous, even for those central fig­
ures in the movement—Emerson, Thoreau, and Bronson Alcott— 
who articulated them the most clearly,2 the attempt of the transcen­
dentalists to provide religious and philosophical solutions for social 
and historical problems becomes one characterizing mode of the 
American consciousness after Emerson as well. American fiction 
has its roots in transcendentalism. 
It has become a critical commonplace to state that the concerns of 
the early nineteenth-century writers center on the relationship be­
tween the individual and society. In particular, as Emerson 
suggests, the transcendentalist viewed solitude as a solution to the 
problems of society. In his essay, "The Transcendentalist," he 
characterizes the representative man as aloof and withdrawn from 
community. "This retirement," he states, proceeds not "from any 
whim on the part of these separators" but "is chosen both from 
temperament and from principle; with some willingness too, and as 
a choice of the less of two evils."3 
The idea that the transcendentalist chose his isolation willingly 
does not imply that he escaped society's notice. On the contrary, in 
spite of the seriousness that the transcendentalists attributed to 
their withdrawal from society, they became, as Emerson describes 
it, "still liable to that slight taint of burlesque which in our strange 
world attaches to the zealot." Thus the label "transcendentalist" 
carried the force of social stigma: "The Philanthropists inquire 
whether Transcendentalism does not mean sloth; they had as lief 
hear that their friend is dead, as that he is a Transcendentalist; for 
then is he paralyzed, and can never do anything for humanity." As 
early as the transcendentalist movement, then, the American un­
derstanding of social stigma included a metaphysical dimension. A 
philosopher's or a writer's ideas might be irregular enough to merit 
labeling him in consequence. By ending his essay with some mod­
erating words on hermits, Emerson suggests a need for tolerance for 
the "one or two solitary voices in the land, speaking for thoughts and 
principles not marketable or perishable."4 Society ought to be large 
enough, he seems to be saying, to accommodate a few eccentrics. 
In the case of the hermit, whose isolation from society results from 
mutual agreement, the psychological stigma of exclusion becomes 
inconsequential and even amusing. For the individual who wishes 
4 I The Mark and the Knowledge 
to remain part of his community, however, to solve its problems 
without losing his citizenship, social stigma defines the boundaries 
within which he must confine his individuality. This individual be­
comes the province of the American novelist, and as we read the 
fiction of the past two centuries, we discover that society has not 
been large enough for a long time to include its cripples, its artists, 
its dissenters, and its minorities, all of whom share, if not physical 
marks or brands, evidence of social and metaphysical difference ap­
parent to the discerning eye. 
Unlike the American transcendentalist who withdrew from soci­
ety in order to establish a more principled relationship with it, the 
individual who tries to live within society's boundaries may risk 
involuntary isolation from community. From the Old Testament on, 
society has ritually characterized its response to such individuals by 
identifying them and excluding them as scapegoats of one kind or 
another. What is interesting as a general observation is that both 
individual withdrawal and social exclusion create caricatures either 
physically or symbolically marked by their transformation from in­
dividuals into representative men. Furthermore, these figures ex­
press, and by expression attempt to resolve, the hidden conflicts and 
internal contradictions of individual and collective human behav-
ior.5 
The American experience of internal contradiction, namely, that 
we are a society of equal individuals, may be historically and na­
tionally explored in our treatment of the Negro. As Ralph Ellison 
implies in Shadow and Act, what was romantic and transcendental 
about early and mid-nineteenth-century American literature was a 
"conception of the Negro as a symbol of Man." This conception re­
ceded, post-Reconstruction, into what Ellison describes as a general 
repression of the American consciousness. For Ellison, evidence of 
this repression—that social problems have not been transcended 
but simply ignored as a result of civil war—may be found in the 
absence of social reality in the "realism" of the late nineteenth cen­
tury, with the exception of Stephen Crane. It was not until the 
"emergence of the driving honesty and social responsibility of 
Faulkner,"6 according to Ellison, that an awareness of ongoing civil 
war returned to the American literature. This civil war may be seen, 
in psychological terms, as the American fight "against our own reli­
gious doubts, the insecurity of our own political position, and the 
one-sidedness of our own national viewpoint."7 
The American Negro has held from the time of his first enslave­
ment the social position of national scapegoat. In this sense Ellison 
is correct in identifying the Negro's social and psychological as well 
as physical segregation as a symbol. Yet the scapegoat psychology is 
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really an inversion of the transcendental view that solitude might 
contribute to a solution of society's problems. The latter is an at­
tempt to achieve social integration without the formation of 
"shadow" consequent to lynch laws and witch trials.8 But the at­
tempt at metaphysical transcendence, a concomitant problem for 
the transcendentalist, fails because there is no equivalent in West­
ern religion to the vehicle of the ritual scapegoat. The characteris­
tics of this vehicle—that it is tangible, literal, and visible—find no 
analogy in Western metaphysics except the Easter passion, in 
which, although Christ died for us, we must accept the guilt for his 
crucifixion without experiencing the cathartic joys of joining his 
accusers. The bread made flesh serves as our only tangible contact 
with the crucified victim, and the Puritans refused to accept literal 
transubstantiation. Thus social exclusion served one function of re­
ligious ritual for the Puritans and their descendants. Social exclu­
sion, dramatized most clearly in our historical treatment of the 
Negro, has provided American community with transcendent 
catharsis. 
For Emerson, the world existed as expanding circles, as corre­
spondences, as analogy; and the power of the analogist lay in his 
ability to create his own world, thus affirming his organic relation­
ship with the universe without relying on ritual. In his journals 
Emerson writes: "It seems to be true that the more exclusively 
idiosyncratic a man is, the more general & infinite he is, which 
though it may not be a very intelligible expression means I hope 
something intelligible. In listening more intently to our own reason, 
we are not becoming in the ordinary sense more selfish, but are 
departing more from what is small, & falling back on truth itself & 
God. For it is when a man does not listen to himself but to others, 
that he is depraved & misled."9 The asocial individual—the 
hermit—creates an entire world by becoming the only person in it, 
and he locates the source of divinity within his own spirit. In Quen­
tin Anderson's terms, "In the particular cultural circumstances 
Emerson's imaginative leap was decisive; he not only said himself, 
but made it possible for others to say, that the more clearly distinc­
tive the voice of the celebrant, the more unmistakably does he attest 
the divine in him."10 Transcendence depended on self-realization. 
Emerson's own parenthetical remark, that his statement "may 
not be a very intelligible expression," explains the logician's frustra­
tion with Emerson's conclusions about the nature of reality and his 
dismissal of Emerson's analogical method. The logical contradiction 
inherent in these conclusions is that the particular limits our per­
ception of the universal and must be transcended; at the same time 
it becomes the analogic vehicle for doing so. The transcendence of 
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the particular is not possible without the existence of the particular. 
Thus, as Quentin Anderson writes, "transcendentalism is a care­
fully measured madness, which admits its aberration when ordering 
coal. It does not sustain; it is occasional like the revival."11 
The Eastern philosopher's reevaluation of Emerson would be 
more charitable. Eastern philosophy, one influence among many on 
American transcendental thought, postulates a logic in analogy that 
is as "true," as useful in the pursuit of knowledge as Western 
rationalism. In the analogical pursuit, as the romantics and the 
transcendentalists have tried to show us, subjective knowledge (as 
opposed to objective or scientific knowledge) is accompanied by mo­
ments of integration between the perceiver and his world.12 These 
moments amount to experiences of enlightenment in the form of 
self-realization—precisely the enlightenment that becomes the goal 
of Eastern means of gaining knowledge. 
But Emerson lacked what the Indian philosophy incorporates in 
its analogical pursuit—a technique (some form of yoga, for exam­
ple). And it is the emphasis on technique, on individual practice of 
some method for increasing perception and achieving knowledge, 
that, had the American transcendental ists articulated it, would at 
the very least have lent method to that "carefully measured mad­
ness." In the absence of a sustaining methodology, in the chasm 
between scientific "enlightenment" and romantic organicism, trans­
cendentalism became, as Perry Miller points out, primarily a reli­
gious or a philosophical movement rather than a literary one.13 
In the light of other influences on American transcendentalism, 
perhaps Miller's distinction is too rigid. The metaphysical poetry of 
Donne and Herbert, for example, created in literary forms the struc­
ture of the practice of religious meditation. Closer to home, the 
Puritans viewed meditation as a rigorous method of self-
examination, following Thomas Hooker in The Application of Re­
demption (1657), and the American poet Edward Taylor wrote his 
Preparatory Meditations1* as the "last heir of the great tradition of 
English meditative poetry that arose in the latter part of the six­
teenth century." Although Taylor was born and educated in En­
gland, Louis Martz asserts that his Meditations reflect the condition 
of the American poet conversing with God in the wilderness, in a 
"peculiar mixture of the learned and the rude, the abstract and the 
earthy, the polite and the vulgar";15 and as a result, Taylor created 
an "American" work. To the extent that transcendentalism was al­
ready part of the English literary tradition in the late sixteenth 
century, then, it was also part of the early American Puritan liter­
ary tradition. 
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In her introduction to The Metaphysical Poets, Helen Gardner 
writes that "the metaphysical manner of setting a subject, 'hammer­
ing it out,' and then 'shutting it up' is closely allied to the method of 
religious meditation and . . . many metaphysical poems are poetical 
meditations." Thus, even Donne's secular poems may be termed 
metaphysical "in its true sense, since they raise, even when they do 
not explicitly discuss, the great metaphysical question of the rela­
tion of the spirit and the senses." She emphasizes the "concentra­
tion" of metaphysical poetry—"The reader is held to an idea or a 
line of argument"—and its development of the conceit. "All com­
parisons discover likeness in things unlike: a comparison becomes a 
conceit when we are made to concede likeness while being strongly 
conscious of unlikeness."16 
In their emphasis on method, Emerson, Thoreau, and Melville 
emerge from the tradition of English metaphysical poetry. Emer-
son's doctrine of the "over-soul" derives from his attempt to create 
metaphysical correspondences to express "the relation of the spirit 
and the senses." Melville's notion of "trying-out" his theme in 
Moby-Dick may be likened to the metaphysical poets' penchant for 
what Gardner calls "hammering out" their subject, and in the first 
chapter of the novel, Ishmael explicitly refers to the white whale as 
one of the "wild conceits that swayed me to my purpose."17 And 
Thoreau's Walden is a carefully constructed analogy between 
natural life cycles and daily processes, a work that Stanley Cavell 
goes so far as to describe as scripture.18 
Cavell's statement that "a writer in meditation is literally a 
human being awaiting expression"19 may recall one of the passages 
from Walden in which Thoreau implicitly refers to the cycle of medi­
tation and expression as the prelude to his own creation: 
In the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous and cosmogonal 
philosophy of the Bhagvat Geeta, since whose composition years of the 
gods have elapsed, and in comparison with which our modern world 
and its literature seem puny and trivial; and I doubt if that philosophy 
is not to be referred to a previous state of existence, so remote is its 
sublimity from our conceptions. I lay down the book and go to my well 
for water, and lo! there I meet the servant of the Bramin, priest of 
Brahma and Vishnu and Indra, who still sits in his temple on the 
Ganges reading the Vedas, or dwells at the root of a tree with his crust 
and water jug. I meet his servant come to draw water for his master, 
and our buckets as it were grate together in the same well. The pure 
Walden water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges.20 
In a concluding remark, Cavell states, "I do not wish to claim that 
Thoreau anticipated the Civil War; and yet the Bhagavad Gita is 
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present in Walden—in name, and in moments of doctrine and struc-
ture."21 
Cavell's comparison is useful in extending his own correspondence 
of Walden as scripture, for the particular "despair" that the hero of 
the Indian epic confronts is civil war: Arjuna does not wish to take 
arms against his relatives, the Kurus, and calls on Lord Krishna for 
aid. The aid Krishna gives is contained in verse 48 of the second part 
of the Gita: "Established in Yoga, perform action."22 With this verse, 
Krishna begins to expand the subject of the epic, whereby self-
consciousness is attained by practicing a technique of meditation 
(loosely referred to as "yoga") and alternating meditation with 
"karma" (work or activity). Thus Cavell can conclude that in Wal­
den as in the Bhagavad Gita, "the way of knowledge and the way of 
work are one and the same."23 
In a consideration of the mechanics of social exclusion—marking 
as a prelude to self and social knowledge—it is useful by analogy to 
examine the principles of yoga, the generic name for meditation 
techniques that have been associated with Eastern philosophy for 
centuries. The only technique I am familiar with firsthand is the one 
taught by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (known in this country as "trans­
cendental meditation"). In this technique, a variant of a type of yoga 
known as "mantra yoga," the meditator is given a mantra (a 
Sanskrit word or phrase) by a teacher and shown how to use this 
mantra as a focus of sound and thought that produces the subjective 
effect of "diving" within consciousness until, at some point, waking 
consciousness is "transcended" (in Maharishi's terms24), the 
meditator may lose the mantra for a short period, and for the dura­
tion of the transcendence, the individual sits in "bliss conscious­
ness," "satori," the presence of the Absolute, the oceanic universal, 
"pure awareness," or "pure being," as the state has been variously 
described. 
It is significant that mantras are specific sounds, or signs, that 
may not be translated into English or any other language because 
they have no referential meanings in Sanskrit. They are what the 
linguist would term "content-free" symbols. Theoretically, the mind 
can only transcend the content-bound thoughts of the waking state 
when it becomes absorbed in a thought that contains such a symbol. 
But the mantra is a literal sign; it may be spelled, spoken, and 
communicated. To the moment of transcendence during meditation, 
it remains literal, part of the world of physical signs and symbols. As 
I understand what Maharishi calls "transcending," the meditator 
focuses on the literal mantra (or "mark") until the boundaries of 
the symbol dissolve and the meditator experiences a state of mind 
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that for American readers must resemble Thoreau's description of 
sublimity at Walden Pond. 
In the absence of a technique like the one Maharishi proposes for 
the meditator, American transcendentalism failed to provide a 
physical vehicle by which its adherents could attain Thoreau's "sub­
limity." It is worth conjecturing that, had the transcendentalists 
succeeded, they might have eliminated the seeming inevitability of 
the witch trial or the lynch mob from our history. Like the commu­
nity in the scapegoat ritual, the meditator in mantra yoga chooses a 
physical vehicle to contain his impurities. By focusing on this vehi­
cle during the meditation, he transcends his individuality. Like the 
mantra, the scapegoat bears the burden of communal evil—the 
marking agents assert that he is not part of them, that they are not 
responsible for the evil he carries. However, ritual social purifica­
tion, unlike meditation, has only a temporary effect, and thus, as Sir 
James Frazer wrote, "a general clearance of evils is resorted to 
periodically."25 
The subjective experience of transcending during meditation may 
be compared to the catharsis of ritual purification, the temporary 
effect of the scapegoat ritual. But unlike the social enactment, in 
which for the physical vehicle—the human scapegoat—ritual death 
is real death, in mantra yoga, as I have explained, the mantra is 
content-free. Only the teacher, by tradition, knows the effects of the 
mantra; the student is told only that the mantra will be a life-
supporting vehicle for him to achieve periodic transcendence and to 
evolve towards personal enlightenment. Such a tradition releases 
the meditating individual from a need for Puritan self-analysis by 
assuming that if he has not attained enlightenment, his analysis 
would be faulty; and at the same time, it locates the presence of evil 
as well as the possibility of salvation within the individual, theoret­
ically eliminating the need for social scapegoats. In this last respect, 
it differs considerably from the Puritan tradition of meditation, 
which, content-bound in both its epistemology and its theology, 
places the burden of moral judgment on the human memory and 
locates specific evils in marked individuals. 
F. O. Matthiessen writes, "The tendency of American idealism to 
see a spiritual significance in every natural fact was far more 
broadly diffused than transcendentalism. Loosely Platonic, it came 
specifically from the common background that lay behind Emerson 
and Hawthorne, from the Christian habit of mind that saw the hand 
of God in all manifestations of life. . . ."26 The recurring social and 
individual emphasis on "the mark" in American fiction provides a 
focus for exploring consciousness that may be interpreted as similar 
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in intention to the mantra in mantra yoga, to the victim as physical 
vehicle in the scapegoat ritual, and to the "particular" or the "rela­
tive" in the transcendentalist system. Early nineteenth-century 
transcendentalism may be viewed, then, as just one manifestation of 
the American search for self-consciousness, and its literary signifi­
cance described as the formal attempt to find natural corre­
spondences for metaphysical truths by means of a "transcendental 
meditation." 
In American fiction, the focus on physically or metaphorically 
marked characters replaces the "concentration" of metaphysical 
poetry; but as epistemology, the scarlet letter, the whale, the racial 
identity of Christmas, and the theme of invisibility all hold the 
reader to a single "idea or line of argument." In addition, the four 
novels of my study may all be described as religious meditations, in 
the sense that, as I will show in subsequent chapters, the narratives 
are "preparatory," like Edward Taylor's poems, for transcending the 
American dialectic—the conflict between equality and identity. 
These four works portray individuals in conflict with their com­
munities. Yet the narrators and the narrative designs of each novel 
suggest that there exists a system of metaphysical, social, and artis­
tic correspondences in which becoming the enlightened American, 
achieving American community, and creating the American novel 
require following the same marked trail. The novelist searches for 
symbols, the penitent discovers sins, and the lynch mob chooses 
victims; the American epistemology becomes a cyclical pattern of 
marking, analyzing until the limits of the analysis are transcended, 
then returning to re-mark and re-view. 
Hester Prynne, Ishmael and Pip, Joe Christmas, Hightower, 
Byron Bunch and Lena Grove, and Invisible Man all oppose pre­
scribed forms in the communities they inhabit. They. possess, in 
Hawthorne's terms, a law to themselves. Others, either unable to 
exist outside the canons of social convention (Arthur Dimmesdale), 
or unwilling to do so (Percy Grimm), contribute to the creation of an 
American social religion, where law and theology become identical 
forces, subjecting humanism and spirituality to strict definition and 
excluding metaphysical paradox. In portraying the conflict between 
the individual and the community, Hawthorne, Melville, Faulkner, 
and Ellison reveal the transformation inherent in the Puritan sen­
sibility by which metaphysics becomes "social physics," but is ac­
companied by no less fervor. 
The Puritans interpreted metaphysics as the study of God and 
everything in the physical world as a manifestation of God's will. In 
their divine interpretation, marks symbolized God's imprint on the 
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world, his presence as the wrathful avenger or the granter of grace. 
The impulse to mark within the Puritan consciousness expressed a 
pervasive metaphysical insecurity that cannot tolerate paradox or 
ambiguity, desires not that God's will be grace but that God's will be 
known, and forces this "knowledge" by assigning labels (Adultery, 
Evil, Negro) to individuals (Hester Prynne, Moby Dick, Joe Christ­
mas) who then serve as scapegoats in modern enactments of ancient 
rituals. The path to self-knowledge for the Puritans and their heirs 
lies in the creation of a social symbolism—a system of marks and 
brands. The subject matter of the American novelist reflects the 
symbolizing process of his own art as well as his historical con­
sciousness. 
I have chosen to include a discussion of two stories by William 
Faulkner in this book because in them Faulkner clearly establishes 
his awareness of the relationship between the social and the 
metaphysical. The social outcast becomes a vehicle for the inclusive 
community to create, however erroneously, a sense of its own iden­
tity and union, as Faulkner indicates in "Dry September"; yet social 
exclusion and metaphysical isolation may become corresponding 
existential situations, as the body servant in "Red Leaves" realizes. 
For the marking agents in these stories (Jefferson and the Indian 
community), marking out specific individuals is intended as cathar­
sis (the social equivalent of individual transcendence), a means of 
strengthening the social center. Such community action, however, 
leads to further blindness and a perversion of spirituality; it is only 
the outcast individuals, carrying the social burden, who achieve 
transfiguration—who literally transform the "figure" by which they 
are marked into a state of quasi-social, quasi-spiritual transcen­
dence. 
Marius Bewley states, "If we except Calvinism which, as an active 
theology, had already given way before the growing popularity of 
Transcendentalism at the time Hawthorne began to write, America 
inherited no great theological system with which to order experi-
ence."27 Certainly Faulkner and Ellison, however, share the trans­
cendental consciousness of Hawthorne and Melville, and convey it 
in their fictional worlds. The principles of social definition by exclu­
sion, and solitude as a solution to social problems, which Hawthorne 
and Melville explore and for which, as I have indicated, Emerson 
was a major spokesman, become social substitutes for theology in 
Faulkner and Ellison. The transcendental epistemology incorpo­
rates the attempts of both Joe Christmas and Invisible Man to trans­
form personal knowledge into social action, to achieve social and 
political change by transforming the mark-as-brand (for Invisible 
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Man's literary predecessors) into the mark-as-password to social 
identity. 
As I understand the concept of marking, and as the preceding 
discussion should indicate, Western logic plays a very small role in 
tracing the effects of the transcendental imagination on the Ameri­
can consciousness. In fact, as Hawthorne, Melville, Faulkner, and 
Ellison demonstrate, and as I will illustrate in the chapters to fol­
low, the novelist, who works analogically, is able to perceive as well 
as to articulate the relationship between social and metaphysical 
isolation in American culture. Because the process of making sym­
bols, and even of using language itself, is analogous to the process of 
noticing and recording by which I have defined marking, the 
novelist has it within his power to create a work that will both 
correspond to the Emersonian universe and become yet another ex­
panding circle, part of the natural world and bounded by it, yet at 
the same time containing it. As Harry Levin writes, "language was 
related to perception through the doctrine of correspondences. For 
the writer who accepted the Emersonian metaphysic, there was no 
choice but to be a symbolist."28 This awareness, which makes the 
novel part of the world and yet the physical vehicle for transcending 
it, defines the transcendental imagination of our greatest fiction 
writers. Symbol making converts social problems into aesthetic and 
metaphysical ones; and if the resulting fictions transform the "bad 
art" of the social marking agents into the materials for symbolism, 
their creators are only attempting to construct a scaffold, a mast­
head, a high tower, or a Harlem ladder that will bridge the social 
and the metaphysical. 
I have loosely followed Emerson's own blueprint in constructing 
my study of the marking process in American fiction. Analogy jus­
tifies digression. One of the dangers in writing a thematic criticism 
is the tendency to use novels as logical "evidence" to prove a point by 
inductive reasoning. Yet just as the mathematician can never reach 
infinity by induction without calling on intuition, so the literary 
critic must also work intuitively sooner or later in order to trans­
cend the linear limits of Western reason. I have chosen to rely on my 
own transcendental imagination sooner perhaps than many of my 
readers will feel comfortable with, but I have done so with the goal 
of any work of literary criticism in mind: I have wanted to construct 
a chart that may increase the reader's understanding of novels that 
are already familiar, yet continue to fascinate us because we can 
never fully apprehend their meaning except by finding new critical 
analogies. 
As a result, although I have indicated here the usefulness of ex­
amining "the mark" in a reading of American literature, I later 
The Transcendental Imagination I 13 
subordinate social and theological interpretations to specific narra­
tive and thematic concerns in the novels, and, in doing so, must 
claim an absurdity inherent in the entire study. The logical ending 
point in a discussion of markedness involves not a conclusion but 
rather another question—what would a study of the concept of 
non-markedness involve? For I have assumed that certain charac­
ters are marked and that we may study them. Writing a book on the 
topic tends to overemphasize the very phenomenon, tends to "mark" 
it, unfortunately, as the only significant approach to American lit­
erature. But as Erving Goffman points out in Stigma, "The occa­
sionally precarious and the constantly precarious form a single con­
tinuum, their situation in life analyzable by the same framework 
. . . it is not to the different that one should look for understanding 
our differentness, but to the ordinary. The question of social norms 
is certainly central, but the concern might be less for uncommon 
deviations from the ordinary than for ordinary deviations from the 
common."29 And as Invisible Man states, "Perhaps I like Louis 
Armstrong because he's made poetry out of being invisible." 
Perhaps it is also possible to make literary criticism out of the visi­
bility of stigma and symbol without losing sight of the mystery that 
remains undefined. The concept of markedness obscures as well as 
reveals, for the marked individual, for his community, and above 
all, for the reader who would be an interpreter of signs. 
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The Scarlet Letter: Social Stigma and Art 
The Scarlet Letter establishes marking as epistemology. As Haw-
thorne's Surveyor/narrator discovers the "rag of scarlet cloth" in 
"The Custom-House," then proceeds to write his romance, he dem­
onstrates how the process of noticing, or marking in the sense of 
observing, holds him to a "single idea or line of argument" and leads 
to an analysis of the letter's meaning that transcends its signifi­
cance either as artifact, when he finds it in the Custom-House, or as 
physical stigma, when he tells the tale he reads in the "sheets of 
foolscap." In order to tell the tale, the narrator must transcend his 
focus on the letter, which is tangible for him in "The Custom-
House," so that in a sense, The Scarlet Letter, by its very existence, 
attests to both the process and the effects of marking. 
In the analysis that follows, I interpret Hawthorne's fictional 
community with this process in mind. The Surveyor/narrator in 
"The Custom-House" establishes the hermeneutics by which the 
reader must come to terms with the romance. To mark Hester 
Prynne the way the Boston community does is to define her, or to 
attempt to do so. Her stigma defines the boundaries within which 
she must confine her individuality. Therefore Hester expresses the 
hidden conflicts and internal contradictions of Puritan behavior. 
However, when she dresses Pearl in the colors of her stigma, she 
reveals her own ability to resolve those conflicts. For Hester's isola­
tion is social. Within the confines of her proscriptions, she finds 
personal strength and spiritual peace that transcend the material 
and social exigencies of her life. Dimmesdale, by contrast, expresses 
the metaphysical insecurity of his community. What I will describe, 
using a term from sociology, as Dimmesdale's social "discreditabil­
ity" is akin to the religious pressure he feels to determine whether 
or not he is among "the Elect." His feelings of social discreditability 
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create the spiritual uneasiness of someone predestined to be in­
cluded with "the Damned." 
In creating an analogy between Dimmesdale's inner conflict and 
the external conflict Hester Prynne feels as she confronts the Boston 
community, Hawthorne reveals the transformation by which 
metaphysical insecurities can manifest themselves as social actions. 
The "law" Hester and Dimmesdale broke threatens the very identity 
of their community. Further, as I will show, in his creation of Chil­
lingworth, Hawthorne attempts to answer the question of the ar-
tist's role in a community whose identity is informed by the para­
doxical reliance on the revealed meaning of marks and signs in the 
face of uncertainty, their absolute mortal inability to know what 
has been preordained. 
Hawthorne has found a symbol that contains his search in the 
romance much as Hester's stigma defines the parameters of her 
existence in the community. Hawthorne engages in a search if not 
for what is peculiarly American about the Puritan community, then 
at least for what insights an understanding of that community can 
provide. His narrator focuses on the scarlet letter as both a physical 
object and a tangible symbol in the construction of his allegory until 
its symbolic meaning is transcended, the allegory falls away, and 
the reader, like Hester, Dimmesdale, Chillingworth, the Puritan 
community, and the narrator himself, is left with what Hawthorne's 
penultimate chapter titles "the revelation" of the scarlet letter. 
Hawthorne derives his aesthetic resolution by transcending the so­
cial, religious, and political themes in his fiction. Analogously, our 
own analysis of The Scarlet Letter explores that process by which 
marking leads to clearer knowledge of who and what we are. 
I 
Hawthorne chooses to introduce The Scarlet Letter with an essay 
that seems to be but indirectly linked with the tale that follows.1 He 
states a twofold intention: to establish his authority as editor for the 
romance; and to give a "faint representation" of his mode of life as a 
Surveyor of the Customs.2 "The Custom-House" itself must be read 
in light of the romance it accompanies, just as, in turn, the introduc­
tory essay illuminates some of Hawthorne's narrator's concerns in 
The Scarlet Letter. 
In "The Custom-House," Hawthorne relates finding a "rag of scar­
let cloth," which, "on careful examination, assumed the shape of a 
letter. It was the capital letter A." He described his initial curiosity: 
"My eyes fastened themselves upon the old scarlet letter and would 
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not be turned aside. Certainly, there was some deep meaning in it, 
most worthy of interpretation, and which, as it were, streamed forth 
from the mystic symbol, subtly communicating itself to my sen­
sibilities, but evading the analysis of my mind" (p. 31). In prefacing 
the novel with "The Custom-House" essay, Hawthorne chooses to 
establish the occasion of finding the letter as the point of inception of 
the tale.3 More is at stake here than the writer's history of the 
genesis of his work. Indeed, "The Custom-House" is actually part of 
the novel; The Scarlet Letter opens with Hawthorne's somewhat 
prurient gaze: "My eyes . . . would not be turned aside." We must 
regard the essay not as autobiography but rather as Hawthorne's 
conscious fabrication of an introduction to his romance. 
Hawthorne explicitly states in the opening pages that his nar­
rator stands at some distance from himself, and that his narrator's 
concerns will govern the structure of The Scarlet Letter. He claims 
that there are limits in the extent to which "an author, methinks, 
may be autobiographical, without violating either the reader's 
rights or his own" (p. 4). Such limits do not approach full autobiog­
raphical disclosure. "The truth seems to be, however, that, when he 
casts his leaves forth upon the wind, the author addresses, not the 
many who will fling aside his volume, or never take it up, but the 
few who will understand him, better than most of his schoolmates 
and lifemates" (p. 3). Hawthorne's limited narrator thus confronts 
one of the predominant concerns of the characters in the tales—who 
yearn for fellowship, yet fear that others will penetrate too far into 
their mystery. The Unpardonable Sin for the converts in "Young 
Goodman Brown" is to become "more conscious of the secret guilt of 
others, both in deed and thought, than they could now be of their 
own."4 Hawthorne's narrator wants "to find out the divided segment 
of the writer's own nature, and complete his circle of existence by 
bringing him into communion with it"; at the same time, he wants 
to position a veil, to create limits of autobiography, that will serve to 
prevent "violation" of "the reader's rights and his own." 
The narrator's attempts recall another of Hawthorne's characters, 
Mr. Hooper in "The Minister's Black Veil." In this tale, the "simple 
black veil, such as any woman might wear on her bonnet," allows 
the minister to change himself into something awful, only by hiding 
his face.5 The artificial physical boundary the minister creates be­
tween himself and the people around him he intends as a symbol of 
the invisible separation that exists between them already. But it 
isolates him completely, separates him further from community, 
even though, on his deathbed, he consoles himself by viewing "on 
every visage a Black Veil."6 Certainly the narrator of "The Cus­
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torn-House" does not intend such separation as makes of the minis­
ter a monster. And yet, without exploring the complexities of isola­
tion that his arbitrary limits impose, he chooses, like the minister, 
to set up a tangible, physical emblem between himself and the nar­
rative he is about to relate.7 
Hawthorne begins his exploration of the relationship between the 
townspeople and the mark with which they brand Hester by consid­
ering the corresponding relationship of narrator to symbol in "The 
Custom-House."8 More than Hawthorne's other novels, The Scarlet 
Letter approaches the problems of the working artist in terms of the 
physical mark or sign that both provides him with an analogical 
focus for his isolation and enforces that isolation. Studying the pro­
gression of the narrator's concerns in "The Custom-House" prepares 
the reader for social complications of marking that the ensuing nar­
rative then considers.9 
Up to the moment in which he finds the letter, the narrator de­
scribes the gourmandise of the Custom-House officers. The 
Custom-House is the place for tales—not of shipwrecks or the 
world's wonders, but of the morning's breakfast, or tomorrow's din­
ner. The old Inspector likes to recount his past indulgences: "I have 
heard him smack his lips over dinners, every guest at which, except 
himself, had long been food for worms" (p. 19). He is fascinated with 
their fecundity in the face of old age and decay, and describes the 
Collector as a man "yet capable of flinging off his infirmities like a 
sick man's gown . . . and starting up once more a warrior" (p. 21). 
The General has a fondness for the "sight and fragrance of flowers," 
and the narrator writes: 'The heat that had formerly pervaded his 
nature, and which was not yet extinct, was never of the kind that 
flashes and flickers in a blaze, but, rather, a deep, red glow, as of 
iron in a furnace" (p. 21). 
He associates gourmandise with living a full life—for the Inspec­
tor has enjoyed much roast meat, twenty children, and three 
wives—but he finds that it also may be achieved during the indo­
lence of sinecure. This pastoral view of sinecure initially leads 
Hawthorne's narrator to accept the job as Surveyor. Thus he com­
ments, early in the essay, on the "strange, indolent, unjoyous at­
tachment for my native town, that brought me to fill a place in 
Uncle Sam's brick edifice" (p. 12), and on the figure of the federal 
eagle, whose wing seems at the beginning of his tenure to shelter 
and protect, although her claws become her more significant attri­
butes after he is fired. Further explaining his willingness to return to 
Salem, the narrator, in another reference to sustenance and tangi­
bility, claims that "even the old Inspector was desirable, as a change 
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of diet, to a man who had known Alcott" or Brook Farm, Emerson, 
Ellery Channing, Thoreau, Hillard, or Longfellow (p. 25). His expo­
sure to the transcendentalists has led him to "relish" more contact 
with the material world, and eating becomes the analogue for this 
contact that suits him best in the essay. 
The narrator's fondness for the excessive sensuality of these old 
men, before he realizes at the end of the essay that their indolence is 
also a form of impotence, yields to his description of his own experi­
ence of physical sensation on finding the "rag of scarlet cloth." While 
he meditates, fascinated, on the origins and meaning of the scarlet 
letter, he "happens" to place it on his own breast. "It seemed to 
me,—the reader may smile, but must not doubt my word,—it 
seemed to me, then, that I experienced a sensation not altogether 
physical, yet almost so, as of burning heat; and as if the letter were 
not of red cloth, but red-hot iron. I shuddered, and involuntarily let 
it fall upon the floor" (p. 32). In this moment, the narrator comes 
closest in the essay to experiencing, himself, the sensuality of the 
Inspector or the furnace glow of the Collector's red "heat." In a turn 
of his own analogy, he emphasizes for the reader the significance of 
his experience by musing on what the Weighers and Gaugers must 
have thought of his hours spent pacing the floor, in contemplation of 
the letter. "They probably fancied that my sole object—and, indeed, 
the sole object for which a sane man could ever put himself into 
voluntary motion—was, to get an appetite for dinner" (p. 32). Yet he 
neither increases his appetite nor comes to terms with the letter. 
"My imagination was a tarnished mirror" (p. 34). Thus he realizes 
that as long as he stays in the Custom House, he won't be able to 
write.10 
His lengthy descriptions of gourmandise and sensuality now serve 
to emphasize the narrator's isolation, when he finds himself unable 
to indulge in it. "It was a folly, with the materiality of this daily life 
pressing so intrusively upon me, to attempt to fling myself back into 
another age; or to insist on creating the semblance of a world out of 
airy matter, when, at every moment, the impalpable beauty of my 
soap-bubble was broken by the rude contact of some actual circum­
stance" (p. 37). In retrospect he realizes that "the fault was mine. 
The page of life that was spread out before me seemed dull and 
commonplace, only because I had not fathomed its deeper import" (p. 
37). But whether or not at some future date the fragments he re­
members will "turn to gold upon the page," "I had ceased to be a 
writer of tolerably poor tales and essays, and had become a tolerably 
good Surveyor of the Customs. That was all" (pp. 37-38). Thus, 
when he is politically "guillotined," as he terms it, he likens the 
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experience to that of a man who wants to commit suicide and, before 
he has the chance, is timely murdered. 
In order to come to terms with the physical world, he has to re­
move himself from it, to spiritualize his burden, to make of his 
experience "a bright transparency," and not end up, like the old 
Inspector, making "the dinner-hour the nucleus of the day" (p. 40). 
His "decapitation" serves as his withdrawal from the world of physi­
cal sensations so that he states, "Henceforth it ceases to be a reality 
of my life. I am a citizen of somewhere else" (p. 44). Yet in ending he 
contrasts his own calmness throughout the procedure with the 
"blood thirstiness that is developed in the hour of triumph" for the 
victors. "There are few uglier traits of human nature than this ten­
dency . .  . to grow cruel, merely because they possessed the power of 
inflicting harm" (pp. 40-41). 
II 
With such an introduction, in which gourmandise becomes blood 
thirst, in which the eagle's wing becomes the blade of the guillotine, 
and for which the physical, tangible rag of scarlet cloth becomes 
both the vehicle of sensation and the emblem of separation and 
literary inadequacy, it is not surprising that the mark or brand in 
The Scarlet Letter becomes both a pathway to understanding (bring­
ing the narrator into communication with his own divided segment, 
as it similarly acts to unite the townspeople) and a mark of separa­
tion not unlike the Minister's Black Veil. Thus the place to begin a 
discussion of the romance is its title and the narrator's initial explo­
ration of the significance of the scarlet letter. 
Titles are markings, signposts; and they can also be misleading. 
In my high school English class, we equated the scarlet letter with 
what it "stood for"—adultery—and read Hawthorne completely as a 
moral road sign. We took our places as spectators among the Puritan 
community and either did not notice (or it was not "pointed out" to 
us) that the narrator's own concerns in the novel move quite beyond 
the literal and allegorical meaning the scarlet letter has for the 
townspeople. 
The critical equivalent to this "moral road sign" interpretation of 
The Scarlet Letter is to read the novel as a study of guilt and isola-
tion.11 Yet Hawthorne's narrator reveals in "The Custom-House" 
that what intrigues him about the letter he finds is its mystery, not 
an experience it referentially portrays. He discounts the actual sen­
sual moment he experienced and, throughout the romance, focuses 
on the inherent meaning of the letter.12 Hawthorne distinguishes 
between stigma and moral guilt; and he interprets the letter as an 
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external mark or brand rather than as a referential reflector. As A. 
N. Kaul writes, The Scarlet Letter "deals not with the sin of adultery 
but with the diverse repercussions on human relationships resulting 
from the consciousness of this sin."13 And thus, as Richard Chase 
points out, "the adultery which sets everything going happens be­
fore the book begins."14 From the imaginary moment of its concep­
tion in "The Custom-House," The Scarlet Letter is birthmarked. 
The romance opens with "a throng of bearded men" assembled in 
front of the prison door. As they wait, the reader is placed among 
them: we wait for something to emerge; it is clear that we are not 
permitted an interior view. The aesthetic distance this "waiting" 
produces allows the reader to share the narrator's ambivalence. We 
want to look, and yet we do not want to look too closely. The ambiva­
lence inherent in the narrator's stance resembles the prurient 
fetishism with which he fingered the cloth in "The Custom-House." 
There he allowed his mind to engage compensatorily in the mecha­
nism of reading the written history of the letter, which at first es­
caped his notice. In the narrative, the initial aesthetic distance pre­
vents both narrator and reader from engaging in those "burning" 
sensations that the tangible letter produced. 
The narrator also stands at a historical remove, further distanc­
ing the reader, and suggests an irony that recurs throughout. He 
states, "The founders of a new colony, whatever Utopia of human 
virtue and happiness they might originally project, have invariably 
recognized it among their earliest practical necessities to allot a 
portion of the virgin soil as a cemetery, and another portion as the 
site of a prison" (p. 47).15 The disjunction between "human virtue 
and happiness" and "practical necessity" sets up a paradox in the 
opening chapters, when the magistrates demand that Hester confess 
the identity of her accomplice. As Michael Davitt Bell writes, "This 
contradiction between the supposed advocacy of liberty and the ac­
tual denial of it produced the central tension that informs the histor­
ical romance of New England."16 The demands the magistrates 
make on Hester deny her liberty. The stigma they force upon her 
thus expresses the paradox Hawthorne presents to the reader, and 
by means of aesthetic and historical distance throughout the open­
ing scene, the narrator views the crowd while the crowd itself fo­
cuses on the scarlet letter. The reader stands back with the narrator, 
viewing the letter as a mark, not of moral transgression, but rather 
of community reaction. From the beginning, then, the novel studies 
the social effects of marking—how it affects the victim, Hester; and 
how the accusers and observers, the governors and townspeople, 
differently interpret it.17 Hawthorne examines the multitude of per­
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spectives a reader may adopt towards his narrator, his major 
characters, and his predominant symbol.18 
The goodwives gathered around the scaffold interpret the mark as 
both tangible and symbolic punishment, and they generally agree 
that it is not severe enough. One woman states, '"At the very least, 
they should have put the brand of a hot iron on Hester Prynne's 
forehead . . . little will she care what they put on the bodice of her 
gown!'" A second replies, '"let her cover the mark as she will, the 
pang of it will be always in her heart.'" And a third, described as the 
"ugliest as well as the most pitiless of these self-constituted judges," 
states, "'What do we talk of marks and brands, whether on the 
bodice of her gown, or the flesh of her forehead? . . . This woman 
has brought shame upon us all, and ought to die!'" (p. 51). The town 
beadle, who "represented in his aspect the whole dismal severity of 
the Puritanic code of law" (p. 52), states that "iniquity is dragged out 
into the sunshine" (p. 54) when Hester emerges from her prison. As 
the members of the crowd express their understanding of the brand, 
it is evident that they share their interpretation of the stigma as a 
punishment that involves public spectacle. 
The earlier work that most clearly anticipates Hawthorne's theme 
of marking as a stigma that brings punishment and disgrace to the 
bearer is "The Birthmark," the first tale in Mosses. In this story, 
Aylmer the alchemist marries a woman whose beauty is marred 
only by a small birthmark on her face, in the imprint of a tiny hand. 
Aylmer's attitude towards the mark destroys by degrees his recogni­
tion of Georgiana's beauty—and he determines to erase it from her 
face. '"No, dearest Georgiana, you came so nearly perfect from the 
hand of Nature that this slightest possible defect, which we hesitate 
whether to term a defect or a beauty, shocks me, as being the visible 
mark of earthly imperfection.'"19 The mark, making visible that 
imperfection, becomes a mark of shame. As the narrator comments, 
"It was the fatal flaw of humanity which Nature, in one shape or 
another, stamps ineffaceably on all her productions, either to imply 
that they are temporary and finite, or that their perfection must be 
wrought by toil and pain."20 
Unlike the Boston townspeople, the marking agents for Hester's 
brand, Aylmer cannot claim responsibility for the birthmark, but 
his inability to live with it suggests more about his own "earthly 
imperfection" than Georgiana's. "Yet, had Aylmer reached a pro­
founder wisdom, he need not thus have flung away the happiness 
which would have woven his mortal life of the selfsame texture with 
the celestial. The momentary circumstance was too strong for him; 
he failed to look beyond the shadowy scope of time, and, living once 
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for all in eternity, to find the perfect future in the present."21 
Aylmer invests the mark with its significance, thus transforming an 
ordinary birth defect into a metaphysical allegory. At the same 
time, his attempt to erase the mark symbolizes his "strong and 
eager aspiration towards the infinite."22 In The Scarlet Letter, the 
same eagerness leads the townspeople to disregard Hester as a sym­
bol of human imperfection and to view her instead as the actual 
flaw. She possesses their "birthmark," which must be revealed, in 
an attempt to erase it in themselves.23 
When Hester emerges from the prison, the narrator extends the 
range of meaning her brand connotes. Her face, "besides being beau­
tiful from regularity of feature and richness of complexion, had the 
impressive ness belonging to a marked brow and deep black eyes" (p. 
53). In this context, the word "marked" associates Hester's forehead 
with the brow of Cain; and biblically marked, the feature denotes 
either a curse or a blessing. At the same time, the scarlet letter is 
magical or mythological. "It had the effect of a spell, taking her out 
of the ordinary relations with humanity, and inclosing her in a 
sphere by herself (p. 54). 
The secular, theological, and mythological overtones of the mark 
become intertwined for the Puritans, "a people amongst whom reli­
gion and law were almost identical" (p. 50).24 Thus Hester assumes a 
saintliness in spite of her criminality and the reader discovers that 
"those who had before known her, and had expected to behold her 
dimmed and obscured by a disastrous cloud, were astonished, and 
even startled, to perceive how her beauty shone out, and made a 
halo of the misfortune and ignominy in which she was enveloped." 
Furthermore, "to a sensitive observer, there was something exquis­
itely painful in it" (p. 53). The narrator sympathizes with this pain: 
"There can be no outrage, methinks, against our common nature, 
. .  . no outrage more flagrant than to forbid the culprit to hide his 
face for shame; as it was the essence of this punishment to do" (p. 
55). He views this enforced revelation of shame as an outrage be­
cause it violates an individual's privacy; it probes too deeply into the 
soul; and it encourages morbid curiosity in the spectators. 
In spite of her social exclusion, Hester remains an object of curios­
ity; the invasion of her privacy is accompanied by a barrier to inti­
macy. The townspeople view her mark as punishment; the gover­
nors, as a witness to divine revelation; the narrator, as an object of 
manifest outrage; and Hawthorne and his reader, as a literal mask 
that obscures rather than reveals, a mystery that contains the 
paradox of "exquisite pain." And in addition to her social stigma, 
Hester also bears the burden of the novel's symbolism. "Giving up 
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her individuality, she would become the general symbol at which 
the preacher and moralist might point, and in which they might 
vivify and embody their images of woman's frailty and sinful pas­
sion" (p. 79). Thus the narrator further marks Hester, speculating 
on her position as a social outcast and ignoring her personal history 
and character.25 
Ill 
By remaining within the geographical limits of the Puritan set­
tlement when her punishment does not force her to do so, Hester 
expresses "a fatality, a feeling so irresistible and inevitable that it 
has the force of doom, which almost invariably compels human be­
ings to linger around and haunt, ghostlike, the spot where some 
great and marked event has given the color to their lifetime; and 
still more irresistibly, the darker the tinge that saddens it" (pp. 
79-80). The brand that "marked" Hester's future, "has given the 
color" to her life, also gives it significance and meaning. But the 
narrator chooses to explore Dimmesdale, instead of Hester, in order 
to discover this meaning.26 At the same time, he avoids labeling the 
relationship that exists between the two characters. He states that 
Hester felt compelled to remain near someone "with whom she 
deemed herself connected in a union, that, unrecognized on earth, 
would bring them together before the bar of final judgment" (p. 80), 
and asks, "Had Hester sinned alone?" (p. 86), yet he suspends an 
immediate answer to the question. The suspense that he creates 
enables him to explore the relationship between Hester and Dim­
mesdale, and between private behavior and social sin, the com­
plexities of which their past history as adulterers would not explain. 
To narrowly define their relationship in the same way that the 
townspeople mark Hester would obscure the deeper and more 
abstract symmetry that emerges between their respective social 
situations. Hester and Dimmesdale are linked for Hawthorne, and 
both.the reader's and the narrator's understanding of one character 
depends on understanding both. The complementary contrast be­
tween Hester's mark and Dimmesdale's "unmarked" involvement in 
the crime they commit against society, between Hester's externali­
zation of her stigma and Dimmesdale's internalization of it, between 
public and private guilt, provides the novel with its dialectic and 
captures Hawthorne's imagination. 
In Stigma Erving Goffman reviews the classical situation of the 
Greek scapegoat and provides a model of social exclusion that 
clarifies Hawthorne's dialectic. In modern society, according to 
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Goffman, stigma refers to the "situation of the individual who is 
disqualified from full social acceptance."27 His social "crime" may be 
only an undesirable differentness, a departure from the "normal" 
expectation. Goffman does not directly comment on the branding 
inherent in Puritan punishment, but his analysis clearly defines the 
motivations behind such action. "The term stigma and its synonyms 
conceal a double perspective: does the stigmatized individual as­
sume his differentness is known about already or is evident on the 
spot, or does he assume it is neither known about by those present 
nor immediately perceivable by them? In the first case one deals 
with the plight of the discredited, in the second with that of the 
discreditable."2* In Goffman's terms, Hester Prynne has already 
been discredited, whereas Dimmesdale is only potentially discredit­
able. As The Scarlet Letter indicates, it is easier for an individual to 
manage being discredited, where the stigma is immediately visible 
to all members of the community, than with the constant possibility 
of becoming discredited—the state of being discreditable, Dimmes-
dale's state. Hester must learn to live with her punishment, but 
Dimmesdale cannot escape constantly redefining the crime and at­
tempting to punish himself.29 
We may compare Goffman's description of the physically stig­
matized individual with Hawthorne's portrait of Hester. The nar­
rator writes, "it now and then appeared to Hester.. . that the scarlet 
letter had endowed her with a new sense. She shuddered to believe, 
yet could not help believing, that it gave her a sympathetic knowl­
edge of the hidden sin in other hearts. She was thus terror-stricken 
by the revelations that were thus made" (p. 86). Further, "in all her 
miserable experience, there was nothing else so awful and so loath­
some as this sense" (pp. 86-87). Goffman writes, "We tend to impute 
a wide range of imperfections on the basis of the original one, and at 
the same time to impute some desirable but undesired attributes, 
often of a supernatural cast, such as 'sixth sense,' or 'understand-
ing.'"30 That Hawthorne's narrator should impute to Hester such a 
"new sense" suggests the extent to which the Puritans re-create 
Hester when they label her. She resembles the converts in "Young 
Goodman Brown," who, because of the "sympathy" of their "human 
hearts for sin," experience a new ability to perceive the evils of 
others.31 But unlike Goodman Brown, who, without accepting final 
conversion, is nevertheless "turned away" from Faith by the meet­
ing in the forest, Hester avoids the gloom of her occasional un­
derstanding. "Be it acccepted as a proof that all was not corrupt in 
this poor victim of her own frailty, and man's hard law, that Hester 
Prynne yet struggled to believe that no fellow mortal was guilty like 
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herself (p. 87). Hester has been given the power to tell her accusers 
who they are, yet she denies this power.32 
Conversely, Dimmesdale, turning inward as a result of Hester's 
branding, "longed to speak out, from his own pulpit, at the full 
height of his voice, and tell the people who he was" (p. 143). His 
tendency, "more than once," is to discredit himself fully before his 
congregation, to say to them, '"I, your pastor, whom you so rever­
ence and trust, am utterly a pollution and a lie!'" (p. 143). He thinks, 
like the Reverend Hooper in "The Minister's Black Veil," that he 
cannot tell them what he is without telling them what they are; and 
his "vague confessions" simply extend the compassion and admira­
tion he receives from his listeners. Therefore, the narrator writes, 
"above all things else, he loathed his miserable self (p. 144). 
The effect of keeping his secret hidden, of internalizing his own 
guilt, removes Dimmesdale from the tangible world. He keeps 
nightly vigils, during which "visions seemed to flit before him," and 
in spite of the fact that Dimmesdale knows they are not tangible, yet 
"they were, in one sense, the truest and most substantial things 
which the poor minister now dealt with" (p. 145). The effect of this 
hypocrisy, as the narrator terms it, is to deprive his reality of its 
substance. Because Dimmesdale contains within himself, or thinks 
he does, the power to ease his chronic discreditability by public 
confession, as he continually fails to do so, he creates a barrier 
between himself and reality.33 That reality has public and social 
dimensions that he cannot face; his only reality becomes a self-
created one. "To the untrue man, the whole universe is false,—it is 
impalpable,—it shrinks to nothing within his grasp. And he him­
self, in so far as he shows himself in a false light, becomes a shadow, 
or, indeed, ceases to exist. The only truth that continued to give Mr. 
Dimmesdale a real existence on this earth, was the anguish in his 
inmost soul, and the undissembled expression of it in his aspect" (pp. 
145-46). In metaphysical terms, Dimmesdale tries to define his own 
scarlet letter, to create his own meaning, in effect to create his own 
world, and places even Hester at a distance; no other human being 
exists in the world Dimmesdale creates for himself, and thus there 
are no elements in it of compassion, objectivity, or absolution.34 
The inherent contradiction in his attempt results from the effects 
of internalizing a symbol that possesses only public and social sig­
nificance. The scarlet letter only operates as a stigma when it may 
be seen. The letter on her breast, visible and public, focuses the 
effect of Hester's stigma; she does not define it, but rather, it defines 
her. This visual manifestation of her separateness has the effect of 
freeing Hester from her initial guilt. Thus, at the end of seven years, 
the governors of the town recommend her letter be removed, and she 
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herself feels liberated from it during her encounter with Dimmes­
dale in the forest—she casts it aside into the bushes. 
Ironically, Dimmesdale's own discreditability, as time passes, be­
comes a permanent barrier between himself and the community. 
Discreditability contains within itself the seeds of self-perpetuation. 
It is clear that such is the case from the opening of the novel, for the 
townspeople attribute mystery as well as meaning to the scarlet 
letter—Hester wears a blatant token of her secret actions (her adul­
tery) in part because she has been secretive (refusing to reveal the 
father of her child). Hester's punishment must be as manifest as 
possible because it then reduces the Puritans' awareness of mystery. 
Assigning a label attaches significance to an action or a tendency 
in a character that has previously escaped naming or notice. For the 
Puritans, assigning the label of the scarlet letter suggests their 
necessity to be able to equate content with form, thereby controlling 
content. The name "adultery" becomes a container for those 
passions in Hester that led to her initial encounter with Dimmes­
dale. It becomes equally a form that contains, controls, those same 
passions in the Puritans themselves. Just as Hester lives peacefully 
with her stigma because it is visible, so the Puritans manage hidden 
and formless emotions by externalizing them in a sign. Assigning a 
label does more than control meaning, however; it also obscures it. 
The act of externalization reflects the Puritan refusal to recognize.35 
Hester unconsciously exploits this refusal when she dresses 
Pearl—the child of her wildness—in the costume of her stigma, red 
cloth trimmed with gold thread.36 Thus the Puritan view of the 
human condition contains a central paradox, that signifying should 
obscure significance. 
The scaffold itself, for Hester in the novel's opening scene, and for 
Dimmesdale later, symbolizes the revelation of mystery. Dimmes­
dale in particular associates the physical structure of the scaffold 
with the public recognition that will ease his "ugly" evenings of 
self-torture and substanceless visions. He thus climbs the scaffold on 
which Hester stood seven years previously because "there might be 
a moment's peace in it." His vigil there fails to bring him peace 
because "the town was all asleep. There was no peril of discovery" (p. 
147). 
It is not surprising that Dimmesdale might think such a vigil 
would ease his mind, given the substanceless state of the mental 
world he has constructed for himself. Thus, for a moment, it is as if 
he exposes the whole world, the whole of his world, to his secret: 
And thus, while standing on the scaffold, in this vain show of expia­
tion, Mr. Dimmesdale was overcome with a great horror of mind, as if 
the universe were gazing at a scarlet token on his naked breast, right 
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over his heart... . Without any effort of his will, or power to restrain 
himself, he shrieked aloud; an outcry that went pealing through the 
night, and was beaten back from one house to another, and reverber­
ated from the hills in the background. . .  . 
"It is done!" muttered the minister, covering his face with his hands. 
"The whole world will awake, and hurry forth, andfind me here!" 
But it was not so. (p. 148)37 
Dimmesdale continues to stand on the scaffold while another cler­
gyman passes by. Again, for a moment, Dimmesdale feels himself 
discovered. He imagines himself remaining in his place at dawn, 
when the whole world would find him. Only Hester and Pearl ap­
pear, however, and join him on the scaffold at his request. When he 
takes Hester's hand, "there came what seemed a tumultuous rush of 
new life, other life than his own, pouring like a torrent into his 
heart" (p. 153). Hester revitalizes Dimmesdale, she supports him 
momentarily, yet this support only confirms his isolation. "With the 
new energy of the moment, all the dread of public exposure, that had 
so long been the anguish of his life, had returned to him" (p. 153). 
By cutting himself off from the possibility of publicly accepting his 
own complicity in Hester's crime, Dimmesdale fails to share the 
control the townspeople achieve by their insistence on revealed 
meaning. This control creates a social structure that supports the 
individuals within it.38 By transforming truth into "the veriest 
falsehood," Dimmesdale deprives himself of the moral and psycho­
logical support inherent in the Puritan system. "In no state of soci­
ety would he have been what is called a man of liberal views; it 
would always be essential to his peace to feel the pressure of a faith 
about him, supporting, while it confined him within his iron 
framework" (p. 123). He does not discover the full force and extent of 
society's conventions until he has broken them, then set himself 
apart from that society by hiding his transgressions. In this way he 
finds himself without support, since the very attempt of his 
parishioners to give him aid in the form of a physician becomes the 
external force that contributes to his deterioration. 
Even Hester relies on this support. The narrator states when Hes­
ter emerges from her confinement that her "first unattended 
footsteps from the threshold of her prison" are possibly more tortur­
ous than the agony of public spectacle because "the very law that 
condemned her—a giant of stern features, but with vigor to support, 
as well as to annihilate, in his iron arm—had held her up, through 
the terrible ordeal of her ignominy" (p. 78). Only a strong individual 
can survive when the support is gone; and thus, although Hester 
falters in her first steps from the prison, she survives. Hester's 
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strength even in her excommunication derives partly from the 
community, for by remaining she serves a social function. She 
achieves an uncomfortable place in the social structure but a place 
nevertheless. The meaning of her mark is the social role she 
plays—that of the moral outcast.39 
Dimmesdale continues to derive his sustenance from Hester even 
at his death. In the last scaffold scene, he makes his public confes­
sion: "With a convulsive motion, he tore away the ministerial band 
from before his breast. It was revealed! But it were irreverent to 
describe that revelation. For an instant the gaze of the horror-
stricken multitude was concentrated on the ghastly miracle; while 
the minister stood with a flush of triumph in his face, as one who, in 
the crisis of acutest pain, had won a victory." But he cannot sustain, 
alone, his moment of triumph. "Then, down he sank upon the scaf­
fold! Hester partly raised him, and supported his head against her 
bosom." She asks him, '"Shall we not meet again?'" His last words 
mock her question. He tells her, "'Hush,'" reminds her of'"the law 
we broke,'" and as he continues, his attention turns back again, 
finally, on himself: '"God knows; and He is merciful! He hath proved 
his mercy, most of all, in my afflictions. By giving me this burning 
torture to bear upon my breast! By sending yonder dark and terrible 
old man, to keep the torture always at red-heat! By bringing me 
hither, to die this death of triumphant ignominy before the people! 
Had either of these agonies been wanting, / had been lost forever! 
Praised be his name! His will be done! Farewell!'" (pp. 255-57, my 
italics). 
The allegorical tone of the revelation of the letter in the third 
scaffold scene pushes the reader towards a simplistic interpretation 
of Dimmesdale's "salvation" or "crucifixion." When Dimmesdale 
calls God's witness to his own sins and forgives his enemy (Chil­
lingworth), he intensifies the crucifixion atmosphere of the scene, 
but his last words dispel it. And Hawthorne refuses, in his last 
chapter, to definitively comment on Dimmesdale's death. The ap­
pearance of allegory, on the contrary, adds to the complexities of 
Hawthorne's tale; it provides even more of a mask on the mystery by 
reinforcing that mask with the very elements of social structure his 
novel tries to penetrate; Dimmesdale publicly confesses his sin be­
fore a world that does not distinguish between law and religion, and 
Hawthorne does not clarify whether the crime the minister has 
committed is social or spiritual. 
In the tales, the allegory often seems clearer. Perhaps this is be­
cause the alignment of narrative sympathies is not as complex as it 
becomes in The Scarlet Letter. As a type of the self-infested socially 
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diseased character, Roderick Elliston seems clearly a Dimmesdale 
figure. In "Egotism; Or, The Bosom Serpent," Hawthorne writes, 
All persons chronically diseased are egotists, whether the disease be 
of the mind or body; whether it be sin, sorrow, or merely the more 
tolerable calamity of some endless pain, or mischief among the cords 
of mortal life. Such individuals are made acutely conscious of a self, by 
the torture in which it dwells. Self, therefore, grows to be so promi­
nent an object with them that they cannot but present it to the face of 
every casual passer-by. There is a pleasure—perhaps the greatest of 
which the sufferer is susceptible—in displaying the wasted or ulcer­
ated limb, or the cancer in the breast; and the fouler the crime, with so 
much the more difficulty does the perpetrator prevent it from thrust­
ing up its snake-like head to frighten the world; for it is that cancer, or 
that crime, which constitutes their respective individuality.40 
Elliston has a clearer knowledge of the path to his own salvation 
than Dimmesdale does. Whereas Dimmesdale associates religious 
confession with the tie that will heal his humanity, Elliston tells 
Herkimer, the friend, when he asks whether there exists a remedy 
for this "loathsome evil," "'Yes, but an impossible one. . . . Could I 
for one instant forget myself, the serpent might not abide within me. 
It is my diseased self-contemplation that has engendered and 
nourished him.'"41 Elliston's "salvation" comes from his wife 
Rosina, who in a moment of "hope and unselfish love," tells him to 
forget himself, and as he does so, the "bosom serpent" can be heard 
moving off through the grass. The ending of The Scarlet Letter con­
trasts decidedly with the ending of the tale, for although Dimmes­
dale succeeds momentarily in confessing his stigma, which had been 
the cure he prescribed for himself, he does so in such a way as to 
compromise the moment by claiming God's grace. Thus, he rejects 
the only real aid that could "save" him in this moment—if we read it 
in the light of "Egotism"—to respond to Hester's implicit plea for 
Dimmesdale to forget himself.42 
IV 
The end of the novel leaves uncertain more than Dimmesdale's 
salvation. The nature of his crime and the extent of his own complic­
ity in it also remain ambiguous. To understand this uncertain am­
biguity, we may again examine Hawthorne's introductory essay to 
The Scarlet Letter. In "The Custom-House," the narrator is expelled 
from his job as Surveyor of the Customs as a matter of political 
reform. His description of this reform is curious in light of Dimmes-
dale's attempt to turn the scaffold—the structure of public 
punishment—into a cross. He talks about the "political 
guillotine"—also a structure of punishment—that has "decapi­
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tated" the Surveyor in him. Whatever basis there may be for the 
narrator's "unceremonious ejectment" (and he suggests that he may 
have been lax in performing his duties, preferring to roam among 
mankind rather than confine himself to political activity), he im­
plies also that any breach of political faith would have been con­
strued with theological severity. Thus political activities become 
"narrow paths" from which he chooses to diverge, and by his expul­
sion, he earns "the crown of martyrdom." In addition, as I mentioned 
earlier, the narrator describes his release as the good fortune "of a 
person who should entertain an idea of committing suicide, and, 
altogether beyond his hopes, meet with the good hap to be mur­
dered" (p. 42); Dimmesdale shares the psychological lassitude 
characteristic of the narrator and finds himself fortunate enough to 
die after he has made his public confession. The narrator of "The 
Custom-House" is not altogether displeased "to observe the blood 
thirstiness that is developed in the hour of triumph" by his political 
enemies; and he observes, "The moment when a man's head drops off 
is seldom or never, I am inclined to think, precisely the most agree­
able of his life. Nevertheless, like the greater part of our misfor­
tunes, even so serious a contingency brings its remedy and consola­
tion with it" (p. 41). 
The narrator has been released from his own inability to write 
amid the sensual and material atmosphere of the Custom House. He 
comes to blame as well the political structure of which he is a part 
for the torpor of his own imagination. 
An effect—which I believe to be observable, more or less, in every 
individual who has occupied the position—is, that, while he leans on 
the mighty arm of the Republic, his own proper strength departs from 
him. He loses, in an extent proportioned to the weakness or force of his 
original nature, the capability of self-support. . . . The ejected officer 
. . . may return to himself, and become all that he has ever been. But 
this seldom happens. . . . Conscious of his own infirmity . .  . he forever 
afterwards looks wistfully about him in quest of support external to 
himself, (pp. 3&-39) 
Dimmesdale's need for the support of social and theological struc­
ture, and his inability to remove himself from it in order to test his 
own renewal, earn the sympathies of the ejected Surveyor/narrator, 
whose subsequent exploration of the meaning in the scarlet letter is 
tinged with his own experience. The death of Dimmesdale becomes a 
martyrdom; and Hawthorne chooses the allegory of romance, a mode 
that ironically obscures more than it reveals.43 
The Scarlet Letter, seen from the perspective of the narrator's 
concerns in "The Custom-House," thus becomes a consideration of 
the relationship between the individual and his sociopolitical and 
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sociotheological roles. The individual who possesses a freely ranging 
imagination that does not adhere to the "narrow paths" of political 
and theological vision may find himself ejected, like the Surveyor. 
Dimmesdale's weakness merits the sympathy of the narrator be­
cause of its universality but also because Dimmesdale's inability to 
accept his sensibility and his materiality resembles the narrator's 
own. For the narrator seeks, in the atmosphere of the Custom 
House, a change of diet from Emersonian spirituality; he finds it, 
momentarily, in the sensation the scarlet letter produces when he 
marks himself by placing the letter on his own breast; and he re­
turns to it, in imagination, during his meditations on the letter. 
His inability to revive it again, by purely metaphysical specula­
tion, leads him to sympathize with Hester's intellectual coldness. 
Hester's life turns "in a great measure, from passion and feeling, to 
thought" when she is marked out from the rest of her society. But 
"the world's law was no law for her mind," and thus she con­
templates an abstract and individual revolution: 
Men of the sword had overthrown nobles and kings. Men bolder than 
these had overthrown and rearranged—not actually, but within the 
sphere of theory, which was their most real abode—the whole system 
of ancient prejudice, wherewith was linked much of ancient principle. 
Hester Prynne imbibed this spirit. She assumed a freedom of specula­
tion, then common enough on the other side of the Atlantic, but which 
our forefathers, had they known it, would have held to be a deadlier 
crime than that stigmatized by the scarlet letter. .. . 
It is remarkable, that persons who speculate the most boldly often 
conform with the most perfect quietude to the external regulations of 
society. The thought suffices them, without investing itself in the 
flesh and blood of action, (p. 164) 
How do we understand a passage like this after reading "The 
Custom-House"? That the narrator wants to believe that the sphere 
of theory is the "real" world? That freedom of speculation incites 
more serious revolutions than "the flesh and blood of action"? Haw-
thorne's treatment of Dimmesdale, if these are simply rhetorical 
questions, may be read as a justification of his own methods. He 
permits the "thought" to suffice, without releasing the "flesh and 
blood" that, from time to time in The Scarlet Letter, suggests its 
presence just beneath the surface. Hawthorne thus controls the 
passions inherent in his subject and leads Henry James to remark: 
"Puritanism, in a word, is there, not only objectively as Hawthorne 
tried to place it there, but subjectively as well. Not, I mean, in his 
judgment of his characters in any harshness of prejudice, or in the 
obtrusion of a moral lesson; but in the very quality of his own vision, 
in the tone of the picture, in a certain coldness and exclusiveness of 
treatment."44 
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The manipulation of content in Hawthorne's recurrent medita­
tions on the form of the scarlet letter is most evident and most 
problematic in the narrator's treatment of Roger Chillingworth. 
Chillingworth is, as many critics have pointed out, a type of the 
artist figure in Hawthorne's studies of the artist in isolation.45 But 
Chillingworth has failed as an artist; his very creation negates the 
life he attempts to portray. Like Aylmer in "The Birthmark," Rap­
paccini in "Rappaccini's Daughter," Ethan Brand, and Owen War-
land in "The Artist of the Beautiful," Chillingworth commits the 
unpardonable sin of the artist who denies or destroys life by trans­
forming it into art. 
During Chillingworth's first interview with Hester, the narrator 
describes him as a person with special visual powers. 
"Believe me, Hester, there are few things,—whether in the outward 
world, or, to a certain depth, in the invisible sphere of thought,—few 
things hidden from the man who devotes himself earnestly and unre­
servedly to the solution of a mystery. Thou mayest cover up thy secret 
from the prying multitude. Thou mayest conceal it, too, from the 
ministers and magistrates, even as thou didst this day, when they 
sought to wrench the name out of thy heart, and give thee a partner on 
thy pedestal. But, as for me, I come to the inquest with other senses 
than they possess. I shall seek this man, as I have sought truth in 
books; as I have sought gold in alchemy. . . . Sooner or later, he must 
needs be mine!" (p. 75) 
Like the stigmatized Hester, Chillingworth possesses "other senses" 
than those of ordinary human perception. He can discern the non-
manifest invisible thoughts and secrets of men. Whereas Hester 
shuns this sense, however, Chillingworth cultivates it, and in the 
forest meeting between Hester and Dimmesdale at the end of the 
novel, Dimmesdale points the moral of Chillingworth's story: "That 
old man's revenge has been blacker than my sin. He has violated, in 
cold blood, the sanctity of a human heart'" (p. 195). By the align­
ment of the narrator's sympathies with Hester and Dimmesdale in 
this scene, Dimmesdale's judgment becomes the reader's as well. 
The curious and problematic aspect of this sympathy, however, is 
that the chapters that focus on Chillingworth before he assumes the 
role of daemonic agent in Dimmesdale's suffering treat him with 
some compassion. He is described, in effect, as a counterpart of the 
narrator himself. 
The ability to discern the nonmanifest, to determine the meanings 
hidden in visible signs, is the province of the good artist as well as 
the evil one, and such curiosity initially motivated the narrator's 
attraction to the "rag of scarlet cloth." When the reader meets Chil­
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lingworth for the second time (in chapter nine, "The Leech") it is 
clear that the narrator himself has suspended his judgment of the 
physician. Both good and evil tendencies are inherent in the nar-
rator's description. "His first entry on the scene, few people could 
tell whence, dropping down, as it were, out of the sky, or starting 
from the nether earth, had an aspect of mystery, which was easily 
heightened to the miraculous. He was now known to be a man of 
skill; it was observed that he gathered herbs,. . . like one acquainted 
with hidden virtues in what was valueless to common eyes" (p. 21). 
The source of his arrival, whether from the sky or "the nether 
earth," becomes a subject of mystery for the townspeople. Neverthe­
less, again, Chillingworth possesses special vision, and what he 
finds in his probing, which (the narrator elsewhere describes) Chil­
lingworth accompanies with "a cautious touch, like a treasure-
seeker in a dark cavern" (p. 124), are the "hidden virtues in what 
was valueless to common eyes." 
In addition, as part of his artist's power, Chillingworth possesses a 
clear vision of relationship between the manifest and the non-
manifest. During one discussion with Dimmesdale, late in their ac­
quaintance, Chillingworth describes some weeds he once found 
growing on the grave of a dead man. "'They grew out of his heart, 
and typify, it may be, some hideous secret that was buried with him, 
and which he had done better to confess during his lifetime. . . . 
These black weeds have sprung up out of a buried heart, to make 
manifest an unspoken crime'" (p. 131). Here Chillingworth resem­
bles the narrator of the Twice-Told Tales or Mosses in drawing his 
moral. The narrator of The Scarlet Letter also resembles Chil­
lingworth, in his own exploration of the relationship between man­
ifest and nonmanifest forms, between the complementary public and 
private effects of stigma on Hester and Dimmesdale. 
The relationship that develops between Dimmesdale and Chil­
lingworth provides the artist-physician with his eventual opportu­
nities for discerning the invisible—at the minister's expense. How­
ever, in its initial stages the friendship grows out of mutual respect 
and attraction. The narrator states, "This learned stranger was 
exemplary, as regarded at least the outward forms of a religious life, 
and, early after his arrival, had chosen for his spiritual guide the 
Reverend Mr. Dimmesdale" (p. 120). In spite of the narrator's com­
ment on the "outward forms," which qualifies the sincerity of Chil-
lingworth's spiritual life, the passage does not indicate that Chil­
lingworth, on his arrival, conceals evil intentions in his attraction 
for Dimmesdale. The narrator describes the relationship that devel­
ops between them as symbiotic—"these two men, so different in age, 
came gradually to spend much time together" (p. 123). 
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In spite of Dimmesdale's lack of what the narrator calls "liberal 
views," he enjoys Chillingworth's presence; they mutually attract 
each other. The passage that describes Dimmesdale's fascination is 
complex and intriguing from a critical point of view. After the nar­
rator suggests that Dimmesdale needs the "iron framework" of 
theology to insure his peace of mind, he adds: 
Not the less, however, though with a tremulous enjoyment, did he feel 
the occasional relief of looking at the universe through the medium of 
another kind of intellect than those with which he habitually held 
converse. It was as if a window were thrown open, admitting a freer 
atmosphere into the close and stifled study, where his life was wasting 
itself away, amid lamplight, or obstructed day-beams, and the musty 
fragrance, be it sensual or moral, that exhales from books. But the air 
was too fresh and chill to be long breathed, with comfort. So the 
minister, and the physician with him, withdrew again within the 
limits of what their church defined as orthodox, (pp. 123-24) 
The language of this unusual passage, "tremulous" and "freer atmo­
sphere," suggests that Dimmesdale finds a potential liberation from 
his guilt in the "occasional relief of his attachment to Chil­
lingworth. It is not necessary to use twentieth-century language to 
describe this freedom; Hawthorne's own phrase, "the flesh and blood 
of action," accurately describes the sensibility Dimmesdale briefly 
encounters. Chillingworth and Dimmesdale approach an intimacy 
in their frankness that threatens the minister; for Dimmesdale, the 
air is "too fresh and chill," possibly because it is removed from his 
accustomed confines, and he forces the withdrawal (in the narrator's 
own language) into the "orthodox." 
Hawthorne does not make the nature of this intimacy explicit, 
although the "withdrawal" of the friendship into conventional 
bounds is accompanied by Dimmesdale's and Chillingworth's joint 
move into a pious widow's house, the walls of which are decorated 
with a tapestry representing "the Scriptural story of David and 
Bathsheba, and Nathan the Prophet, in colors still unfaded, but 
which made the fair woman of the scene almost as grimly pictur­
esque as the woe-denouncing seer" (p. 126). The Biblical story of 
David and Bathsheba is one of adultery; Nathan the prophet chas­
tises David while he is king concerning his conduct in sending 
Uriah, Bathsheba's husband, off to the wars to be killed so that his 
adultery will not provoke God's wrath.46 Thus the tapestry is an 
emblem of the human situation in The Scarlet Letter. Implicit in 
Hawthorne's presentation of this detail, however, the only one of its 
kind in The Scarlet Letter, is also David's earlier history, his 
homosexual relationship with Jonathan. Dimmesdale's attraction 
for Chillingworth, if not homosexual in origin, at least contains the 
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seeds of a human intimacy that frightens him. Thus Chillingworth's 
initial admiration for Dimmesdale, when forced back within what 
the church defines as orthodox, becomes twisted, and he assumes the 
role, not of Jonathan, but of the "woe-denouncing seer." 
After The Scarlet Letter passes its concluding scaffold scene, 
Hawthorne's narrator once again takes up the subject of this rela­
tionship between Chillingworth and Dimmesdale. The narrator 
condemns Chillingworth's actions, saying that "This unhappy man 
had made the very principle of his life to consist in the pursuit and 
systematic exercise of revenge; and when, by its completest triumph 
and consummation, that evil principle was left with no further ma­
terial to support it,—when, in short, there was no more devil's work 
on earth for him to do, it only remained for the unhumanized mortal 
to betake himself whither his Master would find him tasks enough, 
and pay him his wages duly" (p. 260). After making this point, 
however, the narrator recommends mercy in the reader's judgment 
of Chillingworth: 
It is a curious subject of observation and inquiry, whether hatred and 
love be not the same thing at bottom. Each, in its utmost development, 
supposes a high degree of intimacy and heart-knowledge; each ren­
ders one individual dependent for the food of his affections and 
spiritual life upon another; each leaves the passionate lover, or the no 
less passionate hater, forlorn and desolate by the withdrawal of his 
object. Philosophically considered, therefore, the two passions seem 
essentially the same, except that one happens to be seen in a celestial 
radiance, and the other in a dusky and lurid glow. In the spiritual 
world, the old physician and the minister—mutual victims as they 
have been—may, unawares, have found their earthly stock of hatred 
and antipathy transmuted into golden love. (pp. 260-61, my italics) 
Once again the narrator uses the metaphor of sustenance, as in his 
earlier use of "flesh and blood," to describe the symbiosis of love and 
the parasitic thwarting of hatred. 
F. O. Matthiessen's discussion of Chillingworth is particularly 
relevant in this context. He writes, referring to the chapter "The 
Leech and His Patient," "The irony of the title lies in the fact that 
though the old physician knows Dimmesdale's bodily weakness to be 
due to a deeper sickness of the spirit, and though he is determined to 
discover its cause, he is actuated not by the hope that he may 
suggest a cure, but that he may suck out his patient's very vital-
ity."47 In the portrait of Chillingworth, the reader discovers that 
revenge may turn into a perverse but life-sustaining force for the 
avenger. The connotations of "blood-thirsty" become transformed 
into those of "blood thirst," thirst for the "flesh and blood of action," 
of experience—similar to the need for a "change of diet" that led 
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Hawthorne's narrator to serve as Surveyor, similar to the lack of 
materiality in Dimmesdale's life that led him into his intimacy with 
Chillingworth, similar to the adultery that serves as a prelude to the 
romance and leads to the townspeople's perverse exclusion of Hester 
Prynne. 
In this connection, it is enlightening to compare Chillingworth 
and Dimmesdale. For like Chillingworth, Dimmesdale also depends 
for his own sustenance on another human being—Hester. And dur­
ing at least two crucial moments in his life, he receives the strength 
he needs—the first during the midnight scaffold scene that I have 
already discussed; and the second during his encounter with Hester 
in the forest, after which he returns to town a new man, filled with 
renewal of energy that enables him to write, in a burst of inspira­
tion, an Election Day sermon that turns out, ironically, to have as 
its subject "the relation between the Deity and the communities of 
mankind" (p. 249). Unlike Chillingworth, however, Dimmesdale is 
not condemned by the narrator; if anything, the narrator excuses his 
"Remorse" and "Cowardice" (p. 148) because they are human fail­
ings. Chillingworth's morbid curiosity alone ranks with the devil. 
The objective evidence for excusing Dimmesdale and condemning 
Chillingworth is not conclusive. This confuses the reader. In addi­
tion to the blood thirst that both share, the narrator indicates that, 
during one interview at least, Chillingworth specifically offers 
Dimmesdale a cure for his spiritual illness that is not a leech 
cure—the public confession. "With somewhat more emphasis than 
usual," suggesting that for once, at least, Chillingworth speaks ear­
nestly and truthfully, he tells the minister that men who hide their 
guilt" Tear to take up the shame that rightfully belongs to them.. . . 
Trust me, such men deceive themselves!'" (p. 133). He points out 
that Hester's public acceptance of her shame has made her suffer­
ings less intense than Dimmesdale's burden of the "mystery of hid­
den sinfulness" (p. 135). Dimmesdale refuses to continue this discus­
sion with the physician and leaves the room "with a frantic gesture" 
(p. 137). 
With all of the objective indications, then, that Chillingworth is 
not, at least at the inception of his crime, himself the pure embodi­
ment of evil; and with the equally objective evidence that Dimmes­
dale shares the burden of guilt in his own deterioration, the question 
thus becomes more insistent—how does Chillingworth become 
transformed into the devil the narrator states he is (p. 170), and 
why, since the evidence for this remains inconclusive? 
The technical answer to the first part of the question, How. is 
relatively straightforward. The narrator describes Chillingworth, 
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from his first appearance in the novel, as a deformed individual, 
physically marked, just as Hester Prynne is marked, to immediate 
visual perception. Chillingworth's features are those "of a person 
who had so cultivated his mental part that it could not fail to mould 
the physical to itself, and become manifest by unmistakable to­
kens." He also has a deformed back (p. 59). In addition, he is a man 
of mystery, and his "darkness," physically as well as biographically, 
becomes Hawthorne's tool. When it becomes clear that a man has 
not been sent by God, the Puritan instinctively concludes his link 
with Satan. In The Scarlet Letter, the complexities of Chil-
lingworth's relationship with Dimmesdale do not become part of the 
public domain; only the narrator explores them. Thus, the Puritanic 
progression of the final judgment of Chillingworth suggests the nar-
rator's intervention, the narrator's own shifting of sympathies. 
Why these sympathies shift is apparent, I think, in the scene in 
which Chillingworth reveals his own demonism. There are two sig­
nificant evasions of revelation in the novel. The first, withholding 
Dimmesdale's association with Hester, as I have discussed, provides 
the scaffolding on which the narrator builds his symmetric study of 
marked and unmarked individuals. The second evasion, withhold­
ing knowledge of what Chillingworth finds on Dimmesdale's breast, 
is more difficult to justify. 
The narrator prepares the scene for revelation by permitting the 
reader a privileged view of Chillingworth. He describes the physi-
cian's manner, in which he hypocritically hides his "mysterious and 
puzzled smile" from the minister: 
This expression was invisible in Mr. Dimmesdale's presence, but grew 
strongly evident as the physician crossed the threshold. 
"A rare case!" he muttered. "I must needs look deeper into it. A 
strange sympathy betwixt soul and body! Were it only for the art's 
sake, I must search this matter to the bottom!" (pp. 137-38) 
The passage suggests that the narrator, as well, is about to manifest 
something to the reader, "were it only for the art's sake." As Chil­
lingworth approaches Dimmesdale, however, the reader's view is 
forced back. We continue to see Chillingworth, but not what Chil­
lingworth himself sees. Chillingworth at this moment becomes the 
only intimate witness to the ghastly elements in Dimmesdale's soul. 
It is certainly true that the narrator eventually gives the reader a 
good indication, although he does not ultimately commit himself, 
that what Chillingworth finds is a letter "A" etched on Dimmes-
dale's breast. By that time, however, Dimmesdale has pointed to 
Chillingworth as the emblem of evil, and the narrative power of this 
moment of Chillingworth's revelation has been superseded by the 
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third scaffold scene. Clearly, then, Hawthorne's narrator is not, in 
the private moment with Chillingworth, interested in Dimmesdale. 
He has allowed the physician to approach the minister out of his 
initial artistic curiosity, but at the moment of revelation, with­
draws. Instead he focuses on Chillingworth's expression—and on 
the artist's narrow escape. The narrator writes, 
After a brief pause, the physician turned away. 
But with what a wild look of wonder, joy, and horror! With what a 
ghastly rapture, as it were, too mighty to be expressed only by the eye 
and features, and therefore bursting forth through the whole ugliness 
of his figure, and making itself even riotously manifest by the ex­
travagant gestures with which he threw up his arms towards the 
ceiling, and stamped his foot upon the floor! Had a man seen old Roger 
Chillingworth, at that moment of his ecstasy, he would have had no 
need to ask how Satan comports himself when a precious human soul 
is lost to heaven, and won into his kingdom. 
But what distinguished the physician's ecstasy from Satan's was 
the trait of wonder in it! (p. 138) 
The scene suggests an explanation for Hawthorne's choice of his 
own mode and genre—allegory and romance. In "The Custom-
House," his narrator had written, "A better book than I shall ever 
write was there; leaf after leaf presenting itself to me, just as it was 
written out by the reality of the flitting hour, and vanishing as fast 
as written, only because my brain wanted the insight and my hand 
the cunning to transcribe it" (p. 37). But "these perceptions have 
come too late," and the transcription of "the reality of the flitting 
hour" is not the narrator's metier. Instead, he withdraws from the 
materiality and sensuality of life at the Custom House, and is timely 
ejected—not into a more realistic world, but into a world of romance 
(just as the reader is abruptly "ejected" into the tale that follows). 
And in The Scarlet Letter, the narrator's narrow escape asserts the 
ascendancy of romance over materialism. In this moment he refuses, 
avoiding the unpardonable sin of the tales, to explore Dimmesdale's 
most intimate secrets, focusing instead on the dangers of the chasm, 
which may lead the unsuspecting artist into the devil's kingdom. 
In the short sketch "Monsieur du Miroir," Hawthorne considers 
this chasm as the "impenetrable mystery" that separates the nar­
rator from his own reflection. He writes of the man in the mirror, 
"the chief that I complain of is his impenetrable mystery, which is 
no better than nonsense if it conceal anything good, and much worse 
in the contrary case."48 F. O. Matthiessen reflects, "What moved 
him in 'Monsieur du Miroir' was the related contrast between super­
ficial appearance and hidden truth, between the pale features of the 
man reflected in the mirror and the tormented life that was locked 
40 I The Mark and the Knowledge 
up in his heart."49 The narrator refutes the efficacy of exploring the 
reflection, of probing behind what he calls the man's "delusive gar­
ment of visibility."50 Yet he does explore it, for the space of the 
sketch, and the fictional situation depicts a moment of potential 
self-exploration and self-revelation. "Monsieur du Miroir" suggests 
that a similar self-exploration process takes place in The Scarlet 
Letter, that like the man in the mirror, Chillingworth also becomes 
the narrator's reflection, and when the revelation becomes too pain­
fully intimate, he withdraws his sympathies from Chillingworth, 
who becomes the figure the casual reader remembers—the man who 
cries, at Dimmesdale's death, "'Thou has escaped me!'"51 
Thus, "incited . .  . by the propensities of a student of human na-
ture"52 to explore the hidden meanings behind the scarlet letter, the 
narrator of Hawthorne's romance ends also by looking in a mirror. 
He stated in the sketch, "So inimitably does he counterfeit that I 
could almost doubt which of us is the visionary form, or whether 
each be not the other's mystery, and both twin brethren of one fate 
in mutually reflected spheres."53 The mirror analogue appropriately 
describes, not the relationship between the rag of scarlet cloth ac­
companied by the sheets of foolscap the narrator finds and the tale 
he then proceeds to construct, but rather a relationship between the 
narrator of "The Custom-House" and the narrator of The Scarlet 
Letter. If Chillingworth is a type of the artist, the artist certainly 
resembles Chillingworth as well. As "The Custom-House" shows, 
both are motivated by blood thirst, although Hawthorne's reflection 
on this, in the romance, leads him to withdraw his narrative curios­
ity just on the verge of material revelation. In The Scarlet Letter, the 
narrator chooses allegory, unlike his demonic counterpart within 
the narrative, who would lay bare Dimmesdale's soul if he could. In 
support of his own withdrawal, he states: "There can be, if I 
forebode aright, no power, short of the Divine mercy, to disclose, 
whether by uttered words, or by type or emblem, the secrets that 
may be buried with a human heart. The heart, making itself guilty 
of su,ch secrets, must perforce hold them, until the day when all 
hidden things shall be revealed'" (p. 131). In spite of his concern for 
social roles in the novel, he is not interested in disclosing the secrets 
in Dimmesdale's heart—or his own. He does not have that much 
"blood thirst." Hawthorne's very choice of allegory characterizes his 
subject as ultimately introspective—directed toward protecting the 
individual from the community. 
In his choice of mode, however, he reveals a great deal about 
himself. As Baskett has suggested, from the moment when Haw­
thorne places the scarlet letter on his breast he becomes "the figure 
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of the Alienated Artist."54 However, although it is true that many of 
Hawthorne's artists, not simply the narrator of The Scarlet Letter, 
are isolated from society,55 and although A. N. Kaul is probably 
correct when he writes that Hawthorne "saw in art itself the true 
answer to this dilemma" because "art could be a form of communion 
without conformity,"56 what The Scarlet letter demonstrates is that 
Hawthorne is more interested in isolation than in communion, if by 
communion Kaul means mutual revelation and confession among 
the members of a community. Hawthorne focuses on the letter as a 
means of attaining self-knowledge; he chooses allegory rather than 
the "flesh and blood of action." As Fogle writes, "Allegory gives 
point and reference and therefore is in itself a guarantee of purpose; 
it affords a principle to which the action of narrative may be referred 
and around which the action may be organized."57 In these terms, 
Hawthorne's own use of allegory becomes analogous to the Puritan 
practice of meditation and the physics of social exclusion. All three 
require recurrent focus on the mark in order to achieve transcen­
dent knowledge. Yet allegory allows Hawthorne to achieve an artis­
tic resolution of social and metaphysical problems and still keep his 
distance from the material world. 
inThe Scarlet Letter, then, Hawthorne integrates the use of mark­
ing as social, artistic, and metaphysical method for both the artist/ 
outcast and his excluding community. The difference between view­
ing the novel as a study of marking and viewing it more tradi­
tionally as a study of isolation from society58 is to see Hawthorne's 
art not simply as historical romance and certainly not as naturalis­
tic reflection of the world (that would require "flesh and blood") but 
rather as an epistemological process in and of itself. It is also to seize 
upon this epistemology as one component of "American" literature. 
Hawthorne links but does not equate his search for the significance 
in a symbol with the Puritan quest for revelation of guilt and exclu­
sion of the stigmatized offender. In so doing, he uncovers the close 
relationship between social stigma and art for the Puritan commu­
nity. Harry Henderson alludes to this process in Versions of the 
Past: "What is at first taken by the community as a sort of algebraic 
sign for a quality of the personality . .  . is transformed almost im­
mediately by the author from the allegorical to the symbolic level. 
To an imagination dominated by literal readings of natural and 
social phenomena, nothing could be more subversive than sym-
bolism."59 If Hester manages her own version of American revolu­
tion while living within the confines of her stigma, Hawthorne es­
tablishes a working definition of American identity while withdraw­
ing behind the protective walls of his allegory. It is part of the 
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American temper, he seems to be saying, to learn about the world by 
marking it, then establishing it as American by excluding what is 
marked. 
The difference between the community's use of stigma to 
strengthen its social identity and the artist's use of the mark as a 
focus for symbolistic inquiry is clear: the Salem witch trials, the 
lynching of Negroes in the South, and the struggle of minorities of 
all kinds for two centuries are emblematic of the deep metaphysical 
insecurity we have inherited from the Puritans. In the struggle for 
identity, both in the sense of who we are and how much we are alike, 
American communities have not tolerated deviance. What is de­
structive to our country, however, has created viable ground in 
which our literature has flourished. By the same method, the 
American fiction writer has focused often on stigma, as if this were 
the aberrant and abortive result of American attempt at commu­
nity. 
As Hawthorne indicates, markedness is an indicator of an indi-
vidual's visibility and thus his potential isolation from community; 
it is also, as I will show in subsequent chapters, one technique 
American writers following Hawthorne continue to use in their pro­
gressively complex studies of the changing American identity. 
Hawthorne's concern with social stigma explores the Puritan's at­
tempt to make the nonmanifest manifest. Following Hawthorne, 
Melville examines the correspondence between the physical world 
and the metaphysical one. Faulkner's analogous concern returns to 
the social realm of public and private experience and in Ellison, the 
parameters of correspondence are social visibility and invisibility. 
For each of these writers, however, what is at stake is what it means 
to be American. As Charles Feidelson writes, "The symbolistic out­
look involves much more than the stylistic device which is ordinar­
ily called 'symbolism'; the physics of symbolistic literature depends 
on its metaphysics . . . the theory of symbolism is really a theory of 
knowledge."60 I would only add to this, following my study of The 
Scarlet Letter, that a study of American symbolistic literature in­
volves a study of stigma. As I will attempt to show in my analysis of 
Moby-Dick, Melville, though he is not explicitly concerned with 
American sociology, has seized upon marking as the epistemology 
particularly suited to Ishmael, the American orphan, in his search 
for who he is. 
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1960). 
12. Charles Feidelson describes what he calls "the central theme of the sketch . . . 
the theme implicit in the vignette of Hawthorne poring over the scarlet letter. . . . 
That self-portrait. . . amounts to a dramatic definition of the following 'romance' and 
of the author's relation to it. The author's donnee, as James would call it, is neither 
Imagination nor Actuality per se but a symbol whose inherent meaning is The Scarlet 
Letter" (p. 9). 
13. A. N. Kaul, The American Vision: Actual and Ideal Society in Nineteenth 
Century Fiction (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 147. 
14. Richard Chase, The American Novel and Its Tradition (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1957), p. 70. 
15. See Kaul for a general discussion of the complexities of Hawthorne's historical 
view. 
16. Michael Davitt Bell, Hawthorne and the Historical Romance of New England 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 13. 
17. John E. Becker comments on the novel's first chapter, prefacing the scene in 
which Hester appears before the crowd, in a way that is relevant to my argument in 
this study: "The first chapter acts as the prelude to a meditation, it is a 'composition of 
place.' It is vividly pictorial and yet completely static. It does not start the action; it 
starts a process of reflection and prepares us for many moments ahead when we will 
be forced to suspend our interest in the story, focus our attention on a symbol or 
symbolic tableau, and meditate" (Hawthorne's Historical Allegory: An Examination 
of the American Conscience [Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971], p. 90). 
What I have described as Hawthorne's aesthetic distance does remove the reader 
from direct unmediated perception of the novel's drama. The "process of reflection" 
that Becker describes accurately depicts the way in which the mark provides the 
reader with a focus for "meditation." We may view each separate interpretation or 
perspective on the letter as yet another opportunity for the reader to "focus our 
attention . . . and meditate" on the letter's meaning. 
18. The tendency of critics in the past has been to interpret a single stance as 
Hawthorne's own; and thus, interpretations of the novel are various and widely 
divergent. The spirit of mystery that intrigues Hawthorne in "The Custom-House," 
and the range of perspectives his narrator provides the reader in the opening two 
chapters, indicate ^deliberate inconsistency. See Charles Child Walcutt, "The Scarlet 
Letter and Its Modern Critics," in Twentieth Century Interpretations of The Scarlet 
Letter, ed. John C. Gerber (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968) for a survey of 
critical positions on the novel. Hyatt H. Waggoner, in Hawthorne: A Critical Study 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), states further, "What seems to me to 
need doing at this point in the development of Hawthorne criticism is to show why the 
work is more enigmatic than Hawthorne's other finished romances, even though 
there is a sense in which one would think it ought to be clearer. It ought to be clearer 
because it has less action and more exposition devoted to analysis of meaning. Ex­
pository writing is a way of 'telling,' narration a way of 'showing.' If symbolism is 
always more ambiguous than allegory and art contains a functional ambiguity that 
would be a defect in logical statement, why is this novel, which leans so heavily on 
statement, so ambiguous?" (pp. 126-27). Waggoner tries to answer his own question 
by showing that "Hawthorne . .  . is letting his images do most of the work for him" (p. 
127), but it seems to me that Waggoner's question is more interesting than his 
attempt to answer it. The novel is ambiguous, and ambiguity is part of Hawthorne's 
subject. As Feidelson writes, "Hawthorne's subject is not only the meaning of adul­
tery but also meaning in general; not only what the focal symbol means but also how 
it gains significance" (p. 10). And in the opening scene, the letter gains significance as 
an object that requires interpretation. 
19. Works. 2:48. 
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20. Ibid., p. 50. 
21. Ibid., p. 69. 
22. Ibid., p. 61. 
23. Harry Henderson views Hawthorne as a "holist" within his own understand­
ing of what that word means. A holistic view of culture, as Henderson defines it, 
creates "an illusion of a whole civilization or culture, in which each institution or 
characteristic of a society might be seen as integral to the total culture" (p. 18). 
Furthermore, "For the holist, it is manners and mores which are significant. . . . 
The holist sees society as a seamless web of relationships" (p. 36). Therefore Hester's 
stigma is integral to the Boston community, "in which all surface manifestations of 
behavior carry social significance" (p. 115). For the townspeople, Hester is not a 
symbol; she is rather the embodiment of their own sin. The effect of their perspective 
forces the interconnection between private and public worlds. Henderson states later, 
"The distinction between the inner and outer spheres of human existence is such a 
pivotal intuition of Hawthorne's writing that it is difficult to overestimate its impact 
on the holist frame, in which the interlocking surfaces are 'society.' A character's 
position within or outside this matrix dictates the content and pattern of his thought" 
(p. 116). By assigning Hester her particular stigma, the magistrates are attempting 
to establish not only Hester's position within the community but also the "content or 
pattern" of her thought. By interpreting her stigma, the townspeople are trying to 
understand their own position as well. They are part of the same "matrix." Thus 
Henderson views the opening scene as "as dramatic a 'private' and 'public' concern as 
one can imagine" (p. 115). 
Two additional comments from other critics shed light on this point. Baskett 
writes, "The scarlet letter itself is a vivid emblem of the Puritan belief that no 
individual action occurs outside the purview of the theocratic society" (p. 323). To say 
this is to concur implicitly with Henderson, because the townspeople s attempts at 
interpretation establish their "purview' of Hester's action. Becker, in Hawthorne's 
Historical Allegory, goes so far as to describe Hester's punishment as "an allegorical 
celebration of the Puritan way of life. In public punishment, the culprit is the repre­
sentative of forces which are undermining society. The people assemble into a hierar­
chically structured group in order to accomplish a ritual destruction of the criminal 
force. This may be done by the destruction of the criminal or, less radically, by so 
torturing the criminal that, symbolically at least, the crime is considered removed 
both from his heart and the hearts of the gathered assembly" (p. 95). Becker is 
commenting on the scapegoat ritual here. For the Puritans, however, at least for the 
townspeople in the opening scene, Hester's stigma is not a symbolic punishment. The 
Puritans are not ritualistically self-conscious, as Becker implies. Hester's crime, her 
punishment, and the resulting expulsion of evil from their midst are all real. 
24. Many critics have discussed the significance of this quotation. Among them 
Becker states, "In contrast to society in any other place or at any other time, Puritan 
society cannot distinguish between offenses against society and offenses against God. 
Within such a world, the individual conscience, the 'heart,' has no distinct place" (p. 
91). Henderson writes, "One of Hawthorne's most telling criticisms of New England 
Puritanism is conveyed by his portrayal of it as a civilization which believed that its 
obsession with forms and appearances brought it closer to 'pure' religion" (p. 115). 
Joseph Schwartz, in "Three Aspects of Hawthorne's Puritanism," New England 
Quarterly, 36 (June 1963), comments, "From Hawthorne's point of view the Puritan 
way of life, their denial of civil liberty for others, and their theology combined to give 
an unfavorable aspect to the national character. It created a social system, based 
upon an identification of law and religion, that trammeled itself as it did the people 
who lived under it" (p. 207). When the religious practice of such a community in­
volves searching for stigmata as part of meditation, it is not surprising that Hester's 
legal punishment should resemble a social religion. However, as Henderson writes, 
"To the nineteenth- or twentieth-century mind the concept of a civilization attempt­
ing to realize transcendental ideals by reinforcing the formal matrix of society is 
highly ironical" (pp. 115-16). 
25. As Marius Bewley writes, "In the last analysis, Hawthorne is not interested in 
Hester's private drama. She exists magnificently in the art as the focus of tangled 
moral forces, but she is herself as much of a symbol as the scarlet letter which she 
wears on her breast" ("Psychology and the Moral Imagination," in Gerber, p. 39). And 
as Becker comments on tne additional burden Hawthorne gives Hester: "We see both 
the allegorical Hester created by the Puritans and Hawthorne's Hester, more real, 
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more mimetic, yet still a character in an allegory. . . . But her very resistance to the 
Puritan allegory will make her an allegorical figure within Hawthorne's allegory. 
The scar of the Puritan punishment marks Hester for life; her resistance twists her 
into a figure of resistance" (p. 98). 
26. 'The story, indeed, is in a secondary degree that of Hester Prynne; she be­
comes, really, after the first scene, an accessory figure; it is not upon her the denou­
ment depends. . . . The story goes on, for the most part, between the lover and the 
husband." See Henry James, Hawthorne (New York: Collier, 1966), p. 100. 
27. Erving Goffman, Stigma (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), preface. 
28. Ibid., p. 4. 
29. As Quentin Anderson expresses it, "Hester's punishment is to Dimmesdale's 
suffering as public infamy is to private shame" (The Imperial Self: An Essay in 
American Literary and Cultural History [New York: Random House, 1971], p. 67). 
30. Goffman, p. 5. 
31. Works, 2:103. 
32. As Anderson expresses it, "Hester herself is made to perceive a sense of guilty 
participation in the faces of some of those she encounters, as if she were the embodi­
ment of acts and impulses they do not confess" (p. 69). 
33. For another discussion of Dimmesdale's need for confession, see George E. 
Woodberry, "The Dark Side of the Truth," in Gross, where he states: "Absolution, so 
far as it is hinted at, lies in the direction of public confession, the efficacy of which is 
directly stated, but lamely nevertheless; it restores truth, but it does not heal the 
past" (pp. 16-17). 
34. As Anderson comments, "the response of Dimmesdale to his sense of trans­
gression is to attack his own body; the response of the townspeople is to attack the 
separated member, the bearer of the stigma, the extruded evil" (p. 69). Anderson 
implies here that Dimmesdale's self-flagellation is analogous to the Puritan stig­
matization. In effect, Hawthorne is demonstrating in Dimmesdale the pervasiveness 
of Puritan theology within the individual conscience. Just as the Boston community's 
attempt to exclude marked individuals is analogous to the Puritan meditation, con­
versely Dimmesdale himself may be viewed as the single embodiment of Puritan 
community. He is, to anticipate Melville, "the world in a man-of-war." 
35. Hawthorne's portrait of the Puritan inability to tolerate mystery that has not 
been made manifest suggests a cultural cast of mind. In a related observation con­
cerning Bellingham and Wilson in the novel, Henderson writes: "Though they are 
history-makers and role-enforcers, they have no insight into the inner life. For 
Hawthorne, the separation of'heart and head' was not the chief fault of the history-
makers of New England; it was, rather, their inability to imagine a human reality 
behind the masks of society, an imaginative, not an emotional, failure" (p. 118). 
36. Becker sees Hester's action as an individual one: "Hester stands forth in de­
fiance of that society. She has taken the symbol which was to make her another 
allegorical figure in the Puritan allegorical world and, by force of an almost violent 
art, has turned it into an expression of her own defiant individuality" (p. 94). My own 
interpretation of Hester's management of her stigma is more akin to what Henderson 
terms the holistic view of Puritan society. 
37. See Marius Bewley, The Eccentric Design: Form in the Classic American Novel 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 161-74, for an excellent discussion 
of the midnight scaffold scene and Dimmesdale's public expiation. 
38. In an interesting discussion of allegory in The Scarlet Letter, Becker com­
ments: "A society whose public rituaj is made to extend in this way beyond the ritual 
arena and the ritual moment into daily life, is a society so committed to allegory that 
it has become not a mode of expression but a mode of life. The correspondence be­
tween concrete events and eternal truths becomes a presupposition of life itself (p. 
96). It is this very presupposition that allows the Puritans their "control" and empha­
sizes their intolerance for mystery or ambiguity or paradox. 
39. Baskett makes a point about "The Custom-House" that suggests Hawthorne's 
affinities with Hester. "Hawthorne's growing, if unwilling, understanding that, de­
spite his desire for withdrawal from an uncongenial 'system,' he must somehow 
establish a significant, self-nurturing relation with it, is intensely signified when he 
places the scarlet letter on his breast" (p. 327). Hester must also establish such a 
relation with a similarly "uncongenial" system. 
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40. Works, 2:309. 
41. Ibid., p. 319. 
42. Kaul talks about several stories ("Wakefield," "The Man of Adamant," 
"Egotism") in which people alienate themselves from society: "These are thus the 
stories of a peculiar destiny: of an alienation which arises from cold selfishness, from 
deluded piety, and from egotistical individualism, and which leads in all cases to a 
corruption of the human personality and the break-down of normal social relations 
within the community. They are the parables of a culture in which the Puritan 
absorption with the self has shaded off into the democratic ideal of the individual's 
self-sufficiency" (p. 158). 
43. Joel Porte, in The Romance in America: Studies in Cooper, Poe, Hawthorne, 
Melville, and James (Middletown, Conn.; Wesleyan University Press, 1969), com­
ments on Hawthorne's experience: "All the major characters in The Scarlet Letter, 
including Hawthorne himself, aspire to the condition of the romancer—a position of 
spiritual depth and understanding earned through sympathy with or experience of 
pain. The price of attaining such a bad eminence is worldly danger: 'decapitation' for 
Hawthorne when he is removed as Surveyor of the Customs and thus permitted to 
return to writing, or pariahdom for Hester. . . . The Scarlet Letter, in short, can be 
read as an allegory of art" (pp. 98-99). 
44. James, p. 101. 
45. See Millicent Bell, for example, who points out that the "peculiar faculty of 
Chillingworth" is "peculiarly akin to the artist" (p. 74). Henderson calls Chil­
lingworth "the searcher of the inner man just as Bellingham and Wilson are the 
censors of the outer" (p. 117). Henderson's comparative study of Dimmesdale and 
Chillingworth is also interesting here: "Dimmesdale's tragedy is that he cannot be 
secure in either his faith or his role. His faith is impotent before social imperatives. 
Chillingworth, like a charlatan, assumes new roles with ease. For him, man is made 
by art, not by faith. . .  . In the social ascendancy of Dimmesdale over Chillingworth 
Hawthorne epitomizes a New World which eschewed art to choose a faith it could not 
live with" (p. 121). 
46. See 2 Samuel 12. 
47. Matthiessen, p. 306. 
48. Works, 2:183. 
49. Matthiessen, p. 258. 
50. Works, 2:194. 
51. In support of my idea that Hawthorne sees much of himself in Chillingworth, 
Kaul talks about the fact that the pursuit of art "could become an obsession, a means 
of isolation from the world rather than a mode of communication with it. When this 
happens, when art is unrelated to human sympathy, its 'diabolism' . . . becomes a 
fact in Hawthorne's moral vision" (p. 164). Chillingworth is thus an example of an 
artist whose "art" becomes "unrelated to human sympathy." 
52. Works, 2: p. 182. 
53. Ibid., p. 195. 
54. Baskett, p. 326. 
55. Critics have made this point about the isolation of Hawthorne's artists. A. N. 
Kaul, for example, talks about the "spiritual death" that results from "conformity to 
certain kinds of society. . . . [Hawthorne's artists] live in a society which combines 
the Puritan mistrust of art with the emphasis on practicality and utility of both the 
early New England code and latter-day American life. It is a society in which the 
artist has no recognized place unless it be the one traditionally reserved for the Black 
Man" (p. 166). And R. K. Gupta, in "Hawthorne's Treatment of the Artist," New 
England Quarterly, 45 (March 1972), pp. 65-80, states: "In the case of the artists, 
loneliness is imposed by society. The artists do not themselves deliberately reject 
human brotherhood. . . . They are isolated because of society's failure to understand 
them and value their achievement." 
56. Kaul, p. 167. 
57. Richard Harter Fogle, Hawthorne's Fiction: The Light & The Dark (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 42. 
58. This is one standard interpretation of the novel. Marius Bewley writes, for 
example, "The Scarlet Letter is a study of isolation on the spatial plane . . . the 
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conflict between Hester and the community is the most poised statement Hawthorne 
ever made of the tension between solitude and society" (p. 174). R. W. B. Lewis, in 
"The Controlled Division of Sympathies," in Gross, writes: "Hawthorne felt. . . that 
the stuff of narrative consisted in the imaginable brushes between the deracinated 
and solitary individual and the society or world awaiting him. . .  . In The Scarlet 
Letter not only do the individual and the world, the conduct and the institutions, 
measure each other: the measurement and its consequences are precisely and cen­
trally what the novel is about" (p. 26). And Quentin Anderson states: "Hawthorne 
saw human selves as fostered in a net of relations, finding their meaning and value 
only through those relations" (pp. 60-61). 
59. Henderson, pp. 116-17. 
60. Feidelson, pp. 49-50. 
Moby-Dick: Social Physics and Metaphysics 
The Scarlet Letter studies social stigma and yet, by means of alle­
gory, maintains a curious distance from the world, from the "flesh 
and blood of action." Melville's novel embraces that "flesh and 
blood," yet seems ostensibly about anything but social stigma. As I 
will discuss in this chapter, Ishmael has already learned White-
Jacket's lessons and therefore Ishmael combats metaphysical rather 
than social isolation. Then why include a study of Moby-Dick in a 
book about social stigma in American fiction? 
Moby-Dick becomes an implicit reflection on social stigma by 
focusing on the vision that results from Ishmael's social invisibility. 
His vision is not social, but his invisibility is. Thus Melville implies 
that wisdom for the American, symbolized in part by the omnisci­
ence Ishmael achieves as narrator, requires his social invisibility. 
This makes Melville akin to the transcendentalists because, in 
going to sea, Ishmael escapes the landed concerns of his society, 
which include social hierarchy and social stigma. 
At the same time, as I will indicate in the discussion that follows, 
Ishmael carries with him the Puritan tendency to focus on objects in 
the material world that are physically marked. In so doing, he man­
ifests the Puritan epistemology in which social behavior is analo­
gous to the inner scrutiny of meditation but at the same time he 
removes himself from the community within which the Puritans of 
Hawthorne's novel create and contain their identity. For Ishmael 
does not need to exclude other human beings from the world in order 
to discover who he is. He turns not to stigma but to symbolism. 
Unlike Ahab, who attributes malice to the inscrutable and then 
pursues it in the manifest form of the white whale, thereby demon­
strating his own Puritanism, Ishmael is content to focus on those 
qualities of the physical world that are marked in order to transcend 
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to an understanding of the ineffable, the absolute world of "land­
lessness." 
Ahab's pursuit is analogous to Hester's initial branding in the 
sense that Ahab, like the Puritans, searches for meaning inherent 
in physical stigma (for Ahab, of course, the stigma is his ivory leg). 
Yet Ahab is also like Dimmesdale. He is discreditable like the 
minister; he cannot reveal the true nature of his pursuit of the 
whale to the "community" of men aboard the Pequod. The search for 
knowledge in such a context of discreditability, for Dimmesdale and 
for Ahab, can produce metaphysical isolation. Ishmael attempts to 
overcome such isolation. 
Much more than Hawthorne's narrator, Ishmael is "struck" by 
markings. As a sailor, Ishmael focuses on Ahab's marked quest in 
order to achieve self-consciousness and narrative omniscience. As a 
narrator, Ishmael focuses on things that are marked in order to 
achieve symbolic significance for his narrative. Art itself becomes 
Ishmael's substitute for the social scapegoat the Puritans needed. 
And Melville escapes the allegorical level Hawthorne remains 
mired in because, unlike Hawthorne, Melville allows his own nar­
rator to participate in the real action of the narrative as a sailor on 
board the Pequod. 
Melville achieves both the "flesh and blood of action" and 
Ishmael's "transcendental imagination" precisely because Ishmael 
is a character as well as a narrator in his fiction. Hawthorne pushes 
toward creating a narrator who is a "character" in the tale by intro­
ducing The Scarlet Letter with "The Custom-House," but he does not 
achieve the resolution between "the Actual and the Imaginary" or 
fact and fancy or the physical and the metaphysical that Melville 
does. Melville's triumph is his ability to envision conflicting 
views—and conflicting worlds—at the same time. Melville is able to 
balance unity with multiplicity—the realm of the absolute with the 
finite relative world. As Feidelson writes, 'The whale is simultane­
ously the most solid of physical things and the most meaningful of 
symbols. The voyaging intellect of Ishmael interacts with the mate­
rial world to generate symbolic meaning."1 Ishmael's tolerance for 
mystery, for "landlessness," finds no analogue in The Scarlet Letter. 
Whereas Hawthorne is uncomfortable with duality, Ishmael rel­
ishes it. 
Therefore Melville's fear that "without some hints touching the 
plain facts," some readers "might scout at Moby-Dick as a mon­
strous fable, or still worse and more detestable, a hideous and into­
lerable allegory" is actually a jest. "Going a-whaling yourself" al­
lows Ishmael the "flesh and blood of action" and therefore Moby­
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Dick moves beyond what the medieval philosophers considered the 
allegorical level of meaning. Melville's novel is purely analogical. 
Moby-Dick's analogies allow Melville to transcend Hawthorne's 
"mere" allegory and Ishmael's attempt to "contain" his experience 
within his narrative becomes much more convincing than Haw-
thorne's literal choice of the scarlet letter as a "container" for sym­
bolic significance. 
Ishmael's narrative provides Melville with a physical "container" 
for symbolism. Yet that symbolism is open to interpretation. As 
Feidelson expresses it, "the entire book, which constitutes [Mel-
ville's] reading [of the universe], is only fa draught—nay, but the 
draught of a draught.' The reader inherits the job. Moby-Dick is a 
developing meaning. 'I put that brow before you. Read it if you 
can.'"2 Ishmael's narrative demonstrates the effects the Puritans 
hoped for from their epistemology yet failed to reach because they 
lacked Melville's transcendental imagination. Had the Puritans 
been able to embrace the "power of blackness"3 instead of attempt­
ing to contain it in social stigma, they might have succeeded in 
sharing Ishmael's "clean tabernacles of the soul." 
Both Hawthorne and Melville are concerned with subjective 
knowledge. However, whereas Hawthorne doesn't think it should be 
made objective for all the world to glimpse, Melville feels com­
pelled to reveal it. Therefore, although Melville is not explicitly 
concerned with stigma in the social sense, the range of markedness 
is even greater in Moby-Dick than in The Scarlet Letter. Melville is 
not content merely to discern the signs of universal meaning; he 
creates them and allows the act of perception, for Ishmael, to become 
epistemology. For it is by looking, by noticing, that Ishmael, as a 
type of the American fictional narrator, "marks" the significance of 
objects in the world and transcends, however temporarily, 
metaphysical isolation. And it is by focusing on Ishmael that the 
reader can do the same. Ishmael serves as the reader's "marker" in 
the same way that Ahab is the mark Ishmael follows in his quest for 
the "grand hooded phantom." 
I 
Marius Bewley writes, "We are sometimes inclined to lose sight of 
the elementary fact that the whole complex movement of Moby-Dick 
originates in Ahab's inability to resign himself to the loss of a leg."4 
If Bewley is correct, then Moby-Dick becomes, like The Scarlet Let­
ter, a study of physical branding. But unlike Hawthorne, who directs 
the reader's attention to the "rag of scarlet cloth" in "The Custom-
House," Melville opens Moby-Dick not with Ahab or the story of 
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Ahab's crippling, but with Ishmael. And Ishmael is marked not by a 
physical stigma but by his isolation from the universe. He suffers a 
case of the spleen, describes grimly the "damp, drizzly November in 
my soul," and knows it is "high time to get to sea as soon as I can" 
whenever "my hypos get such an upper hand of me."5 In contrast 
with the prefatory pages of the narrative, in which Melville's "sub-
sub" has marked "whatever random allusions to whales he could 
anyways find in any book whatsoever, sacred or profane" (p. 2), 
Ishmael lacks precisely what the "Extracts" seem to contain—a 
point of reference. 
The critical controversy surrounding this novel emerges from 
Melville's separation between Ishmael's metaphysical quest and 
Ahab's revenge pursuit of the whale. In nineteenth-century terms, 
Emerson's dichotomy between the materialist, "who takes his de­
parture from the external world, and esteems a man as one product 
of that," and the idealist, who "takes his departure from his con­
sciousness, and reckons the world an appearance,"6 simplifies to an 
extreme the duality of Ahab and Ishmael. However, within the text, 
the separation becomes further complicated as a problem of narra­
tion. Is it Ishmael's experience "some years ago" with Ahab's voyage 
that now, in the present tense of the opening sentence, leads him to 
tell the story? Or do ontological dilemmas lead him to interweave 
his narrative of metaphysical correspondences and his fascination 
with Ahab's pursuit? If Ahab motivates the novel, then Ishmael's 
search becomes his attempt to understand the thematic significance 
of Ahab's voyage. If the novel results from Ishmael's a priori on­
tological meditations, just as Ishmael attempts to rid himself of the 
"hypos" in his soul by going whaling, then the "marking" in the 
novel—by no means limited to Ishmael's portrayal of Ahab, but 
including Queequeg, Pip, Moby Dick, and Ishmael himself— 
becomes the narrator's means of resolving his "hypotheses" about 
the universe by constructing metaphysical correspondences. In this 
second view, whaling becomes Ishmael's "reading" of the universe, 
one interpretation of the reality he constructs; the quest and the 
telling become synonymous activities for the narrator. 
Melville struggled with similar narrative problems prior to writ­
ing Moby-Dick; in form if not in intensity, White-Jacket creates a 
narrative design that Melville then adapts to his larger theme. 
White-Jacket, more explicitly than the later novel, is a narrative 
occasion as much, if not more, than the record of a voyage, even 
though the narrator remains humorously faithful to his form: "But, 
though not a few good chapters might be written on this head, I 
must again forbear; for in this book I have nothing to do with the 
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shore further than to glance at it, now and then, from the water; my 
man-of-war world alone must supply me with the staple of my mat­
ter; I have taken an oath to keep afloat to the last letter of my 
narrative."7 The novel allows Melville discursive exposition on the 
structure of the man-of-war, the activities within, and an allegorical 
representation between the shipboard world and the landed one; the 
ship becomes a theater, a chapel, a college, and a social state, as well 
as the implied extension of White-Jacket's own individual con-
flict—he, too, is a man-of-war. Yet the relative weakness of White-
Jacket is built into the novel from the beginning; for the voyage is 
one, not in search of adventure or vengeance, but simply "homeward 
bound." Not until Moby-Dick does the literal correspondence be­
tween life on land and life at sea. reach thematic integration. 
But it is curious that, in finding the physical vehicle (whaling) 
that will sustain a voyage with physical as well as metaphysical 
purpose, Melville leaves behind the particular focus that allows the 
earlier novel its moments of metaphysical intensity. Ishmael, unlike 
White-Jacket, is not a scapegoat. In the earlier novel, the narrator's 
jacket, with all of its other idiosyncrasies, has the misfortune to be 
white among a black-coated crew. If White-Jacket could only com­
mand enough black paint to discolor the coat, he feels he would 
escape both the assaults of the elements and those of his fellow 
sailors. But the paint is denied to him; and his resultant visibility 
makes him the scapegoat of social dis-ease. In addition, the lack of 
consistent integration between Ishmael's roles as sailor and nar­
rator is decidedly not a problem in White-Jacket. When White-
Jacket the sailor climbs onto the mast, White-Jacket the narrator 
falls off. And the sailor/narrator's moment of arraignment at the 
mast by Captain Claret (chap. 67), one of the dramatic climaxes of 
the earlier novel, contrasts markedly with the absence of any face-
to-face encounter between Ishmael and his captain, Ahab. 
Thus, in a study of marked characters in American fiction, it 
makes sense to consider White-Jacket; and less immediate sense to 
deal with Ishmael. Yet Melville's distinction between the earlier 
novel, whose narrator is visibly marked in his fictional world, and 
Moby-Dick, whose narrator is marked only for the reader, empha­
sizes a transition between what I term in my chapter title social 
physics and metaphysics. In the earlier novel, the narrator explores 
the artist's perception of his social role; White-Jacket achieves vis­
ion after he transcends his social visibility. In Moby-Dick, Ishmael 
combats not social but metaphysical isolation. In a sense, White-
Jacket is a more primitive Ishmael; and from this point of view, 
Ishmael has already learned White-Jacket's lessons.8 
54 I The Mark and the Knowledge 
Hester Prynne and White-Jacket are scapegoats, marked by their 
social groups. In a social situation, where the character has become 
visibly manifest, to recognize the mark (Hester's letter, the white 
jacket, Ahab's leg) does not constitute a visionary act. Therefore, the 
very visibility of the narrator's social identity in White-Jacket limits 
his vision; he has been named by his crewmates and has accepted 
that social definition of himself. His white jacket serves as his psy­
chological and emotional defense in a way that both protects him, 
because he can blame the jacket, and limits him, because he accepts 
the narrow definition of his differentness. He achieves moments of 
vision, and certainly perceives the allegory in his situation that the 
other men on the Neversink do not; but he clothes his observations in 
physical form until the moment of his symbolic "rebirth" at the end, 
when out of necessity he cuts himself loose from his jacket to keep 
from drowning in its limitations. As White-Jacket indicates, the 
mark itself limits the marked man's knowledge of himself and he 
becomes, as in Hawthorne, a literal manifestation of the marking 
community's own obscured self-knowledge, their particular form of 
limited vision. 
In Moby-Dick, the lack of social marking agents complicates the 
question of marking. Who marks Queequeg? Moby Dick? Pip? 
Ahab? Ishmael? The narrator suggests that social stigma is a landed 
concern that Ahab, in particular, avoids by going to sea. On land, 
Ahab must "dissemble" his madness and motives, so that "when 
with ivory leg he stepped ashore at last, no Nantucketer thought 
him otherwise than but naturally grieved, and that to the quick, 
with the terrible casualty which had overtaken him. . . . Had any 
one of his old acquaintances on shore but half dreamed of what was 
lurking in him then, how soon would their aghast and righteous 
souls have wrenched the ship from such a fiendish man!" (pp. 161­
62). Ishmael recognizes Ahab's dissembling, in the chapter "Moby 
Dick," and implies that, on land, Ahab might have become, in 
Goffman's terms, socially discredited. In the novel, however, Ahab's 
brand becomes both a narrative and a metaphysical focus, not a 
social one; as do Queequeg's markings, the White Whale's hiero­
glyphs and legends, and Pip's madness. These markings and legends 
do not escape the notice of the Pequod's crew, but the whalemen 
avoid interpretation as surely as they avoid mutiny.9 
Further, not even Ishmael bears a social mark. Although his 
opening sentence suggests that he is marked in the Biblical sense 
and cast out to wander, only Ishmael himself—and the reader— 
recognizes his alienation. Within the novel, he enjoys a privileged 
and private view without being, himself, visible. Queequeg is the 
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only other crew member of the Pequod, after Peleg and Bildad leave 
the ship, who even acknowledge a relationship with Ishmael; cer­
tainly Ahab does not. Thus, although Ishmael is clearly marked for 
the reader by virtue of his name, he possesses an anonymous invisi­
bility aboard ship. 
That the crew should not recognize Ishmael's stigma would seem 
to reflect that the focus of the novel for the narrator is personal 
rather than social. In itself, Ishmael's marking does not place him 
beside Hester Prynne, or beside Joe Christmas or Invisible Man, 
whom I discuss in later chapters; and yet, in the novel's juxtaposi­
tion with White-Jacket and The Scarlet Letter, we must consider him 
marked even more than those other fictional bearers of social 
stigma. It goes almost without saying, for the reader who is familiar 
with White-Jacket, that visibility leads to social exclusion. Ishmael, 
in achieving the invisibility of a White-Jacket finally stripped of the 
jacket, also moves beyond the limitations of White-Jacket's vision, 
and Melville's succeeding novel thus reflects on social stigma by 
focusing on a character whose social identity has been all but oblit­
erated by anonymity, whose vision results, as surely as Hester's 
visibility resulted, from the social blindness of his fellow sailors. 
Moby-Dick becomes, in part, Ishmael's meditation on the relation­
ship between vision and visibility. In his meditative moments at the 
masthead, Ishmael possesses a self-consciousness that White-
Jacket's social exclusion imposed on him, but that Ishmael voluntar­
ily chooses. White-Jacket complains that whereas other crewmen 
escaped detection, "their identity undiscoverable—my own hapless 
jacket forever proclaimed the name of its wearer. It gave me many a 
hard job, which otherwise I should have escaped . . . how easy, in 
that mob of incognitoes, to individualize 'that white jacket,' and dis­
patch him on the errand."10 The errands to which he refers often 
send him "to communicate some slight order to the captains of the 
tops." White-Jacket thus, he implies, spends more time ascending 
aloft than the other crewmen; and so even in White-Jacket, the 
masthead becomes associated with meditation and vision. The nar­
rator writes, "I am of a meditative humor, and at sea used often to 
mount aloft at night, and, seating myself on one of the upper yards, 
tuck my jacket about me and give loose to reflection."11 White-
Jacket's visibility increases his opportunities for meditation; and 
from such an altitude, encased in the jacket, which the narrator 
wears as protection from the cold, he is pitched into the sea at the 
end of the novel and almost drowned. Only by ripping the jacket 
open with his knife, "as if I were ripping open myself,"12 does he 
escape death by water—or by the hands of his own comrades, who 
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mistake the jacket for some white shark about to make an end to 
him, and fill it with harpoons an instant after the narrator frees 
himself from it. The harpooning of the jacket and White-Jacket's 
narrow escape establish paradigms that Ishmael in Moby-Dick self­
consciously explores. 
II 
Ishmael's resolve to go to sea reverses both the Neversink's jour­
ney and classical quest narrative. The Neversink and Homer's Odys­
seus are homeward bound, whereas Ishmael's quest initially has no 
goal, except as this goal romantically "looms" in the distance, just 
beyond the horizon of thought; fog or darkness shrouds, distorts, and 
exaggerates its form. Although according to The Oxford English 
Dictionary the origin of the verb "loom" is unknown, the word's 
suggestion of impending occurrence or lurking in shadows indicates 
that whether or not some earlier form may have derived from the 
Latin lumen, or light, "loomings" connotes a potential dawning. Re­
lated words, to lumine, for example, or illumine, and the Latin lumi­
nare, heavenly body, all suggest qualities of light and reflected light. 
Ishmael must go to sea "whenever my hypos get such an upper hand 
of me" in order to escape the "lunacy" or reflected light of his "loom-
ings."13 Further, the primordial connotations of "loomings" indicate, 
throughout the quest that follows, that the origins of the quest are 
more important to Ishmael initially than some known goal. For he 
comes to define his own goals, and in so doing, defines a romantic 
theme: the rejection of theology and the substitution of personal 
myth.14 
It is clear from the beginning that Ishmael feels driven, com­
pelled, to the sea. At first glance, Ishmael suggests that the sea is an 
escape: "This is my substitute for pistol and ball. With a philosoph­
ical flourish Cato throws himself upon his sword; I quietly take to 
the ship." In his next thought, however, he implies that the sea itself 
embodies the same desire in every man: "There is nothing surpris­
ing in this. If they but knew it, almost all men in their degree, some 
time or other, cherish very nearly the same feelings toward the 
ocean with me" (p. 12). He cites the water-gazers, the land-bound 
tradesmen, as evidence that "almost all men," whether or not they 
consciously know it, share some subjective experience that moti­
vates them to act, and states, "Yes, as every one knows, meditation 
and water are wedded for ever" (p. 13). 
The meditative act is one kind of reflection for Ishmael, also in­
volving a looming, a dawning of light. Thus he explains the story of 
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Narcissus, "who because he could not grasp the tormenting, mild 
image he saw in the fountain, plunged into it and was drowned." 
The image Narcissus sees is that of his own "self reflected in the 
water; but it is also all of nature, as Ishmael explains. "But that 
same image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans." The image of 
nature reflected in the sea and the reflection of self viewed in medi­
tation are one and the same thing. "It is the image of the ungraspa­
ble phantom of life; and this is the key to it all" (p. 14). 
The looming moment is the one just prior to visual manifestation, 
just before the phantom assumes form. It is the earliest impulse of 
the oceanic nonmanifest to become a wave of creation; and thus the 
verbal force of "loomings" suggests a prelude to action. Ishmael sees 
and motivates in one nebulous compulsion: going to sea is his medi­
tation; the nature of self-reflection is the recreation and display of 
creation; and mystery, all that he does not understand, initially 
motivates him. Ishmael explains this compulsion as "an everlasting 
itch for things remote. I love to sail forbidden seas, and land on 
barbarous coasts" (p. 16). Going to sea thus securely "grounds" the 
former landsman, but in a more satisfying way; the meditative act 
fulfills a basic need in water gazers; and the ocean of forms and 
patterns incorporated in the novel reflects the intensity of the light 
the narrator achieves. Moby-Dick is Melville's attempt to construct 
a many-faceted "scope," an instrument of vision. As Charles Feidel­
son expresses it, "The first chapter of Moby-Dick is the statement of 
a point of view. Ishmael opens his narrative by identifying voyage 
with vision: the field of man's vision is the sea . . . the sensibility of 
the individual man opens onto the ocean. . . . Beneath the jocular 
tone these initial paragraphs create an effect of irrepressible need. 
The attraction of the mind to the sea is life itself as a quest for 
knowledge."15 
Ishmael's response to the oil painting on the wall in the Spouter-
Inn characterizes in small his approach to knowledge in the novel. 
He describes what he sees: 
But what most puzzled and confounded you was a long, limber, 
portentous, black mass of something hovering in the centre of the 
picture over three blue, dim, perpendicular lines floating in a name­
less yeast. A boggy, soggy, squitchy picture truly, enough to drive a 
nervous man distracted. Yet was there a sort of indefinite, half-
attained, unimaginable sublimity about it that fairly froze you to it, 
till you involuntarily took an oath with yourself to find out what that 
marvellous painting meant. Ever and anon a bright, but, alas, decep­
tive idea would dart you through.—It's the Black Sea in a midnight 
gale.—It's the unnatural combat of the four primal elements.—It's a 
blasted heath.—It's a Hyperborean winter scene.—It's the breaking­
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up of the ice-bound stream of Time. But at last all these fancies 
yielded to that one portentous something in the picture's midst. That 
once found out, and all the rest were plain. But stop; does it not bear a 
faint resemblance to a gigantic fish? even the great leviathan himself? 
(p. 20) 
The irony of the multitude of his farfetched interpretations of the 
painting is emphasized by the conspicuous lack of any theological 
interpretation—for, with regard to the pervasive symbolism of the 
rest of the novel, a reader might wonder why Ishmael does not also 
think of the Trinity, or the three crosses of the Crucifixion. But the 
dramatic "stop" Ishmael puts to the process of interpretation 
suggests his substitution of whaling for theology: it is a democratic 
theme, whose legends have not yet been imbued with religious sig­
nificance, and whose factual lore has not even been properly inter­
preted. "In fact, the artist's design seemed this: a final theory of my 
own, partly based upon the aggregated opinions of many aged per­
sons with whom I conversed upon the subject. The picture represents 
a Cape-Horner in a great hurricane; the half-foundered ship welter­
ing there with its three dismantled masts alone visible; and an 
exasperated whale, purposing to spring clean over the craft, is in the 
enormous act of impaling himself upon the three mast-heads" (pp. 
20-21). Ishmael's own interpretation is very funny, and seems to be 
quite as arbitrary as the interpretations he rejects. 
In light of the correspondence he discovers in the sea as a symbol 
of the source of knowledge, Ishmael's choice to interpret the "name­
less yeast" of the painting as a seascape becomes less arbitrary. He 
has already recognized that whaling is a poetic conceit: "in the wild 
conceits that swayed me to my purpose, two and two there floated 
into my inmost soul, endless processions of the whale, and, midmost 
of them all, one grand hooded phantom, like a snow hill in the air" 
(p. 16). And in narrating Moby-Dick Ishmael retrospectively orders 
the process by which, as a young man, he came to focus on whaling 
as a vehicle for resolving the miscellaneous struggles of conscious­
ness before it becomes conscious of itself, finds a voice, and identifies 
a quest. Marking becomes his literary method as well as his epis­
temological technique for arriving at self-consciousness.16 
Moby-Dick begins at the beginning of Ishmael's quest, not in 
medias res. Ishmael the storyteller has learned from Ishmael the 
man: the process of achieving symbolic significance originates in 
concrete detail. Thus, although Ishmael suspects that his quest for 
origins will lead him to pursue the "snow hill in the air," he also 
realizes that his more immediate problems concern food and lodg­
ing. He does not disregard the practical goals of the whaling indus­
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try that resulted in the opulence of the houses in New Bedford; there 
are material gains from "light" as well as philosophical ones. Mo­
tives for founding the garden in the new world—for planting parks 
"upon this once scraggy scoria of a country" (p. 38)—were economic 
as well as religious. 
Neither does Ishmael allow economy to replace theology (he has 
his own substitute—he is willing to accept any "lay" for a berth on 
the Pequod and a chance to pursue metaphysical phantoms), and on 
his first morning in New Bedford, he begins his landed leave-taking 
by visiting a chapel. His decision to seek a congenial berth in a 
whaling ship has led him to consider his grave. Yet he dissociates 
his metaphysical curiosity from his own death. 
Yes, there is death in this business of whaling—a speechlessly quick 
chaotic bundling of a man into Eternity. But what then? Methinks we 
have hugely mistaken this matter of Life and Death. Methinks that 
what they call my shadow here on earth is my true substance. 
Methinks that in looking at things spiritual, we are too much like 
oysters observing the sun through the water, and thinking that thick 
water the thinnest of air. Methinks my body is but the lees of my 
better being. In fact take my body who will, take it I say, it is not me. 
(p. 41) 
Ishmael's attempt at self-conviction here mixes false bravado and 
genuine innocence and parodies Emersonian Platonism; at the same 
time, he tries to interpret the significance of Father Mapple's 
masthead pulpit: "there must be some sober reason for this thing; 
furthermore, it must symbolize something unseen. Can it be, then, 
that by that act of physical isolation, he signifies his spiritual with­
drawal for the time, from all outward worldly ties and connexions?" 
(p. 43). Ishmael finds that the "act of physical isolation" must "sym­
bolize something unseen" and thereby explains his fascination for 
things that are marked—isolated from their own kind. This fascina­
tion leads Ishmael to accept Queequeg as a bedfellow: "With much 
interest I sat watching him. Savage though he was, and hideously 
marred about the face—at least to my taste—his countenance yet 
had a something in it which was by no means disagreeable. You 
cannot hide the soul" (pp. 51-52). And it leads him to choose the 
grotesquely inlaid and antiquely marked Pequod as his literal whal­
ing vehicle. 
Within his transcendental epistemology, by which Ishmael aligns 
himself with other marked objects and creatures and attempts 
spiritual withdrawal, the contrast of dialectical opposition becomes 
his point of view, his reminder of his own mortality and its inner 
spiritual essence. Lying in bed with Queequeg, having overcome his 
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initial aversion to the cannibal's tattoos, he understands the essence 
of dialectical self-consciousness: 
truly to enjoy bodily warmth, some small part of you must be cold, for 
there is no quality in this world that is not what it is merely by 
contrast. Nothing exists in itself. If you flatter yourself that you are 
all over comfortable, and have been so a long time, then you cannot be 
said to be comfortable any more. . . . For this reason a sleeping apart­
ment should never be furnished with a fire, which is one of the luxuri­
ous discomforts of the rich. For the height of this sort of deliciousness 
is to have nothing but the blanket between you and your snugness and 
the cold of the outer air. Then there you lie like the one warm spark in 
the heart of an arctic crystal, (p. 55) 
Later in the novel, he states, "as for me, if, by any possibility, there 
be any as yet undiscovered prime thing in me . . . then here I pro­
spectively ascribe all the honor and the glory to whaling" (p. 101). 
The "prime thing" and the "warm spark" that the narrator hopes to 
discover finds its physical correspondence in the whaler's search for 
sperm oil, for "the whaleman, as he seeks the food of light, so he 
lives in light. He makes his berth an Aladdin's lamp, and lays him 
down in it; so that in the pitchiest night the ship's black hull still 
houses an illumination" (p. 355). The light and spiritual heat 
Ishmael comes to associate with sperm oil, landlessness, and mast­
head reverie form the corresponding physical "cure" for his meta­
physical problem, his soul's "drizzly November." He leaves behind 
his landed Presbyterianism: "meditation and water are wedded 
forever." 
In my introductory chapter, I discussed the relationship between 
Eastern meditation techniques and American transcendentalism. 
There are moments at the masthead where Ishmael seems to 
achieve a state of "transcendence" that resembles Eastern en­
lightenment, and in retrospect, Father Mapple's pulpit loses some of 
its queerness. Ishmael calls himself "a dreamy meditative man" (p. 
136), and he confesses that from his vantage point a hundred feet 
above the decks, he "kept but sorry guard," having "the problem of 
the universe revolving in me" (p. 139). He describes the masthead 
experience in Emersonian terms: 
but lulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, unconscious 
reverie is this absent-minded youth by the blending cadence of waves 
with thoughts, that at last he loses his identity; takes the mystic 
ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless 
soul, pervading mankind and nature; and every strange, half-seen, 
gliding, beautiful thing that eludes him; every dimly-discovered, up­
rising fin of some undiscernible form, seems to him the embodiment of 
those elusive thoughts that only people the soul by continually flitting 
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through it. In this enchanted mood, thy spirit ebbs away to whence it 
came; becomes diffused through time and space. . . . (p. 140) 
He later writes, "in that dreamy mood losing all consciousness, at 
last my soul went out of my body" (p. 241). The experience becomes a 
common one—"that unaccountable drowsiness which ever would 
come over me at a midnight helm" (p. 354). 
The Eastern influence does not pervade the surface of the novel, 
and as theology Ishmael rejects it as he rejects all theologies, but its 
presence is unmistakable.17 In one passage, marked by the pecul­
iarly humorous tone Ishmael adopts whenever he speaks directly of 
spiritual philosophies, Christian or pagan, he talks about the Indian 
Vedas, "or mystical books, whose perusal would seem to have been 
indispensable to Vishnoo before beginning the creation, and which 
therefore must have contained something in the shape of practical 
hints to young architects, these Vedas were lying at the bottom of 
the waters; so Vishnoo became incarnate in a whale, and sounding 
down in him to the uttermost depths, rescued the sacred volumes. 
Was not this Vishnoo a whale-man, then? even as a man who rides a 
horse is called a horseman?" (p. 306). The word veda, in Sanskrit, 
means knowledge; thus the Vedas refer both to the eternal truth 
that, by its nature, is timeless, and to the earliest cognized form of 
this knowledge by the epic poet Veda Vyasa about 5,000 years ago.18 
Melville deals with both the philosophical and the literal notion of 
the Vedas. Literally, he jokes about "Vishnoo" rescuing "the sacred 
volumes." Although Vishnu names a particular Hindu deity, this 
deity is itself just one manifestation in Eastern philosophy of three 
essential forces of life, or gunas. These forces are contained in the 
interplay between sattva, rajas, and tamas, roughly the forces that 
express creation, put it forth and maintain it, and serve to retard or 
destroy its growth.19 Vishnu manifests the rajas guna, and thus, in 
Melville's analogy, represents the force in creation that provides the 
initial spur to put forth; thus he "rescued" the Vedas. 
The conceptual connection between this rajas force and the 
whale's activities clarifies Ishmael's own compulsion for landless­
ness. Ishmael describes "Vishnoo," incarnate in a whale, "sounding 
down in him to the uttermost depths." The whale's activity of 
"sounding" or diving provides Ishmael's own link in the analogy 
between ocean gazing and meditation.20 The noun "sound" and the 
verb have different origins, according to The Oxford English Dictio­
nary. The noun originates from the Latin sonus, or melody, and the 
verb from the Old English sund, or sea. The associative link between 
the two may possibly be that sound results from vibrations striking 
62 I The Mark and the Knowledge 
the eardrum, but not from diving. Diving in water does produce 
sensation in the eardrum, however; and the verb sound may as­
sociate these two vibratory effects. Physics has demonstrated that 
sound travels through water in physical waves. Ishmael expresses 
his knowledge of an "inner ear" that deepens ordinary hearing as 
"inner vision" suggests more than ordinary sight. "Is it not curious, 
that so vast a being as the whale should see the world through so 
small an eye, and hear the thunder through an ear which is smaller 
than a hare's? But if his eyes were broad as the lens of Herschel's 
great telescope; and his ears capacious as the porches of cathedrals; 
would that make him any longer of sight, or sharper of hearing? Not 
at all.—Why then do you try to 'enlarge' your mind? Subtilize it" (p. 
280). It is therefore interesting to note that sounds—particular 
words or "mantras"—are used extensively as literal vehicles for 
"diving" in Indian meditation techniques.21 Without possessing 
knowledge of these Eastern techniques, Ishmael still finds the most 
life-supporting vehicle available to him, which for Ishmael the 
whaleman is the pursuit of the whale (if only he could be pursued at 
the depths he sounds) and for Ishmael the narrator the established 
cognition and realization of his quest as a metaphysical conceit. 
A. N. Kaul writes, Ishmael "comes very close to regarding [the 
universe] as one indivisible totality—a vast ambiguity of man, fish, 
and the elements, of good and evil. But while such an insight bears 
remarkable affinity to the viewpoint of oriental metaphysics, 
Ishmael achieves it not through oriental contemplation but through 
sustained action. Though he does not pursue Moby-Dick out of ven­
geance, yet pursue him he must if he is to comprehend him and to 
resolve the problem of the universe."22 Ishmael's moments on the 
masthead are analogous to "oriental contemplation" in the sense 
that being on the lookout for whales provides him with a focus or 
"mantra" for meditation. As Howard Vincent expresses it, "Whaling 
is the tonic chord to which we turn again and again, finally concen­
trating on one particular whale."23 In my understanding of trans­
cendental meditation, there is no contradiction between contempla­
tion and what Kaul terms "sustained action." Contemplation or 
meditation is a prelude to action, not a retreat from it. The world of 
action serves to deepen the experience of meditation. In this sense, 
Ishmael's "pursuit" of the whale is as much metaphysical as it is 
physical. As Feidelson writes, "He who would follow Ishmael must 
exert the symbolic imagination, for Ishmael's 'pursuit' of the whale 
is the evolution of an image. Although the meanings that develop 
are disquieting, and the whole process tends to become a 'fiery hunt,' 
he has no other approach."24 Ishmael's ability to "evolve his image," 
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in Feidelson's words, increases as a result of his time on the mast­
head. His "meditations" on the whale increase Melville's powers as a 
symbolist. 
But meditation in whatever form produces only moments of trans­
cendence; beneath the masthead exist the "Descartian" vortices, the 
sharks beneath the surface calm of the sea. If, as Ishmael describes 
his experience amidst the "grand armada of whales," "amid the 
tornadoed Atlantic of my being, do I myself still for ever centrally 
disport in mute calm; and while ponderous planets of unwaning woe 
revolve round me, deep down and deep inland there I still bathe me 
in eternal mildness of joy" (p. 326). Amid the "eternal mildness," 
equally, there lurks the "tornadoed Atlantic of my being." Such is 
Pip's experience, which Ishmael mentions "is common in that 
fishery; and in the sequel of the narrative, it will then be seen what 
like abandonment befell myself (p. 347): 
The intense concentration of self in the middle of such a heartless 
immensity, my God! who can tell it? . .  . The sea had jeeringly kept his 
finite body up, but drowned the infinite of his soul. Not drowned 
entirely, though. Rather carried down alive to wondrous depths, 
where strange shapes of the unwarped primal world glided to and fro 
before his«passive eyes. . .  . He saw God's foot upon the treadle of the 
loom, and spoke it; and therefore his shipmates called him mad. So 
man's insanity is heaven's sense, (p. 347) 
This loom is the ocean floor in Ishmael's "Vishnoo" analogy; it is the 
"unwarped primal world;" and it is such a powerful experience that 
it is, in Wordsworth's phrase, "all gratulant if rightly understood." If 
imperfectly understood or unknown, those initial "loomings" that 
prelude manifestation become twisted into the loomings of pur­
poselessness, lack of reference, lunacy; "and therefore his shipmates 
called him mad. . . ,"25 
In the early chapters of the novel, then, Melville establishes 
Ishmael's subjective search. He suggests that understanding the 
unknown, "landlessness," provides the object of his quest, that whal­
ing provides his means, and that Ishmael's fascination with mark­
ings expresses his attempt to transcend an inner spiritual dissatis­
faction. With the appearance of Ahab, Ishmael's miscellaneous 
"loomings" find their fullest focus, and Ahab's own quest for Moby 
Dick becomes Ishmael's adoptive search. 
Ill 
Ishmael enters into a consideration of Ahab's significance by ex­
amining his physical marks in the same process that has initiated 
his various speculations from the opening of the narrative. When 
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Ahab first appears on the deck of the Pequod Ishmael states, "reality 
outran apprehension." Even more scarred than Ishmael had imag­
ined, Ahab's brand literally and completely marks him, as extensive 
tattooing and hieroglyphs mark Queequeg and the white whale. The 
visual effect of the scars recalls Hawthorne's treatment of physical 
marks. "Threading its way out from among his grey hairs, and con­
tinuing right down one side of his tawny scorched face and neck, till 
it disappeared in his clothing, you saw a slender rod-like mark, 
lividly whitish. . . . Whether that mark was born with him, or 
whether it was the scar left by some desperate wound, no one could 
certainly say" (p. 110). The superstition circulates among the crew 
that "if ever Captain Ahab should be tranquilly laid out—which 
might hardly come to pass . . .—then, whoever should do that last 
office for the dead, would find a birthmark on him from crown to 
sole" (p. 110). Contrary to expectation, it is not the leg itself that 
Ishmael first notices: 
So powerfully did the whole grim aspect of Ahab affect me, and the 
livid brand which streaked it, that for the first few moments I hardly 
noted that not a little of this overbearing grimness was owing to the 
barbaric white leg upon which he partly stood. . . . 
I was struck with the singular posture he maintained, (p. 110) 
And Ishmael concludes, "after that morning, he was every day visi­
ble to the crew" (p. 111). 
Ahab's visibility has greater significance for Ishmael than for the 
rest of the sailors, however, and the second major section of the 
novel, beginning particularly with chapter 28, "Ahab," meditates on 
this significance.26 Ishmael attempts, particularly in the chapters 
"Moby Dick" and "The Whiteness of the Whale," the metaphysical 
interpretation of markings, of legends; but his metaphysical specu­
lation at this point in the narrative takes the form of his narrative 
concentration on Ahab, and the order and unity of the section pro­
vide a blueprint for both Ishmael's interpretation of Ahab and the 
reader's interpretation of Ishmael. 
The unity of the second major narrative section is established in 
two ways. First, this is the only section in the novel where Ahab and 
Ishmael both function together in presence aboard the ship. After 
chapter 42, "The Whiteness of the Whale," Ishmael as character 
does not appear again until the end of the novel, with a couple of 
brief exceptions, and Ahab does not make an extended appearance 
again until chapter 99, "The Doubloon." Second, although the 
events within the section do not all take place during the same day, 
Melville nevertheless achieves temporal unity in the progression 
from early morning when Ahab first appears on deck, to "The Cabin 
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Table" (chap. 34) and "The Mast-Head" stillness—"it is noon" (p. 
130), to Ahab's solitary watch at "Sunset," to the "First Night-
Watch," and to "Forecastle.—Midnight," in the chapter just preced­
ing Ishmael's reflections on "Moby Dick" and "Whiteness." 
Ishmael the narrator imposes this order, not Ishmael the sailor; 
and he resolves not only Ahab's retrospective significance but also 
his own function as a character in the fiction. Ishmael remains liter­
ally on board the Pequod in the early chapters of this section until 
the narrator, revealing the internal logic of the work, draws a corre­
spondence between his own metaphysical fears and Ahab's exter­
nalized, physical means of dealing with similar fears. Ahab's en­
trance into the novel makes it possible for Ishmael to step back from 
dramatic action. He thus becomes an observer of the scene he nar­
rates, as the middle chapter of the section, "The Mast-Head," indi­
cates. 
I have discussed Ishmael's description of the meditative experi­
ence the lookout evokes. In the context of "The Mast-Head," it is 
clear that Ishmael's view operates at some physical remove—"a 
hundred feet above the silent decks" (p. 136). Throughout the rest of 
the novel, as omniscient narrator, he retains his position at the 
mast, able to observe without actually being part of the scene. The 
microcosmic contrast Melville sets up here between the action below 
on deck and the drama of Ishmael's metaphysical warfare recalls 
White-Jacket's moments of introspection. For like White-Jacket, 
Ishmael, too, experiences the world in a man-of-war; he is such a 
world, such a man in conflict, and thus the masthead is not a "crow's 
nest," as much as he might like it to be. (The crow's nest on the 
Greenland whaler, by contrast, contains a partial enclosure, se­
curely furnished with locker, rifle, and bottle [p. 137].) 
In the drama that follows, Ahab becomes an understudy for the 
Ishmael who remains on the narrative mast. Ishmael's fascination 
with Ahab seems initiated by the brand Ahab wears; but in fact, 
Ishmael further "marks" Ahab's meaning because of the 
similarities, as well as the differences, in their pursuits. Ishmael's 
narrative treatment of Ahab is not unlike Hawthorne's narrator's 
treatment of Chillingworth. For Chillingworth, and for the storytel­
ler who would be an interpreter of signs, knowledge may lead to 
(self) possession. 
As Captain Peleg expresses it earlier in the novel, "'stricken, 
blasted, if he be, Ahab has his humanities!'" (p. 77). And Ishmael 
apostrophizes him: "Oh, Ahab! what shall be grand in thee, it must 
needs be plucked at from the skies, and dived for in the deep, and 
featured in the unbodied air!" (p. 130). Ahab's mystery hides some­
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thing "grand" for Ishmael, and his narrative exploration of Ahab, 
"diving deep" into the captain's grimness, is akin to searching for 
"any as yet undiscoverable prime thing in me." Ahab has his own 
meditative tendencies, is engaged in his own ontological pursuit: 
"'Hark ye yet again,—the little lower layer. All visible objects, man, 
are but as pasteboard masks. But in each event—in the living act, 
the undoubted deed—there, some unknown but still reasoning thing 
puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning 
mask'" (p. 144). His desire to "strike through the mask," to pene­
trate "that inscrutable thing," is akin to Ishmael's need to experi­
ence the unknown, to see beneath the literal surface. Much later in 
the novel, Ahab again shows his direct metaphysical fraternity with 
Ishmael's concerns when he states, "O Nature, and O soul of man! 
how far beyond all utterance are your linked analogies! not the 
smallest atom stirs or lives in matter, but has its cunning duplicate 
in mind" (p. 264). But the philosophical contrast is as striking as the 
similarities; like Ahab, Ishmael views the "linked analogies" but 
unlike Ahab, who vows, "'and be the white whale agent, or be the 
white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon him'" (p. 144), he 
does not attribute malice to the inscrutable. Yet Ishmael is reticent 
to reveal any man's weaknesss of character: "for it is a thing most 
sorrowful, nay shocking, to expose the fall of valor in the soul . . . 
man, in the ideal, is so noble and so sparkling, such a grand and 
glowing creature, that over any ignominious blemish in him all his 
fellows should run to throw their costliest robes" (p. 104). If Ahab, 
like Chillingworth, is demonically maddened, Ishmael, unlike 
Hawthorne's narrator, does not condemn him for it. Ahab becomes a 
focus for Ishmael's own pursuit in spite of his madness, not because 
of it.27 
Ishmael explicitly claims his fraternity with Ahab in the opening 
lines of "Moby Dick": 
I, Ishmael, was one of that crew; my shouts had gone up with the 
rest; my oath had been welded with theirs; and stronger I shouted, and 
more did I hammer and clinch my oath, because of the dread in my 
soul. A wild, mystical, sympathetical feeling was in me; Ahab's 
quenchless feud seemed mine. (p. 155) 
Ishmael initially aligns his sympathies with Ahab in part because 
he also has "marked" Moby Dick—the "snowhill in the air." Like 
Ahab, Ishmael attributes a fundamental malice to the whale, an 
"unexampled, intelligent malignity," but his imagination is 
"struck" by the whale's marked physical characteristics and legen­
dary intelligence: 
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But even stripped of these supernatural surmisings, there was 
enough in the earthly make and incontestable character of the mons­
ter to strike the imagination with unwonted power. For, it was not so 
much his uncommon bulk that so much distinguished him from other 
sperm whales, but, as was elsewhere thrown out—a peculiar snow-
white wrinkled forehead, and a high, pyramidical white hump. These 
were his prominent features; the tokens whereby, even in the limit­
less, uncharted seas, he revealed his identity, at a long distance, to 
those who knew him. (p. 159) 
Similarly, the physical encounter, the malignant "assault," initi­
ated Ahab's obsession. Since the moment of that encounter, "Ahab 
had cherished a wild vindictiveness against the whale, all the more 
fell for that in his frantic morbidness he at last came to identify with 
him, not only all his bodily woes, but all his intellectual and 
spiritual exasperations" (p. 160). Ishmael's spiritual "thirst" man­
ifests itself, in Ahab, as a "quenchless" blood thirst. "Ahab and 
anguish lay stretched together in one hammock . . . then it was, that 
his torn body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so interfus­
ing, made him mad" (p. 160). It was not just the physical encounter 
with the whale but the deepening influence of physical pain, and the 
gradual "interfusing" of mental and physical anguish, that leads to 
Ahab's madness—not an ordinary madness, like Ishmael's spleen, 
but a demoniac madness, "'I am madness maddened! That wild 
madness that's only calm to comprehend itself!'" (p. 147). Ahab's 
spiritual anguish turns to physical pain, and his metaphysical quest 
into a real hunt. 
But for Ishmael, Moby Dick's physical markings and Ahab's phys­
ical hunt lead to metaphysical speculation, and in the final chapter 
of the section, he considers the problem of interpreting the whale's 
"whiteness." Further, he establishes a division between Ahab's hunt 
and his own pursuit: "What the white whale was to Ahab, has 
been hinted; what, at times, he was to me, as yet remains unsaid" (p. 
163). For Ishmael, the whale is one more vehicle; it is means, not 
end. For Ahab, Moby Dick remains the goal of the quest. "The 
Whiteness of the Whale" results from Ishmael's careful plotting, 
first of his choice of whaling, of the Pequod, and then of Ahab and 
Moby Dick, as his particular focus for narrative quest, and from 
establishing Ahab as the character within the narrative who will 
continue the physical pursuit while Ishmael becomes the incon­
spicuous meditative whaleman content to follow the chase at some 
distance and to engage in his own metaphysical speculations as 
accompaniment and counterpoint to the dramatic action taking 
place below him on deck. The narrator essentially frees himself from 
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participation in the action and achieves, in "Whiteness," his 
"deepest dive" into interpretive meditation. 
"Whiteness" marks the successful achievement of one narrative 
problem, and thus, after the "First Lowering" into dramatic action 
following the expository chapter, Ahab does not again appear in the 
novel until much later. But it also develops a new narrative concern 
that Ishmael introduced in chapter 32, "Cetology," and that emerges 
as an extension of both Ishmael's Platonism and his achievement of 
narrative distance at the masthead. Ishmael's style in "Whiteness" 
is logical exposition, and he develops his argument by an accumula­
tion of references to whiteness that contrast "whatever is sweet, and 
honorable, and sublime" with that "elusive something in the inner­
most idea of this hue, which strikes more of panic to the soul than 
that redness which affrights in blood" (p. 164). Yet "aside from those 
more obvious considerations touching Moby Dick, which could not 
but occasionally awaken in any man's soul some alarm, there was 
another thought, or rather vague, nameless horror concerning him, 
which at times by its intensity completely overpowered all the rest; 
and yet so mystical and well nigh ineffable was it, that I almost 
despair of putting it in a comprehensible form. It was the whiteness 
of the whale that above all things appalled me. But how can I hope 
to explain myself here; and yet, in some dim, random way, explain 
myself I must, else all these chapters might be naught" (p. 163). 
The "despair" that Ishmael expresses in this passage is occasioned 
by the ineffability he faces, by the difficulty of explaining the 
whale's "mystical" horror in a "comprehensible form." Yet if he does 
not succeed in "explaining" himself, "all these chapters might be 
naught." He has replaced his initial pursuit of the "snowhill in the 
air" by his search for a way to "explain myself; Ahab's whale hunt 
becomes the focus of his story, but he must also find a way to tell 
that story, must create a comprehensible form for the overpowering 
intensity that "whitens" him, appalls him. By telling the story, 
Ishmael may "share" it as well as find a container—hence a finite 
limitation—for the internal chaos that led him to the sea in the first 
place. In "Cetology," he stated, "the classification of the constituents 
of a chaos, nothing less is here essayed" (p. 117). Thus Ishmael's 
pursuit, for all its metaphysical semblance, is akin to Ahab's physi­
cal hunt: if he can make a convincing correspondence between cos­
mos and microcosmos, he will succeed in externalizing his own 
demon—the grimness about his mouth, his soul's "drizzly Novem­
ber." Art, for Ishmael, becomes a constructive scapegoat, as well as a 
vehicle for self-knowledge and spiritual transcendence. 
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IV 
In "Whiteness," he recognizes the goal of his achievement but he 
recognizes also that he must bridge the elements of his dialectical 
vision in order to reach that goal. The symbolism by which man 
accounts for whiteness enables him to view himself, to make objects 
out of his own subjective perception of the world. But Ishmael is 
dissatisfied with all symbolizing that emerges from mood making 
and wants to understand that deepest perception of whiteness, by 
which it "calls up a peculiar apparition to the soul." To account for 
this apparition is, "without dissent," necessary for the man of sense, 
in order to retain his sense and avoid "madness maddened"; and yet, 
to directly analyze it, "would seem impossible" (p. 166). 
Ishmael continues, "Let us try. But in a matter like this, subtlety 
appeals to subtlety, and without imagination no man can follow 
another into these halls. And though, doubtless, some at least of the 
imaginative impressions about to be presented may have been 
shared by most men, yet few perhaps were entirely conscious of 
them at the time, and therefore may not be able to recall them now" 
(p. 167). The logic he would use, in an attempt to achieve that "fixed 
point," is the logic of imagination, the logic of analogy; and he as­
serts (recalling his opening claims in "Loomings" that linked every 
man, whether or not he realizes it, to the sea) that there are levels of 
experience that may not have been cognized at the conscious level, 
but that nevertheless remain "imaginative impressions" that may 
be appealed to by the subliminal logic Ishmael proposes to use. The 
presentational style of the chapter begins at this point to assume the 
characteristics of a Platonic dialogue, Ishmael setting forth points 
that need to be dealt with, backing off in defense, agreeing, dis­
agreeing, questioning; and in all, attempting the objective view of 
his subject that will lead him to the construction of a formal bridge 
to ease the dialectical opposition he described as "the one warm 
spark at the heart of an arctic crystal," and that he begins to clarify 
in "Whiteness" and succeeding chapters. 
After Ishmael's introspections on whiteness, the direction of the 
narrative moves outwards. In the portion of the novel that "White­
ness" concludes, the narrator's attention seems to have acquired a 
new focus, Ahab; and although there is a narrative transition here, 
after which Ahab becomes a tangential concern until the final sec­
tion, the first question the narrator addresses after "Whiteness" 
concerns Ahab's management of time before he can hope to find 
Moby Dick. He writes, "the premature hour of the Pequod's sailing 
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had, perhaps, been covertly selected by Ahab, with a view to this 
very complexion of things. Because, an interval of three hundred 
and sixty-five days and nights was before him; an interval which, 
instead of impatiently enduring ashore, he would spend in a miscel­
laneous hunt" (p. 174). In chapter 46, "Surmises," he considers 
Ahab's reasons for continuing to hunt other whales besides Moby 
Dick. It may be, he reasons, that Ahab was "by nature and long 
habituation far too wedded to a fiery whaleman's ways, altogether to 
abandon the collateral prosecution of the voyage" (p. 182). He rejects 
the possibility that Ahab's monomania may have extended to all 
sperm whales and concludes, 
the subtle insanity of Ahab respecting Moby Dick was noways more 
significantly manifested than in his superlative sense and shrewdness 
in foreseeing that, for the present, the hunt should in some way be 
stripped of that strange imaginative impiousness which naturally in­
vested it; that the full terror of the voyage must be kept withdrawn 
into the obscure background (for few men's courage is proof against 
protracted meditation unrelieved by action); that when they stood 
their long night watches, his officers and men must have some nearer 
things to think of than Moby Dick. (p. 183) 
Ahab realizes that the "final and romantic object," Moby Dick, will 
not sustain the men throughout the long search, without some 
"hopes of cash—aye, cash" (p. 184). 
The problem Ahab confronts in these chapters is also Ishmael's 
narrative problem. In the rest of the novel, like Ahab, Ishmael faces 
the necessity of sustained effort. The "full terror" of the novel, as 
well as the hunt, must be withdrawn into the background. The nar­
rative parenthesis expresses the significance of introspective 
tension—"for few men's courage is proof against protracted medita­
tion unrelieved by action." In spite of moments of unity on the 
masthead, or of extended metaphysical speculation ("Whiteness"), 
Ishmael understands that prolonged exposure to the elements of 
nature and of soul may test or break the courage of a strong man. 
Thus, Pip's excessive concentration of "self in the middle of the sea 
clouds his sanity. However surely Ishmael's inner desire continually 
leads him to return to masthead meditation, his moments of intro­
spection are eased and his capacity renewed in dramatic action. This 
is the necessary balance he phrases between "meditation and ac­
tion." The opening moment—"Call me Ishmael"—and the Epilogue 
collapse the novel into a nucleus. Ishmael arrives at the point in 
consciousness at which he can state, "Call me Ishmael," by having 
moved through his own concentration of self in the middle of the sea, 
in the Epilogue. Yet in order to move from opening to ending mo­
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ments meaningfully in the novel, Ishmael must expand the full 
cumulative manifestation of deepening awareness; and thus he 
eases the narrative exposition and masthead reverie by the 
explicitly dramatic scenes. 
The dramatic action not only eases and renews the meditative 
facility but it also prepares for new insight; it actually creates the 
physical situation that then may be transcended in meditation. In 
the broad scheme of the novel, neither the narrator nor the reader is 
sufficiently prepared to realize the eventual significance of Ahab's 
encounter with Moby Dick in these yet early moments of the narra­
tive. At the same time, action serves as a necessary prelude to the 
accumulation of significance, realized and articulated in the intro­
spective moments. Thus, Ahab instructs his men to keep an eye out 
for whales; and thus, Ishmael comes down from the masthead to 
participate in the first lowering and enacts his mortal fears by draft­
ing his will. The narration of events in this first lowering pushes 
ther dramatic action further; it also creates new opportunities for 
the introspective narrator.28 
This process—the alternation of introspection and action, inward 
and outward focus—becomes firmly established throughout the 
third large narrative section of the novel, which I mark as beginning 
after "Whiteness," and continuing for more than half the novel's 
length until another turn occurs roughly between the chapters 'The 
Doubloon" (chap. 99) and "Ahab's Leg" (chap. 106). One clear exam­
ple of the narrative progression of meditation and action is indicated 
by the sequence of chapters beginning with "Stubb Kills a Whale" 
(chap. 61), dramatic action that necessitates explanation in 'The 
Dart" and "The Crotch" (chaps. 62 and 63); these chapters are then 
followed by more action, in "Stubb's Supper" (64), which necessi­
tates further exposition, "The Whale as a Dish" (65). The introspec­
tive extension of the cetological exposition may lead to Ishmael's 
comic view, as in "The Shark Massacre" (66); or to his metaphysical 
speculations concerning the treachery hidden beneath life's 
"loveliest tints of azure," in "Brit" (chap. 58), "Squid" (59), "The 
Grand Armada" (87), and "The Castaway" (93). The reader must 
have "nearer things to think of than Ahab's pursuit, whereas 
Ishmael tries to overcome the limitations of his own vision—"all 
this to explain, would be to dive deeper than Ishmael can go"—and 
like Ahab, he contents himself for the duration with the discrete 
insights that result from miscellaneous metaphysical meditation 
and that he expresses as objective exposition. 
Stylistically, the formal shifts into dramatic dialogue indicate the 
duality Ishmael balances. The most extensive stylistic shift occurs 
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just prior to "Moby Dick" and "Whiteness," in the chapter 
"Forecastle.—Midnight," in which the narrator limits his exposition 
to brief and parenthetical stage directions. The dramatic presenta­
tion emphasizes the absence of a narrator (Ishmael, by this chapter, 
has ascended the mast), maintaining the contrast between medita­
tion and action, although there are other points to the chapter—few 
sailors speak or sing more than once, and by far the majority of 
voices belong to Asian or island sailors, literally emphasizing a 
statement Ishmael made earlier in the novel, that "the native 
American liberally provides the brains, the rest of the world as 
generously supplying the muscles" (p. 108) of the whaling industry. 
The Pequod's deck microcosmically contains representatives from 
"the rest of the world." Ishmael's metaphysical quest has elements 
of nationality, for he also discovers, by contrast, his "American" 
identity. His "diving" into meditation becomes, itself, symbolic ac­
tivity; by going whaling, he dives also into the past, choosing to 
disembark from Nantucket, "the place where the first dead Ameri­
can whale was stranded" (p. 17)—suggesting that he must imagina­
tively travel back in time in order to understand his present histori­
cal situation. And he tells the reader to test for himself the truth of 
his assertion that "meditation and water are wedded forever"— 
"Should you ever be athirst in the great American desert" (p. 13), he 
claims, you will invariably be drawn to water if there is any to be 
found. 
The dialectical movement of the novel also explains the temporal 
inconsistency of "The Town-Ho's Story" (chap. 54) and "A Bower in 
the Arsacides" (chap. 102). Alan Cheuse suggests that Ishmael's 
relation of Steelkilt's story to the Spanish dons in Lima becomes one 
occasion during which he "practices" story telling. The "darker 
thread" of the story he tells there is the threat of mutiny that, owing 
to the "strange delicacy" of the sailors on board the Pequod who 
heard the full story of Steelkilt and Radney, but who did not circu­
late it ameng the rest of the crew, "never reached the ears of Captain 
Ahab or his mates" (p. 208). Ishmael realizes that the sailors did not 
tell the full story because they did not know "how," and Ishmael 
learns to do so in Lima, sometime after the Rachel picks him up but 
sometime before he begins the narration of Moby-Dick, because he is 
forced to define his terms. "'Lakeman!—Buffalo! Pray, what is a 
Lakeman, and where is Buffalo?' said Don Sebastian, rising in his 
swinging mat of grass" (p. 209). "'Canallers!' cried Don Pedro. 'We 
have seen many whale-ships in our harbors, but never heard of your 
Canallers. Pardon: who and what are they?'" (p. 214). Cheuse inter­
prets these questions as "the imperative directed to the American 
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narrator to define his terms,"29 and suggests that "The Town-Ho's 
Story" records that intermediate stage in Ishmael's evolution as a 
storyteller when he remains the pre-epic narrator. 
"Moby Dick!" cried Don Sebastian; "St. Dominic! Sir sailor, but do 
whales have christenings? Whom call you Moby Dick?" 
"A very white, and famous, and most deadly immortal monster, 
Don;—but that would be too long a story." (p. 221 )30 
Similarly, the "Bower in the Arsacides" records Ishmael's invita­
tion "years ago" from the (fictional) lord of Tranque to spend holi­
days, and to crawl inside the skeleton of the stranded sperm whale 
that the Arsacideans had deified. The measurements he makes are 
hasty (the priests object to his measuring their god) and he has them 
tattooed on his right arm, but "there are skeleton authorities you 
can refer to, to test my accuracy" (p. 375). 
The accuracy and the authority with which Ishmael here and 
elsewhere invests his metaphysical correspondences reflect his at­
tempt, as he states in "The Affidavit" (chap. 45), "to take away any 
incredulity which a profound ignorance of the entire subject may 
induce in some minds" (p. 175). "For this is one of those dishearten­
ing instances where truth requires full as much bolstering as error. 
So ignorant are most landsmen of some of the plainest and most 
palpable wonders of the world, that without some hints touching the 
plain facts, historical and otherwise, of the fishery, they might scout 
at Moby Dick as a monstrous fable, or still worse and more detesta­
ble, a hideous and intolerable allegory" (p. 177). "Fable" becomes 
one element in Ishmael's dialectic that, like theology, no longer 
sustains; he wants to construct a fabulous history that will assess 
and extend "plain facts, historical and otherwise," without resorting 
to the mechanics of allegory. Telling a believable story about the 
white whale will heal the schism between science and myth, and 
enable Ishmael to locate, in his authority as teller, his own myth of 
origins, the "warm spark," and the "prime thing." 
The novel becomes, therefore, a schoolroom, and the narrator's 
stance professorial. Chapter 55 opens, "I shall ere long paint to you 
as well as one can without canvas, something like the true form of 
the whale as he actually appears to the eye of the whaleman" (p. 
224). But in strict academic fashion, he first takes it upon himself to 
exhaust the "Monstrous Pictures of Whales" that prove false por­
traits, to credit the "Less Erroneous Pictures of Whales, and the 
True Pictures of Whaling Scenes," and to give an account of whales 
in other media, "in Paint; in Teeth; in Wood; in Sheet-Iron; in Stone; 
in Mountains; in Stars" (chap. 55, 56, 57). "But these manifold mis­
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takes in depicting the whale are not so very surprising after all. 
Consider! Most of the scientific drawings have been taken from the 
stranded fish; and these are about as correct as a drawing of a 
wrecked ship, with broken back, would correctly represent the noble 
animal itself in all its undashed pride of hull and spars. . . . The 
living whale, in his full majesty and significance, is only to be seen 
at sea in unfathomable waters" (p. 227). In addition, the skeleton of 
a whale provides very little clue to the appearance of his true form. 
He concludes, "the great Leviathan is that one creature in the world 
which must remain unpainted to the last" (p. 228). Precision is im­
possible in either a purely scientific or a purely imaginative por­
trayal of the whale. Only the subjective experience of "going 
a-whaling" will yield "a tolerable idea of his living contour," but the 
risks involved in such a means of gaining knowledge about the 
subject are fundamental—"you run no small risk of being eternally 
stove and sunk by him" (p. 228). In all, he warns the casual student 
away. 
In the following chapter, "Brit," Ishmael suggests that the dif­
ficulties in attempting a portrait of the whale that will be both 
objectively and subjectively valid is the historian's analogue to the 
dangers the sailor faces in leaving land behind. 
Consider all this; and then turn to this green, gentle, and most 
docile earth; consider them both, the sea and the land; and do you not 
find a strange analogy to something in yourself? For as this appalling 
ocean surrounds the verdant land, so in the soul of man there lies one 
insular Tahiti, full of peace and joy, but encompassed by all the 
horrors of the half known life. God keep thee! Push not off from that 
isle, thou canst never return! (p. 236) 
In emphasizing the dangers for the real and the ideal adventurer, 
the passage contains its own humor. Just as Ishmael's physical con­
cerns push him to desire that same precise knowledge of the whale 
he warns his readers against, so his metaphysics requires his 
theological "landlessness"; but the tone of mock danger that the 
passage reveals suggests a contrast between the physical and 
metaphysical dangers of Ahab's, contrasted with Ishmael's, quest; 
there are moments when even Ishmael cannot quite believe that the 
soul's dangers are as great as the body's, but he has chosen the 
former "perils" and must convince himself they are real. Ishmael is 
not alone in his attempt at self-conviction; and his exploration of 
"cetology" externalizes the problems of the scientific researcher who 
wishes to add something concrete to the body of knowledge. Just as 
Starbuck and Stubb represent the Janus faces of subjective perspec­
tive, a howl and a laugh,31 so there are heroic and mock-heroic 
Moby-Dick I 75 
approaches to objective knowledge and the objective portrayal of 
imaginative experience. 
Ishmael's chief concern, throughout the third expository section, 
might be phrased as the wisdom of logic compared and contrasted 
with the teachings of analogy. What lies at the essence of subjective 
knowledge that impels its objective manifestation? Why is it not in 
itself sufficient? And, conversely, what are the values as well as the 
limitations of empirical means of gaining knowledge? The emphasis 
on "cetology" pushes toward objectivity by using a scientific term to 
focus on knowledge that, in spite of science, can only be gained by 
"going a-whaling yourself." But the novelty of the term, in spite of 
the technical knowledge Melville does in fact reveal, creates a dual­
ity. "Cetology" itself is one vast analogy. 
Ishmael plays philosophically with this duality after Stubb cap­
tures his sperm whale by suspending his explanation of cutting-in 
and trying-out while Stubb and Flask kill a right whale. He then 
sets up the "two great whales, laying their heads together" on oppos­
ing sides of the ship, and says, "let us join them, and lay together our 
own. . .  . To the Nantucketer, they present the two extremes of all 
the known varieties of the whale. As the external difference be­
tween them is mainly observable in their heads; and as a head of 
each is this moment hanging from the Pequod's side; and as we may 
freely go from one to the other, by merely stepping across the 
deck:—where, I should like to know, will you obtain a better chance 
to study practical cetology than here?" (p. 278). "The Sperm Whale's 
Head—Contrasted View" (chap. 74) and "The Right Whale's 
Head—Contrasted View" (chap. 75) set up an artificial balance for 
the moment of exposition, during which the narrator suggests that 
the sperm whale's head represents Kant and the right whale's, 
Locke. The philosophical contrast between subjective versus objec­
tive means of gaining knowledge varies the problem of duality, but 
the narrator rejects the classification itself as an oversimplification 
that slows his pursuit—"throw all these thunderheads overboard, 
and then you will float light and right" (p. 277).32 
He continues his analogical method, cites the whale's visual ap­
paratus as evidence of his comprehensive and subtle mental facul­
ties, then interprets its superiority to man's. Concerning human 
powers of perception, "so long as a man's eyes are open in the light, 
the act of seeing is involuntary; that is, he cannot then help mechan­
ically seeing whatever objects are before him" (p. 279). However, the 
act of seeing may not be equated with the art of focusing; and from 
experience we know that it is impossible to focus on two separate 
points at the same instant. "But if you now come to separate these 
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two objects, and surround each by a circle of profound darkness; 
then, in order to see one of them, in such a manner as to bring your 
mind to bear on it, the other will be utterly excluded from your 
contemporary consciousness" (pp. 279-80). In the whale, he 
theorizes, since each eye possesses its own range of visual percep­
tion, without possibility of focus, both "must simultaneously act." 
This analysis of the position of the whale's eyes corresponds to the 
physical description of the scene on board the Pequod as well as to 
Ishmael's philosophical duality. For, as Ishmael implicitly compares 
the two, the Pequod itself becomes a massive head with two fronts, 
each whale head's "contrasted view" literally suggesting the ap­
pearance of each eye on one whale. Thus, he momentarily considers 
the superiority of the whale's vision and suggests, in effect, that all 
of man's "intellectual and spiritual exasperations" result from his 
inability to focus on more than one point at any one instant. This 
results in a continual running back and forth across the deck: 
neither man's attempt to reconcile duality, nor his ability to accept 
it, can match the whale's, whose visual powers support "simultane­
ous perception." 
In a logical deck crossing, he then considers the other side of his 
contrast, noting in what respect man's visual scope permits his as­
cendancy over the whale's limited vision. "Man may, in effect, be 
said to look out on the world from a sentry-box with two joined 
sashes for his window. But with the whale, these two sashes are 
separately inserted, making two distinct windows, but sadly impair­
ing the view" (p. 279). Man's scope compensates for the whale's 
ability to focus; the whale may simultaneously hold opposing views, 
but man may consider the whole question, even though he must 
resolve it to a single view. The Pequod, whale heads attached, em­
bodies philosophy, where holding opposing views of the world may 
lend new windows, but result in an overall impaired view. It also 
provides an analogue for the limitations of whaling, the limitations 
of Ishmael's chosen focus. The whale hunters on deck cannot ap­
preciate the metaphysical implications of their struggles; in con­
trast, the man on the mast achieves the elevation requisite to the 
synthesis of distanced scope, but like Hawthorne's narrator, misses 
the physical combat. 
After he has cut the right whale's head loose, Ishmael returns to 
an investigation of the sperm whale's head and his literal descrip­
tion of the scene. He compares the whale's "case," where the sperm 
oil is contained, with the "great Heidelberg Tun," and states, "I 
know not with what fine and costly material the Heidelberg Tun 
was coated within, but in superlative richness that coating could not 
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possibly have compared with the silken pearl-colored membrane, 
like the lining of a fine pelisse, forming the inner surface of the 
Sperm Whale's case" (p. 287). This Heidelberg Tun of the whale is 
his "sanctuary," and its contents are his primary source of value. 
Explicitly in this chapter, Melville's cetology becomes an analogy 
for sperm oil; in digging out his extensive whale lore, he provides a 
literary experience of boiling for spermaceti. The "sanctuary," 
where the oil may be extracted by the bucketful, also provides the 
sperm whale with his physical power—it is his "battering ram" as 
well as the clue to his buoyancy. Without the oil, the head sinks 
"like lead." 
As the narrator's detailed physical investigation of the whale pro­
ceeds, he continues to stress the unsurpassable difficulties of his 
task. In the chapter, "The Tail," he writes, "The more I consider this 
mighty tail, the more do I deplore my inability to express it. . .  . 
Dissect him how I may, then, I but go skin deep; I know him not, and 
never will" (pp. 317-18). Before he rejects empirical methods as 
singly adequate means of gaining knowledge, he tests them further 
in the last chapters of cetology. Up to this point, he states, he has 
chiefly "dwelt on the marvels of [the whale's] outer aspect" but now 
wants to "unbutton him still further": 
I confess, that since Jonah, few whalemen have penetrated very far 
beneath the skin of the adult whale; nevertheless, I have been blessed 
with an opportunity to dissect him in miniature. In a ship I belonged 
to, a small cub Sperm Whale was once bodily hoisted to the deck. . . . 
Think you I let that chance go, without using my boat-hatchet and jack-knife, and breaking the seal and reading all the contents of that 
young cub? 
His conclusion after this attempt repeats his earlier discovery: 
How vain and foolish, then, thought I, for timid untravelled man to 
try to comprehend aright this wondrous whale, by merely poring over 
his dead attenuated skeleton, stretched in this peaceful wood. No. 
Only in the heart of quickest perils; only when within the eddyings of 
his angry flukes; only on the profound unbounded sea, can the fully 
invested whale be truly and livingly found out. (p. 378) 
He tires of his academics, and in disposing of the whale's spine, talks 
about the vertebrae as billiard balls and marbles: "Thus we see how 
that the spine of even the hugest of living things tapers off at last 
into simple child's play" (p. 378). 
While his objective inquiries have occupied his narrative atten­
tion, the spiritual claims he made, early, for his choice of a sea 
voyage and his pursuit of the great "snow hill in the air" have all but 
disappeared from his tapering narrative. In his final attempt at 
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cetological rendering, the chapter, "The Fossil Whale," he invents 
some humorous geological terms for describing the "mighty 
Leviathan skeletons," but the humor undercuts any further value 
Ishmael might attribute to science. "I am horror-struck at this an­
temosaic, unsourced existence of the unspeakable terrors of the 
whale, which, having been before all time, must needs exist after all 
humane ages are over" (p. 380). In addition to "antemosaic" (before 
Moses?) he invents the Leviathan's "pre-adamite traces" (before 
Adam?) and describes his "osseous post-diluvian reality" (p. 381). 
Each of these terms makes perfect sense in its analogical context; 
and as geological wordplays, they explicitly record the narrator's 
triumph over logic, if this exaltation has not already been demon­
strated earlier in the chapter: 
Friends, hold my arms! For in the mere act of penning my thoughts of 
this Leviathan, they weary me, and make me faint with their out­
reaching comprehensiveness of sweep, as if to include the whole circle 
of the sciences, and all the generations of whales, and men, and mas­
todons, past, present, and to come, with all the revolving panoramas of 
empire on earth, and throughout the whole universe, not excluding its 
suburbs. Such, and so magnifying, is the virtue of a large and liberal 
theme! We expand to its bulk. To produce a mighty book, you must 
choose a mighty theme. No great and enduring volume can ever be 
written on the flea, though many there be who have tried it. (p. 379) 
The oppositions in Ishmael's dialectic may be extensively sum­
marized as follows: "Extracts" and "Loomings"; the Ishmael of the 
novel and the Ishmael of narration; fact and fable in "The Town-Ho's 
Story"; objective versus subjective means of attaining Eastern en­
lightenment (the whale as the incarnation of Vishnu); science 
("cetology") and poetry (the novel); logic and analogy; realism and 
romanticism; Aristotle and Plato; Locke and Kant; the right whale 
and the sperm whale; Ahab and Ishmael; the physical and the 
metaphysical; visibility and vision; theology and democracy; and so 
forth.33 The coexistence of opposites forms the essential narrative 
duality of Moby-Dick, as we move back and forth between "cetology" 
and the pursuit of whales. One element is atomistic, when Ishmael 
explores physical details to their ultimate significance, often ending 
in absurdities that amuse even himself; the alternate rhythm at­
tempts universality, when he tries to create metaphysical corre­
spondences that will establish overriding unity. The physical seems 
always to be the initial concern, but as vehicle, and as some tangible 
starting place. The transcendental method he explored earlier, in 
his Emersonian analysis of his masthead reveries, becomes his 
choice of narrative method in an attempt to resolve these dialectical 
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oppositions. Analyzing and interpreting the white whale, because 
he symbolizes so many essences at the same time as he is physically 
massive and complex, provides the novel's skeleton. In himself, the 
whale represents both visible embodiment and the "heartless voids 
and immensities of the universe" (p. 169). To capture the first is, in 
some sense, to contain the latter. "Wonder ye then at the fiery 
hunt?"34 
In spite of the skill with which he ends by showing the com­
prehensive ascendancy of analogy over cetology, however, he has 
not yet achieved the portrait of Moby Dick that served to motivate 
his initial sailing and became the metaphor for his spiritual quest. 
He poses a final inquiry, "whether owing to the almost omniscient 
look-outs at the mast-heads of the whale-ships . . . ; and the thou­
sand harpoons and lances darted along all continental coasts; the 
moot point is, whether Leviathan can long endure so wide a chase, 
and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must not at last be extermi­
nated from the waters, and the last whale, like the last man, smoke 
his last pipe, and then himself evaporate in the final puff (p. 383). 
In this passage the whale hunt is fully reinvested with the symbol­
ism of Ishmael's quest for vision and concomitant self-consciousness. 
Like the narrator of the novel, the lookouts at the mastheads of 
whale ships have become "almost omniscient" in their visual pow­
ers, and Ishmael wonders whether or not, by the very remorseless­
ness of the chase, man may soon achieve a Leviathanic apocalypse, 
in which not only the last whale but also the last man may "evapo­
rate in the final puff." But he argues in favor of the whale's 
immortality—and his own: "Wherefore, for all these things, we ac­
count the whale immortal in his species, however perishable in his 
individuality" (p. 384). 
The irony of the increased omniscience of the narrator becomes 
the clue to his mortality, for the "last man" is only alive to the 
extent that he is a quester, a whale hunter. Thus, committed to the 
hunt yet desiring the transcendence that might accompany achiev­
ing the quest, Ishmael is caught up in the self-consciousness that 
accompanies his increasing vision. As he concluded in "Stowing 
Down and Clearing Up" (chap. 98), 
many is the time the poor fellows, just buttoning the necks of their 
clean frocks, are startled by the cry of "There she blows!" and away 
they fly to fight another whale, and go through the whole weary thing 
again. Oh! my friends, but this is man-killing! Yet this is life. For 
hardly have we mortals by long toilings extracted from this world's 
vast bulk its small but valuable sperm; and then, with weary pa­
tience, cleansed ourselves from its defilements, and learned to live 
80 I The Mark and the Knowledge 
here in clean tabernacles of the soul; hardly is this done, when— 
There she blow's!—the ghost is spouted up, and away we sail to fight 
some other world, and go through young life's old routine again, 
(p. 358) 
The theme is more conclusively phrased in a later chapter, "The 
Gilder," but its placement here at the end of "Clearing Up" both 
prepares for the "spouting up" of Ahab that immediately follows in 
"The Doubloon," as an element of the narrative that has been sub­
merged but not resolved, and characterizes the marking or sounding 
out for whales as the continuing epistemological modus vivendi for 
achieving, if "hardly" or momentarily, "clean tabernacles of the 
soul." 
V 
The mark that signals the presence of a whale—"There she 
blows!," and that for Ishmael corresponds to his visionary quest, has 
its most significant manifestation in the last section of Moby-Dick, 
in Ahab's characterization and chase. In the opening sentence of 
"The Doubloon," Ishmael states, "in the multiplicity of other things 
requiring narration it has not been added how that sometimes . . . 
when most plunged in his mood, he [Ahab] was wont to pause in 
turn at each spot, and stand there strangely eyeing the particular 
object before him" (p. 358). Ahab's own epistemological method is to 
focus and by means of focus, to attempt metaphoric scope. "But one 
morning, turning to pass the doubloon, he seemed to be newly at­
tracted by the strange figures and inscriptions stamped on it, as 
though now for the first time beginning to interpret for himself in 
some monomaniac way whatever significance might lurk in them" 
(p. 358). The doubloon is the white whale's talisman, the sun's 
medal, the globe's circumference, the sign of the zodiac, and for 
Ahab, "'this round globe is but the image of the rounder globe, 
which, like a magician's glass, to each and every man in turn but 
mirrors back his own mysterious self. Great pains, small gains for 
those who ask the world to solve them; it cannot solve itself" (p. 
359). The doubloon's zodiac, for Stubb, "is the life of man in one 
round chapter" (p. 361), and for another sailor, "whoever raises a 
certain whale, this round thing belongs to him." The old Manxman 
says, "'If the White Whale be raised, it must be in a month and a 
day, when the sun stands in one of these signs. I've studied signs, 
and know their marks'" (p. 362). And Pip concludes the chapter, 
'"Here's the ship's navel, this doubloon here, and they are all on fire 
to unscrew it. . .  . Ha, ha! old Ahab! the White Whale; he'll nail ye!'" 
(p. 408). The doubloon, as the symbol of the white whale, suggests 
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the source of the self s mystery; it mirrors the interpreter's own 
birth. For the one who wins it, or nails it, "the life of man" "belongs 
to him." 
The chapter marks the beginning of Ishmael's final attempt to 
come to terms wth both the metaphysical origins of his narrative 
and the analogical search of the cetological chapters by dramatizing 
Ahab's own monomaniac pursuit of the white whale. Ishmael allows 
his cetology to taper off for several chapters, so that even after 
"Doubloon" and "Leg and Arm" Ishmael must still dispose of the 
whale's skeleton and the fossil whale before taking up, to the end, 
the chase. But the concentration of the narrator's focus from "Ahab's 
Leg" (chap. 106) to the Epilogue reintegrates the separation be­
tween Ishmael and Ahab, and reveals Ishmael's own place in Ahab's 
tragedy. 
It is tempting to equate Ahab's view of tragedy with Ishmael's, 
and equally so to look away from Moby-Dick in its last chapters—to 
Shakespeare—for a clue to the novel's meaning. In his essay on 
King Lear, Stanley Cavell equates the blindness of madness with 
the "avoidance of love." Melville's own recognition of the link be­
tween the two is unmistakable, as Ahab ignores Starbuck's appeal 
to return home: "This whole act's immutably decreed. 'Twas re­
hearsed by thee and me a billion years before this ocean rolled. Fool! 
I am the Fates' lieutenant; I act under orders'" (p. 459). What Cavell 
says about Lear applies directly to Ahab; it is only necessary to read 
one for the other in the following quotation from Cavell's essay: 
To overcome knowing is a task Lear shares with Othello and Macbeth 
and Hamlet, one crazed by knowledge he can neither test nor reject, 
one haunted by knowledge whose authority he cannot impeach, one 
cursed by knowledge he cannot share. Lear abdicates sanity for the 
usual reason: it is his way not to know what he knows, or to know only 
what he knows. At the end, recovered to the world, he still cannot give 
up knowledge, the knowledge that he is captured, lost, receiving just 
punishment, and so he does again the thing for which he will now 
irrecoverably be punished. It is the thing we do not know that can 
35 save us.
In Cavell's terms, we might say that both Ahab and Ishmael want to 
"overcome knowing " Ahab tries to do so by making the whale the 
vehicle for all that he knows, then trying to destroy it.36 For 
Ishmael, it is precisely to the thing he does not know that he looks 
for salvation—"in landlessness alone resides the highest truth." 
Ishmael accepts what he does not know and then investigates alter­
native means of dealing with it. He recognizes the split between 
physical and metaphysical, tries to isolate objective means from 
subjective means of gaining knowledge, and ends on the masthead, 
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where his meditative and introspective moments of transcendence 
move him effortlessly from objective to subjective realms and he 
"loses himself in the transcendental state. The physical becomes a 
vehicle for Ishmael to "overcome knowledge" by understanding both 
the whale and Ahab's need to hunt it; by transcending it, not by 
destroying it. 
If the Shakespearean materials in the last section guide our in­
terpretation of Ahab's tragedy, the use of the dramatic form in gen­
eral clarifies even more Ishmael's relationship to that tragedy. The 
rapid scene shifts and numerous soliloquies, the parenthetical stage 
directions, and the carpenter, on his "one grand stage" (p. 387) a 
kind of puppeteer, fitting Ahab with leather, hinge, and leg, all 
serve as constant technical reminders that the narrator of the 
drama remains behind the scenes, as it were, still metaphysically 
removed to the masthead. Drama, for Ishmael, remains a means of 
presenting subjective experience objectively, and thus of transcend­
ing the dichotomy between the two. Ahab's tragedy as the crew play 
it on the boards of the Pequod's deck dramatically reenacts narra­
tive paradigms Ishmael himself acted out in his pre-omniscient 
state of consciousness prior to the Pequod's sailing and his own 
achievement of masthead distance. 
Ahab's relationship to Starbuck, as a type of Ishmael's relation­
ship to Queequeg, becomes one of the most curious of these dramatic 
reenactments, beyond Ahab's obvious externalization of Ishmael's 
spiritual pursuit into a whale hunt. Ahab tells Starbuck, the second 
day of the chase, "'Starbuck, of late I've felt strangely moved to thee; 
ever since that hour we both saw—thou know'st what, in one 
another's eyes'" (p. 459). Starbuck alone witnesses the profundity of 
Ahab's isolation: 
From beneath his slouched hat Ahab dropped a tear into the sea; nor 
did all the Pacific contain such wealth as that one wee drop. 
Starbuck saw the old man; saw him, how he heavily leaned over the 
side; and he seemed to hear in his own true heart the measureless 
sobbing that stole out of the centre of the serenity around. Careful not 
to touch him, or be noticed by him, he yet drew near to him, and stood 
there, (p. 443) 
In this passage, Starbuck creates for himself the privilege of 
creeping past Ahab yet at the same time locates his own "centre" 
in his captain's. The last sentence of the passage emphasizes the 
physical proximity of the two men, yet the concomitant lack of 
physical contact—"Careful not to touch him . .  . he yet drew near 
to him." In this unique moment, Ahab's hatred does not defend him 
against the advances of love, and briefly he seems to allow Star­
Moby-Dick I 83 
buck's nostalgia for his wife and boy a place in his own perspective. 
The moment is accompanied by, perhaps evoked by, Starbuck's 
apostrophe to Ahab, "fOh, my Captain! my Captain! noble soul! 
grand old heart, after all! . . . this instant let me alter the course!'" 
But the moment passes, and "Ahab's glance was averted; like a 
blighted fruit tree he shook, and cast his last, cindered apple to 
the soil" (p. 444). He calls on his own lack of free will to turn any­
thing to good: 
"Aye, toil how we may, we all sleep at last on the field. Sleep? Aye, and 
rust amid greenness; as last year's scythes flung down, and left in the 
half-cut swaths—Starbuck!" 
But blanched to a corpse's hue with despair, the mate had stolen 
away. (p. 445) 
The atmosphere of this sequence in "The Symphony" (chap. 132) 
reminds the narrator of a wedding. He describes the clearness of the 
day: "Aloft, like a royal czar and king, the sun seemed giving this 
gentle air to this bold and rolling sea; even as bride to groom" (p. 
442). Ahab reminisces about his "young girl-wife I wedded past 
fifty," and Starbuck has his own vision—"Tis my Mary, my Mary 
herself! . . . See, see! the boy's face from the window!'" (p. 444). At 
the same time, Ahab and Starbuck realize an intimacy paralleled in 
the novel only by Ishmael and Queequeg, in bed together in Nan­
tucket, as if "in our hearts' honeymoon" (p. 54); as Ahab states, "'I 
see my wife and my child in thine eye.'" 
In this context, it is also significant to note that in one of the few 
brief appearances of Ishmael in the narrative after the chapter 
"Whiteness," he finds himself tied to Queequeg by the monkey-rope, 
as Queequeg climbs on a sperm whale's back. Ishmael's own welfare 
depends on Queequeg's ability to retain his balance—"we too, for 
the time, were wedded"—and he states, "So strongly and metaphys­
ically did I conceive of my situation then, that while earnestly 
watching his motions, I seemed distinctly to perceive that my own 
individuality was now merged in a joint stock company of two: that 
my free will had received a mortal wound; and that another's mis­
take or misfortune might plunge innocent me into unmerited disas­
ter and death . . . still further pondering, I say, I saw that this 
situation of mine was the precise situation of every mortal that 
breathes; only, in most cases, he, one way or other, has this Siamese 
connexion with a plurality of other mortals" (p. 271). 
The paradigm the wedding references suggest, in which Ahab and 
Starbuck reenact the intimacy of Ishmael and Queequeg, sets up 
Ishmael as a second fictional center, a counterpoint to Ahab in the 
last section but separate from him, and in spite of his detached 
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stance as narrator. In effect, within the narrative, Starbuck acts out 
an integration between Ishmael and Ahab that cannot be dramati­
cally enacted by the narrator of Moby-Dick. The moment of Star-
buck's apostrophe to Ahab echoes Ishmael's own moment in the 
chapter "The Specksynder," which I cited earlier—"Oh, Ahab! what 
shall be grand in thee, it must needs be plucked at from the skies, 
and dived for in the deep, and featured in the unbodied air!" (p. 130). 
But the kind of intimacy the narrator externalizes into a physical 
closeness between Ahab and Starbuck is not even possible between 
Ishmael and Ahab, quite simply because, in order to achieve narra­
tive omniscience, Ishmael forfeits his dramatic role as sailor and 
"Ahab" becomes his aesthetic creation. It is part of the narrative 
triumph in the last chapters of the novel, the fictional stowing down 
and clearing up, that Ishmael, by means of his own projected re­
semblance to Starbuck, gains such "proximity" to Ahab, yet without 
sacrificing his masthead distance. Throughout the narration of the 
chase, Ishmael speaks of the whalers in the third person—"The 
hand of Fate had snatched all their souls. . . . They were one man, 
not thirty" (p. 454). And he does not become part of it until the third 
day, when, as he states in the Epilogue, "I was he whom the Fates 
ordained to take the place of Ahab's bowsman, when that bowsman 
assumed the vacant post; the same, who, when on the last day the 
three men were tossed from out the rocking boat, was dropped 
astern" (p. 470). The narrator's proximity to Ahab becomes a techni­
cal device by which Melville demonstrates the similarities between 
Ishmael's quest and Ahab's, even to the end of the novel; but a vision 
of these similarities is available only to Ishmael and the reader, not 
to Ahab. Ahab sees Starbuck, with his limited vision; but Ishmael is 
never visible to him. The meaning of Ahab's tragedy, throughout, is 
accessible to Ishmael, but not to Ahab himself. 
In the closing chapters Pip, like Starbuck, strengthens the inte­
gration of Ishmael and Ahab and demonstrates Ahab's blindness. I 
have already quoted Ishmael's fraternity with Pip; in "The Casta­
way," he describes Pip's isolation in the sea and asserts "what like 
abandonment befell myself." Ahab's madness occasions his own in­
timacy with Pip; he finds comfort in Pip's insanity in an echo of 
Edgar and Lear on the heath: "'Here, boy; Ahab's cabin shall be 
Pip's home henceforth, while Ahab lives. Thou touchest my inmost 
centre, boy; thou art tied to me by cords woven of my heart-strings'" 
(p. 428). And he states a few pages later, "There is that in thee, poor 
lad, which I feel too curing to my malady. Like cures like; and for 
this hunt, my malady becomes my most desired health'" (p. 436). 
Ahab uses Pip's madness and "maddens" it, thereby disregarding 
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the heightened perception that led to Pip's apparent insanity. Only 
Ishmael interprets Pip's "wretched laugh" as a mockery of the 
"black tragedy of the melancholy ship" (p. 405), not an indication of 
maddened vision. And Ishmael watches the transcendental vision 
Queequeg experiences when he thinks he is about to die: "like cir­
cles on the water, which, as they grow fainter, expand; so his eyes 
seemed rounding and rounding, like the rings of Eternity" (p. 395). 
Pip and Queequeg have momentarily transcended the boundaries of 
death; but only Ishmael is capable of interpreting these experiences 
in this way. Ahab hastens his own tragedy when he rejects Pip's 
vision. But even though he is conscious of doing so—"like cures 
like"—the closest Ahab comes to enlightenment is death. 
VI 
An obvious critical question arises in dealing with Moby-Dick: 
why is the novel so long and the chase so brief? This narrative 
problem finds its solution in Ishmael's "intense concentration of 
self in the momentary Epilogue. The Epilogue records the com­
bined physical intensity and the transcendental state of conscious­
ness Ishmael experiences, briefly, as he floats on the sea with 
Queequeg's coffin as a life buoy. The full significance of this moment 
depends on all the "miscellaneous hunt" that precedes; but it man­
ifests none of it. In the final episode, the mammoth construction of 
the novel disappears, dissolves into the lyric Epilogue, "and the 
great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago" 
(p. 469). In the last moment, Ishmael floats "on the margin" of the 
scene, yet "in full sight of it." The closing vortex he describes is his 
intense vision of the "heartless void," and yet, though caught up in 
the revolving suction, when he gains the center, "the black bubble 
upward burst," and he is liberated. He has transcended the physical 
where he is still an orphan and floats unharmed, floats on the waves 
of unity with the universe that follow the transcendent moment. 
Ishmael's suspension in the sea lasts for a day. He floats on a 
coffin—thus experiencing a symbolic triumph over death that Ahab 
had implicitly predicted in his final monomaniac curse but does not 
himself achieve: '"Thus, I give up the spear!'" (p. 468). If Ahab 
attributes to himself, like Dimmesdale, the fate of crucifixion, the 
narrative, by closely integrating Ahab and Ishmael in the last sec­
tion, predicts Ishmael's resurrection. The "coffins" Fedallah had as­
cribed to Ahab's fate are nowhere to be found in the last scene; 
Ishmael floats on the coffin Queequeg made. Marius Bewley calls 
this "resurrection" Ishmael's return to life, "cured of that spiritual 
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malady from which we see him suffering in the first chapter of the 
book."37 
And yet, in spite of this "resurrection," in spite of the momentary 
sanctuary Ishmael finds, the real tragedy of Moby-Dick obtrudes in 
the Epilogue. The novel's "solution" to the dialectical opposition 
that motivates quest—the separation of Ahab and Ishmael—finds 
its limits. Ishmael's moment is but temporary. "On the second day, a 
sail drew near, nearer, and picked me up at last. It was the devious-
cruising Rachel, that in her retracing search after her missing chil­
dren, only found another orphan" (p. 470). The Rachel is errant; and 
it catches up Ishmael, once again, in its miscellaneous wanderings. 
The Rachel does not find what she is looking for, but "only" finds 
Ishmael. And Ishmael's moment of metaphysical integration— 
when "the savage sea-hawks sailed with sheathed beaks"—can only 
serve to heighten his sense of isolation when he returns, as he must, 
to the physical. He qualifies his transcendence by his reference to 
Ixion's wheel. Will Ishmael, like Ixion, be forever chained to the 
physical vehicle that can only be momentarily transcended if at all? 
Ishmael floats "on the margin" of Ahab's tragedy, with this relation­
ship to it: Ishmael's tragedy is not the lack but the impermanence of 
vision; not the promise of death, but the return to viewing.38 
If there exists any clearer picture of Ishmael's attempt and the 
final qualifications inherent in his success, it may be found in "The 
Gilder" (chap. 114) whose title seems to refer back to the doubloon 
and to interpret (to "gloss' or gild) the novel in its golden light. In 
this chapter, Ishmael describes first the "times of dreamy quietude, 
when beholding the tranquil beauty and brilliancy of the ocean's 
skin, one forgets the tiger heart that pants beneath it" (p. 405). "All 
this mixes with your most mystic mood; so that fact and fancy, 
half-way meeting, interpenetrate, and form one seamless whole" (p. 
406). Ishmael substitutes this seamless interpretation of "fact and 
fancy" for theology; he attempts to resolve duality; and he expresses 
the novel's transcendental rhythms—balancing analogy and cetol­
ogy, meditation and dramatic action, retrospection and narrative 
re-creation. But such scenes, however "soothing," are also tempo­
rary. 
Would to God these blessed calms would last. But the mingled, min­
gling threads of life are woven by warp and woof: calms crossed by 
storms, a storm for every calm. There is no steady unretracing prog­
ress in this life; we do not advance through fixed gradations, and at 
the last one pause:—through infancy's unconscious spell, boyhood's 
thoughtless faith, adolescence' doubt (the common doom), then skepti­
cism, then disbelief, resting at last in manhood's pondering repose of 
If. But once gone through, we trace the round again; and are infants, 
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boys, and men, and Ifs eternally. Where lies the final harbor, whence 
we unmoor no more? In what rapt ether sails the world, of which the 
weariest will never weary? Where is the foundling's father hidden? 
Our souls are like those orphans whose unwedded mothers die in 
bearing them: the secret of our paternity lies in their grave, and we 
must there to learn it. (p. 406) 
With the sinking of the Pequod, the metaphysical distance be­
tween Ishmael the sailor and Ishmael the narrator collapses. The 
moment of transcendence is temporary—time-bound; but in the or­
dering of time in the novel, Ishmael at the last steps forth to begin 
again the telling; "Call me Ishmael." The warp and woof of the 
transcendental method returns Ishmael to the miscellaneous search 
for a focus that opens the novel, to the lunacy of loomings; and 
Moby-Dick ends by qualifying its own philosophical and 
methodological assumptions. 
Watters states that "for Melville, the more nearly omniscient the 
observer, the more true and valuable his interpretation."39 Moby-
Dick demonstrates the fusion of the interpretative act and the at­
tainment of omniscience. Because Ishmael marks a focus for his 
interpretations of the cosmos in the microcosmos (the analogies he 
draws by means of cetology), he dives deeper into understanding 
each time he engages in the introspection of his masthead medita­
tions. The omniscience he achieves, removed from the deck of the 
Pequod, serves to further his ability to engage in the interpretation 
of cetology and to create the analogies that transcend the lim­
itations of knowledge of the physical world. 
Ishmael's epistemology is so compelling that one feels tempted to 
ask whether the very act of marking may not reflect the way we 
learn about the world. The "Extracts," with their suggestion that 
some sub-sub librarian has gone through and "marked" all the 
books that exist for references to the whale, imply that the reader's 
interpretation of the novel involves an analogous process—of un­
derlining or marking. The reader's own "extracts" from the novel 
become our "reading" of the text in the same way that Ishmael's 
cetology becomes Melville's "reading" of the world. Ishmael "floats 
on the margin" like a living marker of (our) life's text. We mark 
what we find significant in what we read in an attempt to underline 
or emphasize it.40 
Melville's own "marginal" notes become integral parts of the text 
in the chapters on cetology.41 Melville implies that knowledge 
transcends method. In Moby-Dick, manifest and nonmanifest, like 
"fact and fancy," become "intertwined." Yet in floating "on the mar­
gin" of the scene, Ishmael is preparing to deal once again with 
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landed concerns. The reader can anticipate Ishmael's return to the 
world of metaphysical "hypos" as the integration of visionary and 
vision breaks down and Ishmael recognizes the need for further 
questing. 
In the novel that follows Moby-Dick, Pierre once again becomes 
the "dreamer of the avenging dream." Like Ahab, Pierre possesses 
the "dark, mad mystery in some human hearts, which, sometimes, 
during the tyranny of a usurper mood, leads them to be all eagerness 
to cast off the most intense beloved bond, as a hindrance to the 
attainment of whatever transcendental object that usurper mood so 
tyrannically suggests. . . . Weary with the invariable earth, the 
restless sailor breaks from every enfolding arm, and puts to sea in 
height of tempest that blows off shore."42 When man pursues the 
transcendental object without regard for the bonds of human rela­
tionship, his heart turns to stone and his attempt to resolve am­
biguities results in violence. In the limitations of Ishmael's vision­
ary transcendence and the despair that leads Pierre to suicide, Mel­
ville anticipates the return, in Faulkner, to a fictional community 
that regards social exclusion as religious ritual, and for which the 
catharsis of violence replaces spiritual peace. In Faulkner's studies 
of marked or "marginal" men, sociology becomes just one manifesta­
tion of the truths Melville reveals in his cetological, analogical 
"reading" of the world. 
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Faulkner's "Dry September" and "Red Leaves": 
Caste and Outcast 
With respect to the symmetry of the chapters in this book, a study of 
"Dry September" and "Red Leaves" may seem out of place.1 I have 
chosen to deal with them at length and apart from Light in August 
because they not only illustrate that Melville's "social physics and 
metaphysics" may be usefully explored in Faulkner, but they also 
demonstrate in microcosm my concerns throughout. I have read 
Moby-Dick as a metaphysical extension of social concerns in The 
Scarlet Letter and White-Jacket; a reading of "Dry September" and 
"Red Leaves" indicates that, for Faulkner, social exclusion may re­
sult from metaphysical isolation. Furthermore, in a social analogue 
of Ishmael's romantic quest, the marking of scapegoats becomes the 
community's attempt to substitute social theology for a metaphysi­
cal one. Faulkner clearly reveals this process in these two particular 
stories. Therefore they serve as a model by which Faulkner demon­
strates my thesis in this study. 
It is important, in considering works that span two centuries of 
American fiction, to locate those elements of continuity that allow 
us to interpret them in meaningful ways. In establishing their em­
phasis on the mark as one of these elements, I do not mean to imply 
that the novelists in my study arrive at similar conclusions about 
the nature of American community, but rather that they face simi­
lar problems. The conclusions we may point to by interpreting their 
fictions establish the ways in which the novelists' versions of that 
community have changed in two centuries. One of Faulkner's signif­
icant contributions to American fiction, as I will show in the next 
two chapters, is the demonstration that many of our "new" social 
and metaphysical dilemmas in the early twentieth century have 
their origins, if not their solutions, in our history. For the purposes 
of my study, only Faulkner among the early twentieth-century 
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novelists provides us with a glimpse of those origins. He does this 
best of all, most single-mindedly, in the two stories "Dry September" 
and "Red Leaves," in which he addresses himself particularly to 
social and metaphysical isolation. What literary critics isolate as 
"themes" in American fiction Faulkner establishes as real dilemmas 
that have no easy resolution. 
The reaction of the community to marked individuals in Faulkner 
differs considerably from the reaction of the Boston townspeople to 
Hawthorne's Hester. In The Scarlet Letter, as I have suggested, the 
theology by which the Puritans try to inform their lives leads to a 
social paradigm for self-scrutiny in which the community as a body 
looks "within itself," as it were, for marks of the presence of evil in 
their midst, and tries to strengthen its own identity by assigning 
social stigma. In Moby-Dick, Ishmael adopts the epistemology of 
marking but moves beyond the "landed concerns" of the Puritan 
community. However, Melville indicates that what the Puritans 
recognized as theology allows the "isolatoe" Ishmael to construct his 
own myth of analogical relationship to the universe. Ishmael trans­
cends the limitations of theology but retains the meditative process. 
In Faulkner, as I will indicate in my analysis of these two short 
stories and Light in August, the process of social exclusion, inherited 
from Hawthorne's Puritans but divorced of its theological proscrip­
tions, continues to provide the American community with a means 
of affirming its tenuous identity. However, Faulkner's comment on 
this process shows the extent to which social exclusion, in and of 
itself, attains the force, if not the tenets, of theology. In Faulkner's 
studies of fictional community, social violence becomes the group's 
"meditation" on who they are. 
In both "Dry September and "Red Leaves," Faulkner achieves a 
sociological effect by commenting on a historical situation. In "Dry 
September," he examines the lynching of Will Mayes in a Jefferson, 
Mississippi, of the 1920s; the figures William Cash provides validate 
the historical authenticity of the story, for during this decade, lynch­
ing remained a means of dealing with the social eccentric.2 And 
Indians like the ones in "Red Leaves" did occupy the northwest 
corner of Mississippi a decade or two into the nineteenth century 
and keep black slaves there. However, in "Red Leaves," Faulkner's 
temporal and chronological accuracy serves only to remind the 
reader that, by contrast with white slavery, Indian slavery exists 
historically as an arcane and local crime. Thus Faulkner's fictional 
world, a century later, comments on white and black caste society in 
the South. He has placed his Negroes in Indian hogans and dressed 
his Indians in white men's clothes. The particular historical situa­
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tion projects the attitudes of Faulkner's own century.3 The historical 
authenticity of "Dry September" approaches social satire in "Red 
Leaves," if we read this story as Faulkner's portrait of his society's 
own tragedy; the aesthetic distance Faulkner achieves as a result 
demonstrates the similarities between the body servant's archetypal 
metaphysical isolation and the social alienation that individual 
members of American fictional communities experience. 
"Red Leaves," like "Dry September," expresses Faulkner's con­
cern with caste and outcast; it also studies metaphysical exclusion, 
in which ritual becomes social reality. "Red Leaves" thus focuses my 
interest in this book. The Negro body servant, archetypally marked 
by the Indians as their scapegoat, yet manages to transcend his 
social role as lower caste member by translating his social exclusion 
into metaphysical terms. Although it is because he is a servant that 
he must run the Indians' race, and although he never achieves any 
other social identity or even any other name than that of "body 
servant," it is not as a servant that he experiences his isolation. His 
metaphysical experience transcends the limitations of social caste. 
His social role becomes his personal quest, and Faulkner, in his 
analysis of the body servant, models for us the intimate relationship 
between personal and social identities. He shows us that social 
ritual may become a vehicle for attaining knowledge, both for the 
Negro and for the Indians in the story, and in his title, as I will 
indicate, defines metaphor as methodology, emphasizes the logic of 
analogy, and marks the personal as social. 
I 
Faulkner does not mark his characters physically, as Melville 
marks Ahab; socially, as Hawthorne's Boston marks Hester Prynne; 
or metaphysically, as Ishmael at the beginning of Moby-Dick marks 
himself. Yet each of the major characters in "Dry September" be­
comes marked, set apart, or outcast—becomes visible in a society 
that insists on invisibility. By making manifest ambiguities within 
a white society (the blackness within white) and casting them out by 
"out-caste-ing" the racial deviant (marked by skin color), the mem­
bers of the society protect their homogeneity, their aggregate invisi­
bility. 
The reader first encounters Minnie Cooper as a marked character, 
and she becomes the focus of several different impulses of social 
exclusion. In the narrative present of "Dry September," the men in 
the barbershop make her the subject of their gossip, the branded 
object of rumor.4 The rumor has sexual connotations; and when 
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McLendon enters the barbershop in section 1, he labels these conno­
tations, calls the rumor "rape." His act is a form of linguistic mark­
ing. By labeling, he effectively turns the rumor into fact, into an 
unacceptable act in a white male society that views sexuality as its 
strongest threat—"'Are you going to sit there and let a black son 
rape a white woman on the streets of Jefferson?'"5 
The motivations that subsequently set off a lynch mob are several 
and complex. Strangers and observers become visible when a lynch 
mob forms. They experience social pressure to place themselves well 
within the ranks of the invisible and, in addition, to collectively 
force the fear of sexual encounter between black man and white 
woman out of the range of sexual possibilities within the society.6 
The mob accomplishes this by eliminating the black man; and hence 
when rumor becomes fact, it no longer suffices that the black man is 
chronically placed outside the white caste—a particular one must be 
killed. In "Dry September," as long as the rumor with its sexual 
connotations remains rumor, the group speculating in the barber­
shop may consider Minnie Cooper as a pornographic object. Each 
man may mentally "attack, insult, frighten" Minnie. But once the 
rumor becomes established fact and speculation becomes "rape," 
then the men experience the frustration of vicarious violation—and 
they subordinate the sexual realities of lynching. 
In section 2, a flashback from the dry September present, the 
narrator describes Minnie's separateness. The significant details in 
this description emphasize Minnie's history of sexual ambiguity and 
her extreme visibility. Her manner, during her youth, became 
"brighter and louder" than her companions'; and she carried her 
"bright, haggard look" to parties "like a mask or a flag." This par­
ticular phrase suggests the irony of social exclusion. Minnie's 
marked behavior both obscures and reveals. During her affair with 
the bank cashier, she emphasized her visibility while riding in the 
red runabout by wearing "the first motoring bonnet and veil the 
town ever saw." Faulkner implies that her exhibitionism indicated 
her desire to win social acceptance, but she managed to earn instead 
a place in rumor, "relegated into adultery by public opinion." The 
ambiguity that characterized Minnie's public behavior carries over 
into her private life and the present tense, as she sits on her porch 
during middle age in a "lace-trimmed boudoir cap" and translucent 
voile dresses. 
Section 4, the reader's next view of Minnie, takes place in the 
narrative present, and enacts the hidden ambiguities Faulkner 
hints at in section 2. Her excitement as she dresses, her trembling as 
she walks with her friends towards the movie house, her tingling 
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lips, her attempt to "hold back the laughing so it would not waste 
away so fast and so soon," all suggest that becoming the object of 
rumor has stimulated her senses. She dresses for visibility and an­
ticipates a vision of sorts—the picture show "was like a miniature 
fairyland with its lighted lobby and colored lithographs of life. . . ." 
The "silver dream" focuses her longing. 
Sexuality and visibility are accompanied by voyeurism. Her 
friends watch Minnie dress, their eyes "bright . . . with a dark glit­
ter," and the people who watch her enter the movie house muffle 
their reactions in "undertones of low astonishment." The women 
who take her home after her collapse are very curious about her. 
Their initial reactions—"'You must tell us what happened. What he 
said and did; everything'" becomes "'Do you suppose anything really 
happened?' [they asked] their eyes darkly aglitter, secret and 
passionate." What Minnie sees, in accordance with her "furious un­
reality," as Faulkner describes it in section 2, is "life caught in its 
terrible and beautiful mutations." 
Ironically, the dramatic moment in 4 where these ambiguities 
manifest themselves also leads to Minnie's moment of integration, 
in which the eccentric becomes, once again, a social focus. She as­
sumes for a moment, her place in the center of the group as she 
enters the square with her friends, and "even the young men loung­
ing in the doorway tipped their hats and followed with their eyes the 
motion of her hips and legs when she passed." 
The laugh at the end of the section serves as a dramatic climax, 
suggests that Minnie's sensual excitement has reached an analog­
ous climax, and stresses the irony of her momentary centrality. Her 
absurd laugh, which seems to begin as an expression of pleasure and 
end in echolalia, evades interpretation. The rape rumor that 
branded Minnie at the beginning of the story serves to grant her 
perverse satisfaction in 4, but this satisfaction does not exist in 
reality; her sexual experience partakes of fantasy, resembles the 
silver dream. Yet the young men have it both ways—they first act, 
by lynching Mayes, and then indulge in sexual speculation when 
Minnie walks by.7 
If Minnie's visibility yields her some measure of satisfaction and 
security, however, the black man's does not. Will Mayes is the sec­
ond marked character in the story, and the reasons for his marking 
and his lynching are only too obvious. In addition to his blackness, 
which makes him a potential scapegoat, he has tried to integrate 
himself into his community—he has a job, behaves respectfully and 
passively. That he should become the lynch mob's choice suggests 
that attempts at integration, invisibility, and sobriety only make 
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the Negro more of a threat to the men of Jefferson. Mayes does not 
know his place, in effect, as an outcast, and when McLendon and his 
followers lynch him, they take care of two problems at once—they 
ritual istically eliminate their projected fear of the black man as a 
sexual threat, and they force once again the visible separation of 
castes; lower caste members are simply not permitted to act like 
white men.8 
The third marked character in "Dry September," who becomes the 
most problematic for the reader, is Hawkshaw. In the first section of 
the story, he seems to function as an impartial observer, but as his 
impartiality becomes visible, he becomes socially unacceptable. The 
men in the barbershop imply that he is a northerner and a "nigger­
lover." He tries to hide behind this pose of impartiality, even when 
he follows McLendon into the street. But the other barbers point out 
Hawkshaw's conflict, as well as his danger, by swearing "Jees 
Christ" four times. "'I'd just as lief be Will Mayes as Hawk, if he 
gets McLendon riled.'" one of the barbers states. Hawkshaw's visi­
bility casts him out, like Mayes, for potential crucifixion. 
Hawkshaw's motivation for accompanying McLendon is not per­
fectly clear. The narrator hints that, although his desire to stop the 
lynching may be strong, he experiences an equally strong curiosity, 
a compulsion to witness. Thus, to McLendon, he maintains an 
agreeable appearance, although the war veteran detects protest in 
his silence: "'What's the matter, Hawk' . . . 'Nothing.'" That 
Hawkshaw strikes Mayes with the others may be interpreted as his 
attempt to strengthen his position with McLendon, but the action 
may also suggest Hawkshaw's own inner conflict—that even the 
barber shares some of the white man's fear. But when he protests in 
the car ("'John,' the barber said") and receives implicit encourage­
ment from Mayes ('"Mr Henry'"), he can no longer retain his invisi­
bility; Mayes places a claim on him, asks him to become an outcast 
in his defense, and Hawkshaw reacts by jumping out of the car.9 
At the crucial moment, he refuses to share the black man's visibil­
ity, and when he retches into the ditch, reveals a complex of emo­
tions. The narrator states, "Dust puffed about him, and in a thin, 
vicious crackling of sapless stems he lay choking and retching." On 
one hand, Hawkshaw has shown himself to be just such a sapless 
stem; he has been powerless to stop McLendon. On the other hand 
knowledge of what is going to happen to Mayes becomes physically 
experiential for Hawkshaw as he just avoids a similar fate.10 And 
yet, finally, he also achieves a cathartic reaction to the initial rumor 
by witnessing the lynching from a particular position of danger. 
This brings on the physical release, turns his stomach. 
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Hawkshaw's action leads to a technical question: why does the 
barber literally drop out of "Dry September" when he jumps out of 
the car? His subsequent absence produces a lack of mediation for the 
reader throughout the rest of the story. Yet there seems little place 
in sections 4 and 5 for the presence of an observer. The highly evoca­
tive language of section 4 requires unmediated ambiguity; and the 
narrator hints in the last sentence of section 5 that greater powers 
than Hawkshaw observe the community—"The dark world seemed 
to lie stricken beneath the cold moon and the lidless stars." A partial 
answer to the technical question might be that, throughout, Faulk­
ner needs to preserve ambiguity for full effect; and the unbalancing 
force of McLendon, who reduces ambiguity for the men in the bar­
bershop by making rumor fact, requires the balance of Hawkshaw to 
reestablish this ambiguity. When Hawkshaw himself becomes a 
marked character, he potentially changes the direction of the narra­
tive. He must cast himself out of the car in order to retain his 
invisibility of whiteness in a white and black world; and Faulkner 
must eliminate Hawkshaw from the story in order to prevent his 
observer from becoming a major focus. 
But the influence of Hawkshaw's powers of observation remains 
within the story; the reader's unmediated, immediate response in 4 
and 5 replaces the observer in sections 1 and 3. The reader sees with 
the other observers—the voyeuristic friends who surround Minnie 
and the wife McLendon thinks has been spying on him. Hawkshaw's 
perverse release reduces the aesthetic distance; the reader moves 
uncomfortably close to the story. And Faulkner thus raises other 
questions: What is the relationship between the seer and the view­
er? Where does the fiction writer stand in a work like "Dry Septem­
ber"? Is he observer or voyeur? 
Even McLendon becomes a marked character by the end of "Dry 
September," but unlike the other three, his marking exists only for 
the reader, not for the townspeople of Jefferson. In his social context, 
McLendon certainly "stands out" in section 1 by "standing up" for 
the women and children of Jefferson, by issuing his war call; but his 
visibility is the only acceptable kind. Since he is the whitest south­
erner in the town, and the most powerful catalytic agent for 
eliminating social deviance, the people of Jefferson do not mark 
him, but grant him invisibility. In section 5, McLendon's wife has 
waited up for him; she is an impartial observer but he views her as 
inquisitor, as voyeur, and he shows her violence instead of love. 
There is public release for the town in "Dry September"—the social 
deviant is eliminated. But there is no private release for McLendon; 
the inner ambiguities remain.11 
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II 
"Red Leaves" is also a study of the alien, but from a metaphysical 
perspective as well as a social one. There is no mediating observer in 
"Red Leaves"; Faulkner employs instead a combination of historical 
distance and Eastern philosophical detachment, depicts the 
slaveholders as both Indian and American Indian, and forces aes­
thetic distance from social reality. Thus, the reader does not respond 
physically, as he may to sections 4 and 5 of "Dry September." "Red 
Leaves" compels our intellectual sympathy, our contemplation of 
the metaphysical significance of social sacrifice rather than our wit­
ness to the physical immediacy of lynching. 
The ritualistic quality of action in "Red Leaves" contributes to the 
aesthetic distance. The Indians exclude and kill the nameless Negro 
body servant only to fulfill the requirements of ritual—they do not 
physically mark him in any way, no more than they do his fellow 
Negroes—and in this particular society, where Indian women re­
ceive no emphasis, sexual tension between upper and lower castes 
does not seem to exist. "Red Leaves" is not, then, a study of racism, 
or an evocation of white man's fear. The Negro is marked out to be 
put to death because whenever the Man dies, by tradition so must 
his horse, his dog, and his body servant. Implicit in the ritual is the 
race.12 When Doom died, it took the Indians three days to catch his 
body servant, and although the narrator does not state that these 
Indians expect the body servant to run, they take no precautions 
against his doing so, and do not seem particularly surprised when 
they find him gone. The meaning of the body servant's mark derives 
not from his caste, but from the ritual he performs, for both himself 
and the Indians, in his race from and against death. 
The first section of "Red Leaves" explicitly fails to explain. The 
language is decidely vague: I count sixteen relative pronouns, or 
phrases that function as relative pronouns, that do not relate specif­
ically to previous information in the text. For example, the first 
Indian says, in the second paragraph, "'I know what we will find,'" 
The second answers "'What we will not find.'" If we look back at the 
first paragraph of the story, however, which immediately precedes 
this interchange, we find no explanation for what the pronoun 
"what" refers to. Another example of this same device occurs a few 
paragraphs later, when the first Indian states, "'I have said all the 
time that this is not the good way"' and further on, "'I do not like 
slavery. It is not the good way. In the old days there was the good 
way. But not now.'" The second Indian answers, "Tou do not re­
member the old way either.'" The phrases the good way and the old 
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way (my italics) function as relative pronouns; but we do not learn 
what they refer to, except in terms of what it is not. It is not slavery, 
and it is not sweating—'"I have listened to them who do. And I have 
tried this way. Man was not made to sweat.'" The confusion here is 
not just the reader's—the Indians' own ignorance of the legendary 
"good way" and their inability to describe it any further than with 
these inadequate phrases create the confusion. This particular lin­
guistic pattern enforces ambiguity, creates an atmosphere of in­
scrutability. 
In addition to the inscrutability, the first section also establishes a 
pattern of excessive negation, of defining things in terms of the 
things they are not, conspicuous in the imagery as well as in the 
dialogues between the two Indians. "There was no sign of life," we 
learn in the first paragraph. "The lane was vacant, the doors of the 
cabins empty and quiet; no cooking smoke rose. . .  . In the old days 
there were no quarters, no Negroes." 
A third pattern qualifies the process by which the Indians per­
ceive reality and the narrator creates the fictional world—objects 
are masked, hidden, covered up. For example, the doorsteps at the 
Negro quarters are "neat with whitewash" and "patinaed." When 
the two Indians enter the central cabin, the Negroes "seemed to be 
musing as one upon something remote, inscrutable." The masking 
ranges from the physical image of the whitewashed slave quarters 
and the later mud mask with which the body servant covers his face 
to the connotations of the Indians' "blurred serenity" or their anal­
ogy to carved heads "looming out of a mist." The Indians respond 
inscrutably to their environment; they mask it with ritual and ar­
tifact (the red shoes, the gilt bed, and the steamboat); and unable to 
perceive what it is, they notice only what it is not. 
The dramatic action in the story focuses on the death and funeral 
of Issetibbeha and the subsequent race the body servant runs. Be­
cause we do not see Issetibbeha in life, but only read about his 
funeral, and because the man who replaces Issetibbeha, Moketubbe, 
is almost dead himself, the story becomes an exploration of what life 
means by examining its conceptual opposite. The body servant is 
marked out as the person who will actually experience the death, 
and the Indians invest this ritual with the cumulative meaning of 
Issetibbeha's life—the body servant must run his (Issetibbeha's) 
life's race. This interpretation finds support in the comment an In­
dian makes to the Negro when they catch him, "'You ran well. Do 
not be ashamed.'" Exploration of the meaning of life becomes, for the 
marked man, a movement toward experiencing dying, and for 
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Moketubbe and the Indians, the ritualistic pursuit of the body ser­
vant in his race for life.13 
There is a physical parallel between the race and the death of 
Issetibbeha as well as the ritualistic one. On the day the Indians 
find the Negro's blood ("'He has injured himself"), Issetibbeha be­
gins to smell (section 5). For the first time the fact of Issetibbeha's 
death becomes more than a concept—it is a tangible physical pres­
ence. The end of section 4 clarifies the parallel. The Negro's own 
understanding of death remains similarly conceptual until the cot­
tonmouth bites him. From that point on, death is inevitable and real 
to him. The poison provides a tangible reason for his dying and for 
his "rank smell." The Negro's flight, then, is a symbolic, ritualistic 
counterpart to Issetibbeha's dying. It enables the Indians to vicari­
ously understand Issetibbeha's death, and, indirectly but more sig­
nificantly, their own lives by the process of perception that the lan­
guage of the first section reveals as definition by negation. 
The Negro, familiar with the traditional ritual, knows that when 
Issetibbeha dies, he will be as good as dead also. His vigil in the loft 
becomes his own death watch. The reader learns that for the body 
servant, "a fire would signify life," so that when the doctor emerges 
from the steamboat and lights two sticks, the Negro knows Issetib­
beha is still alive. 
"So he is not dead yet," the Negro said into the whispering gloom of 
the loft, answering himself; he could hear two voices, himself and 
himself: 
"Who not dead?" 
"You are dead." 
"Yao, I am dead," he said quietly. 
The lighting of the clay-daubed sticks only postpones the actual 
moment of Issetibbeha's death, and of the body servant's own, and it 
is the conception of his own death that he tries to understand. He 
knows he is dead also, rather will shortly be, and tries to imagine 
the moment of dying. "He imagined himself springing out of the 
bushes, leaping among the drums on his bare, lean, greasy, invisible 
limbs. But he could not do that, because man leaped past life, into 
where death was; he dashed into death and did not die, because 
when death took a man, it took him just this side of the end of living. 
It was when death overran him from behind, still in life." Man does 
not choose death, but death takes man, and takes him "just this side 
of the end of living." This, for the Negro, would be the desirable way 
to die—to be fully alive until the moment of death, then be "taken," 
in all the force and immediacy of the word. At the same time, how­
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ever, he understands that his own death will not happen in this way. 
The final sentence in the passage is left unfinished. The worst kind 
of dying, the Negro seems to feel, would be, still alive, to watch 
death catch up from behind—to experience a state of death in life. 
He understands that he will die this way—and because he has not 
experienced it, yet conceptually knows it, he is afraid. 
The passage suggests that the body servant's race is symbolic for 
him as well as for his pursuers—death chases him in the form of the 
Indians. But his fear makes it real. He finds it strange, after Issetib­
beha dies, "that he was still breathing . . . that he still breathed air, 
still needed air." His life processes, which the breathing represents 
for him, become exaggeraterd. He has become more conscious than 
ever of living, in the face of death. 
When he allows himself to be bitten by the cottonmouth at the end 
of section 4, he seems to feel that, since he is doomed to imminent 
death, the snake can do him no more damage. But it is only after the 
existential moment, after the snake has bitten him three times and 
there now exists a physical cause for death, that he comes closer to 
understanding by experience what has been up to this point in his 
life only a concept, a ritual.14 "'Ole, grandfather,' the Negro said. He 
touched its head and watched it slash him again across his arm and 
again, with thick, raking, awkward blows. 'It's that I do not wish to 
die,' he said. Then he said it again—It's that I do not wish to die'— 
in a quiet tone, of slow and low amaze, as though it were something 
that, until the words had said themselves, he found that he had not 
known, or had not known the depth and extent of his desire." Death, 
for him, becomes understandable in terms of life—'"It's that I do not 
wish to die'"—and only after he says the words, articulates the 
understanding for himself, does he know the "depth and extent of 
his desire" to live. He has approached an understanding of death by 
understanding what it means to be alive. 
At one point in the Negro's race, he comes face to face with an 
Indian. "They were both on a footlog across a slough—the Negro 
gaunt, lean, hard, tireless and desperate; the Indian thick, soft-
looking, the apparent embodiment of the ultimate and the supreme 
reluctance and inertia." In the contrast between Negro and Indian, 
Faulkner manifests the significance of his story. For the Negro not 
only acts out Issetibbeha's death for the Indians by running life's 
"race" with death in sight, but he also illuminates the nature of the 
Indians' lives. Moketubbe, now the Man, is a paradigm for the In­
dian slaveholder's condition—death in life—and the Negro's race 
becomes symbolic of the kind of race Moketubbe also runs. 
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Part of the ritual involves the necessity for the new Man to lead 
the hunt in search of the predecessor's body servant. This ritual 
becomes a pivotal transition from death back into life—it is the act 
that earns the living Man the right to the dead Man's title. But the 
Negro experiences death in life, the worst possible form of either 
living or dying. And in so doing, he describes precisely the nature of 
the Indians' lives, which the figure of Moketubbe markedly indi­
cates. 
We learn that from his birth, Moketubbe has seemed "to exist in a 
complete and unfathomable lethargy," and that "he might have 
been dead himself. It was as though he were cased so in flesh that 
even breathing took place too deep within him to show." As we see 
elsewhere, none of the Indians likes to sweat or to work; Moketubbe 
is not an exception—and in his own extreme way, he embodies, in 
all the physical as well as symbolic connotations of the word, what is 
deathlike about the Indians. 
At the end of "Red Leaves," after the Negro has been captured,15 
the Indians wait "patient, grave, decorous, implacable" while the 
body servant tries to drink. 
Then the water ceased, though still the empty gourd tilted higher 
and higher, and still his black throat aped the vain motion of his 
frustrated swallowing. A piece of water-loosened mud carried away 
from his chest and broke at his muddy feet, and in the empty gourd 
they could hear his breath: ah-ah-ah. 
"Come," Basket said, taking the gourd from the negro and hanging 
it back in the well. 
The story ends at the moment just before the one in which the Negro 
will actually die, completely and irrevocably, the moment of utter 
darkness when death in life will become simply death. This moment 
comments on Moketubbe; for every time he tries to wear the red 
shoes, he begins to faint, and when the Indians remove the shoes, 
"Moketubbe's face would not alter, but only then would his brea­
thing become perceptible, going in and out of his pale lips with a 
faint ah-ah-ah sound." 
In "Red Leaves," marking is the means by which the Indians try 
to understand the inscrutable; and by which Faulkner explores the 
experiential meaning of words like "life" and "death." He studies 
markedness at its farthest remove from the physical—the 
metaphysical. Even the physical badge that the body servant puts 
on—his mud mask—becomes a symbolic veil. In the moment just 
prior to his death, the mask drops off—and just as the story does not 
view death, neither does it reveal the secrets behind his mask. 
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Faulkner offers us his title—"red leaves"—as a way of guiding our 
interpretation of his story, but the title itself requires interpreta­
tion. Faulkner himself once stated that the title derives from what 
he termed the process of "deciduation."16 In the process of dying, 
leaves on a deciduous tree become very beautiful. They are reddest 
and seem to be most alive just prior to the moment in which they 
fall. The body servant's race against death is analogous to the red­
dening of the leaves; and like the leaves, in the moment of death, his 
mask falls off. But Faulkner leaves us with the metaphor. Even at 
the end of the story, its meaning is masked. Its title both obscures 
and reveals. 
In spite of the atmosphere of detachment in "Red Leaves," the 
story ultimately achieves an intensity as great if not greater than 
"Dry September," analogous to the comparable intensity with which 
Moby-Dick succeeds White-Jacket. Faulkner's inner view of the 
marked man, in "Red Leaves," compels the reader's sympathy. By 
distancing his fiction from social reality, he avoids layering his por­
trait of slavery with contemporary attitudes. The reader approaches 
the body servant without the stereotype of racial stigma—the man 
does not become Faulkner's "Negro character." Thus Faulkner per­
mits the human response. The result lends the reader the mask of 
the mark: and he achieves a vision of the black servant's visibility. 
The thematic explorations of social marking and transcendental 
vision in "Red Leaves" seem to resemble the concerns of Hawthorne 
and Melville more than those of modern fiction. Within the fictional 
worlds of both stories, communities are essentially closed, like 
Hawthorne's Boston: the road that leads out of town in "Dry Sep­
tember" and the park-like forest surrounding "Red Leaves" both 
serve to isolate the enclosed fictional environments. Such is particu­
larly the case in "Red Leaves," where the body servant runs blindly, 
"since there was nowhere for him to go." Even the social deviant, the 
ritual scapegoat, remains within the closed community, just as Hes­
ter Prynne becomes part of the daily life of the Puritan townspeople. 
In Light in August, the closed community emphasizes Joe Christ-
mas's metaphysical isolation. Joe's murder of Joanna Burden be­
comes a sociological version of the transcendental method that leads 
Hawthorne to allegory and Melville to qualify Ishmael's "resurrec­
tion" of Ahab's tragedy. It is not until Ralph Ellison, as I will 
discuss, that the marked man leaves the closure and goes North to 
find that his stigma is invisibility. Light in August continues to 
underline the isolation of the individual within American commu­
nity. McLendon and Moketubbe are the representative men of this 
isolation. And in such a social system, only the scapegoat achieves 
nobility and truth. 
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Notes 
1. Except for brief comments within larger studies of Faulkner's work, there have 
been few comprehensive attempts to deal with these stories. This is not to say that no 
studies exist but rather that, in my view, they are inadequate. Among the dozen 
articles that have appeared on "Dry September" in recent years, John B. Vickery, 
"Ritual and Theme in Faulkner's 'Dry September,'" Arizona Quarterly, 18 (Spring 
1962), and Howard J. Faulkner, "The Stricken World of'Dry September,'" Studies in 
Short Fiction, 10 (Winter 1973) are the best. Joseph W. Reed, Jr., gives "Dry Septem­
ber" space in his useful book, Faulkner's Narrative (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1973), as does Hyatt H. Waggoner, in William Faulkner: From Jefferson to the 
World (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1959). Arthur L. Ford's early essay, 
"Dust and Dreams: A Study of Faulkner's 'Dry September,'" College English, 24 
(December 1962), interprets the presence of the dust but does not deal with the story's 
sociological implications. 
Bibliography on "Red Leaves" is even more limited than that available on "Dry 
September." In his essay "The Descent of the Gods: Faulkner's 'Red Leaves' and the 
Garden of the South," Studies in Short Fiction, 11 (Summer 1974), Gilbert H. Mullen 
notes: "Given the remarkable calibre of this short story, and the proliferation of 
Faulkner criticism in the past two decades, it is curious that this story remains 
unexplicated; to a large extent, this failure is a reflection of the cursory treatment of 
Faulkner's short fiction in most major studies of his work" (p. 244). In a footnote to 
this statement, Mullen goes on to specify the limitations of criticism on the story: 
"The only valid exception to this remark is Michael Millgate, who in The Achieve­
ment of William Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1965) makes an incisive 
evaluation of the significance of Faulkner's short fiction. Although he does not expli­
cate 'Red Leaves,' Millgate thinks that the story is one of the best in These Thirteen. 
[Millgate makes the same statement about "Dry September."] In William Faulkner: 
A Critical Study (New York: Vintage, 1962), Irving Howe goes further than Millgate 
and terms the story one of the three best in contemporary American fiction, but Howe 
also fails to analyze 'Red Leaves' closely. Far more typical reactions to 'Red Leaves' 
are expressed by William Van O'Connor, who in The Tangled Fire of William Faulk­
ner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954) is frankly confused by the 
symbolism of the story; and by Hyatt Howe Waggoner, who . . . doesn't mention the 
story at all." 
Mullen's own essay helps considerably to redress the neglect he cites in the above 
statements. He fails to credit Charles H. Nilon, Faulkner and the Negro (New York: 
Citadel Press, 1965) for devoting five pages to analysis of the story and does not 
mention one useful article by Robert W. Funk, "Satire and Existentialism in Faulk-
ner's 'Red Leaves,'" Mississippi Quarterly, 25 (Summer 1972). 
2. William J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Vintage, 1942), p. 307. 
3. Robert Funk supports this reading to a point but insists that the story becomes a 
"universal comment on human mortality" (p. 348). I agree more with Mullen's read­
ing: "For rather than attacking the cultural ethic of the Old South directly, he creates 
a parable on slavery by casting the Indians in the role of plantation masters, while 
the blacks, rather than being an economic asset, become useless chattel. In short, he 
develops a startling conceit in which plantation culture and the institution of slavery 
that supported it are reduced to decadence and parody" (p. 245). 
4. Howard Faulkner suggests that Minnie originated the accusation of rape (p. 48). 
He states, further: "It is as if in their attempt to destroy another human being, 
Minnie Cooper and McLendon have succeeded in destroying their own humanity as 
well" (p. 49). Ralph Haven Wolfe and Edgar F. Daniels, in "Beneath the Dust of'Dry 
September,'" Studies in Short Fiction, 1 (Winter 1964), suggest, more blatantly, that 
"Minnie Cooper . .  . is surely motivated by something far more specialized than the 
desire, as Professor Ford says, 'to recapture her past glory'. . . . [W]ith whisky and 
with her determined association with the young people, she has managed until this 
moment to hide from herself the increasingly evident truth of her 'dry September.' 
Like the lynchers, she has reached a crisis fully sexual in its meaning" (pp. 158-59). 
However, there is no evidence in the text to support the interpretation that Minnie 
originated an "accusation" against Will Mayes. Who can trace the origin of a rumor? 
And Faulkner makes it clear that the men in the barbershop do not even know what 
they are talking about until McLendon utters the word "rape." 
5. "Dry September," in Collected Stories of William Faulkner (New York: Random 
House, 1943), pp. 169-84. The collection includes "Red Leaves," pp. 313 12. In order 
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to avoid unnecessary notation in the text, I have omitted page references in this 
chapter only. I have generally specified section numbers instead, and the reader who 
is familiar with the context of each story should have no difficulty locating particular 
lines. 
6. For a comprehensive discussion of the sociology of lynching, see John Dollard, 
Caste and Class in a Southern Town (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957). 
7. Wolfe and Daniels propose a sexually oriented interpretation that moves far 
beyond my own suggestions here. They argue: "Behind the facade of social indigna­
tion lies this immensely powerful sexual preoccupation. The actual lynching . .  . is 
not a community action.. . . [T]he degree of emotional involvement in the affair of the 
supposed rape is in direct proportion to the degree of the characters' own sexual 
maladjustment" (p. 158). 
This is a tendentious reading of the story that does not consider that the barbershop 
acts as a microcosm for the community as a whole. The only people in the community 
who do not have representatives in the barbershop are women and Negroes. As Reed 
states, "The bond of the barbershop here cements a lynch mob; the community's 
concern for its inhabitants here only alienates and isolates Minnie. The boundary of 
the small town, in other stories marking the closeness of familiarity, here turns 
everything sour, septic, promotes rumor, and makes inevitable the violence of reac­
tion" (p. 51). 
It is possible to infer from Wolfe and Daniels's reading sexual motivation on the 
part of all the main characters. Wolfe and Daniels conclude their essay by stating 
that "the accusation . . . gives Minnie momentary respite from sexual death, the 
lynching . . . gives perverted sexual release to McLendon; the fraudulent protest . . . 
allows the 'virtuous' barber vicarious participation in the lynching" (p. 159). Al­
though this motivation may be one aspect of the forces that build to the lynching, 
certainly Wolfe and Daniels do not mean to suggest that racial prejudice, what Reed 
terms "the violence of reaction," and the dry heat itself do not contribute in even more 
substantial ways to produce tension in the story. 
8. Charles Nilon writes, "Will Mayes . .  . is any Negro man. Like Hawthorne, and 
his attitude toward Hester's sin, Faulkner is more interested in examining the causes 
and results of lynching than he is in the crime itself. For this reason he does not give 
the details of Will Mayes' death" (p. 44). However, Mayes is not just any Negro man. 
As I point out in the text, he has tried to integrate himself into the community and 
therefore becomes a likely target of McLendon's wrath. Nilon is correct, I think, when 
he focuses on the lynching rather than the crime—particularly since, again, the 
crime originates not in direct accusation but in rumor. 
9. Here again Wolfe and Daniels offer a distorted reading of the text. They accuse 
Hawkshaw of insidiously introducing Mayes's name into the conversation in the first 
place because he wants him to become the focus of the mob. "Once the name has 
entered the discussion, he is able to deny Will's guilt and protest against the proceed­
ings to his heart's content, knowing full well that he is merely fanning the flames" (p. 
159). If this is the case, McLendon certainly does not know it, and Hawkshaw risks 
his security in the town at the same time as he betrays his cowardice when he jumps 
into the ditch, refusing to accompany the mob any further. 
10. Howard Faulkner focuses on the symbolism of the moon in "Dry September" 
and offers this interpretation of Hawkshaw's actions: "Only once in the story does the 
moon rise above its connection with Jefferson's physical and moral landscape . . ." 
—when Hawkshaw walks back to town after jumping from the car. Howard Faulkner 
concludes, "If Hawkshaw has not been able to save Will Mayes, he has at least been 
able to save himself (p. 48). This reading partially corrects Wolfe and Daniels's 
interpretation, but it does not completely exonerate Hawkshaw of moral responsibil­
ity. 
11. Hyatt Waggoner's interpretation of the story is well stated: "In the largest 
sense, the story may be seen as a parable of what happens to man in the wasteland 
where, driven by an intolerable sense of insecurity and isolation, faced by an over­
whelming threat, he turns to sadistic violence as a means of asserting his existence. 
The story develops the insight that sadism and a sense of insecurity are closely 
linked" (From Jefferson to the World, p. 196). 
12. For the best naturalistic description of tracking a man in a swamp I have ever 
read, see William Humphrey's autobiography, Farther Off From Heawn (New York: 
Knopf, 1977), pp. 82-97. 
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13. Charles Nilon states of the Indians that "it is learned from their conversation 
that they were powerless to take him against his will: 'But you turned him back?' 'He 
turned back. We feared for a moment'" (p. 42). In the context of the story the Indian 
states, '"we could smell something else, which we did not know. That was why we 
feared. . . .'" In my interpretation of the story, any fear the Indians have other than 
the fear of death itself is the fear that the body servant will turn back and not 
complete his race, their ritual. 
14. Nilon supports this point. "It is as if his flight from the Indians was merely an 
abstraction to which his intelligence had not given meaning, for he does not realize 
that he does not wish to die until the poison bite of the snake has given him an 
immediate fear of death" (p. 43). Mullen calls this the body servant's "moment of 
absolute dignity" in which "he manages to hold the horror of death in abeyance" (p. 
247). 
15. Nilon interprets the story differently at this point. "After he discovers through 
the snake's bite that he wants to live, he is afraid of dying. The slave gives up flight, 
not because he has fear of the Indians, but as an acceptance of the inevitable' (p. 42). 
We see the body servant sitting on a log singing at the end of section 5. Faulkner 
writes, "His voice was clear, full, with a quality wild and sad. 'Let him have time,' the 
Indians said, squatting, patient, waiting. He ceased and they approached." The Negro 
does not give himself up, as Nilon implies, but recognizes that he has been captured 
by the Indians, who praise him: '"You ran well. Do not be ashamed.'" 
16. Faulkner in the University, ed. Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1959), p. 39. 
Light in August: Violence and Excommunity 
From the earliest formation of communities in America, religion 
served as a principle of exclusion. The elect defined themselves by 
excommunicating the damned, as in The Scarlet Letter. In southern 
culture and in Faulkner's narratives, Puritanism survived in the 
form of Calvinist fundamentalism. The community no longer de­
fined itself in strictly religious terms, but its need for definition by 
exclusion, expressed in "Red Leaves" by the Indians' attempts to 
define things by what they are not, remained. Melville translates 
social isolation into a metaphysical quest; Faulkner studies the way 
in which social exclusion results from metaphysical isolation. The 
Salem witch trials were over, but they were replaced, in the postwar 
South, with Negro lynchings. 
In the Puritan community, as I have discussed in my reading of 
The Scarlet Letter, the worst social transgression was spiritual. As 
part of the doctrine of predestination, souls were born either saved 
or damned; and it was the spiritual task of every good Puritan to 
engage in "meditation," to search his soul for an indication of his 
own salvation. But for the arbitrary grace of God, any man would 
certainly find himself in hell. Jonathan Edwards's famous sermon, 
"Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God" (1741) reminded the Puri­
tans: 
How dreadful is the state of those that are daily and hourly in danger 
of this great wrath and infinite misery! But this is the dismal case of 
every soul in this congregation that has not been born again. .. . If we 
knew that there was one person, and but one, in the whole congrega­
tion, that was to be the subject of this misery, what an awful thing it 
would be to think of! If we knew who it was, what an awful sight 
would it be to see such a person! How might all the rest of the congre­
gation lift up a lamentable and bitter cry over him!. . . And it would 
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be no wonder if some persons, that now sit here, in some seats of this 
meeting-house, in health, quiet and secure, should be there before 
to-morrow morning.1 
The "mark" in the Puritan community referred to a physical man­
ifestation of God's will, reflecting the belief of the early Christians 
that, as Erving Goffman points out, stigma referred to "bodily signs 
of holy grace that took the form of eruptive blossoms on the skin."2 
However, the judgment concerning the usually ambiguous implica­
tions of the bodily signs lay in the province of the observers, not the 
afflicted individual. Any doubt that the Puritans could not resolve 
concerning the good or evil nature of the physical mark or moral 
irregularity led them to interpret the bearer as marked by Satan 
himself, and each Puritan citizen became the instrument of divine 
retribution. 
The community's desire to reflect divine will in its social rituals 
was analogous to the individual's continual soul searching. It is not 
inconceivable that much of the social wrath exercised by Puritan 
communities was in fact generated by individual frustration; the 
inability of the individual to absolutely detect inner good, accom­
panied by his secret reluctance to probe too deeply, must certainly 
have led him to externalize his soul's search in the process of com­
munal exclusion. Casting out devils was analogous to defining those 
who are saved: namely, those who successfully participate in the 
eradication of evil. 
Olga Vickery's analysis of the relation between the individual and 
the community in Light in August is enlightening in this context 
and worth quoting at length: 
no matter how isolated and impenetrable the private world of an 
individual, he still has a physical and social existence in the public 
world which-makes its demands of him. His comfort, if not his life, 
depends on his accepting and exemplifying in his own life those 
stereotypes which represent society's vision of itself and its past. And 
since withdrawal or rebellion are as much public acts as is affirma­
tion, no-one can escape. Society has myths not only of the hero but also 
of the antagonist, and it has evolved rituals to deal with each. Collec­
tively, Jefferson is Southern, White, and Elect, qualities which have 
meaning only within a context which recognizes something or some­
one as Northern or Black or Damned. This antithesis is periodically 
affirmed through the sacrifice of a scapegoat who represents, in fact or 
popular conviction, those qualities which must be rejected if Jefferson 
is to maintain its self-defined character.3 
Man creates categories that give an individual social identification. 
"The sheer weight of generations," Vickery writes, "each in its turn 
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conforming to and therefore affirming this process of public label­
ling, establishes the labels not only as a matter of tradition but as a 
kind of revealed truth."4 
The antithesis and the process of public labeling that Vickery 
describes in Faulkner may also be viewed in Hawthorne, as my 
study of The Scarlet Letter indicates. By pointing out these concerns, 
Vickery implicitly allows us to compare Faulkner's fictional world 
with Hawthorne's. Joanna's ancestors originated in Exeter, New 
Hampshire, and as Peter Swiggart writes, Calvin Burden "stands 
for a tradition of New England Puritanism that is related in both 
spirit and doctrinal roots to the more evangelical Presbyterian sects 
dominating the American Midwest and Deep South."5 Historically, 
Jefferson, Mississippi, is a direct descendant of Boston and Salem, 
Massachusetts. 
However, many critics incorrectly interpret the significance of 
Calvinism in Light in August. They see its heritage in the communi-
ty's attitudes toward sin and the punishment of sin6 as what one 
critic terms "punitive religious moralism."7 Therefore for these crit­
ics Christmas becomes a "victim" of Calvinism. In light of Vickery's 
analysis and my own, Light in August demonstrates not the simple 
consequences of Puritan moralism but rather the way the Puritans' 
habit of mind has determined the quality of community life in 
America. Francois Pitavy writes about Christmas: "While rejecting 
Calvinism as a religion, he does retain its modes of thought."8 What 
I take Pitavy to mean here is that Christmas "becomes" a 
Calvinist—but not a "religious moralist." He does "become" a Puri­
tan, in my analysis, not only because he is the object of the Jefferson 
community's "periodic affirmation" of its "self-defined character," 
but also because he "volunteers" to become its sacrificial victim. He 
seems to believe in the very antithesis by which Vickery charac­
terizes his community. 
In such a world, where an individual's relation to the community 
receives the support of dogma, social definition can seem to ease 
metaphysical isolation, can provide one cure for the "hypos." In 
Light in August, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, Joe Christ­
mas focuses on stigma as surely as Hester Prynne or Arthur Dim­
mesdale, as Ahab or Ishmael, in his search for an identity. The 
stigma he chooses as a vehicle, unlike the scarlet letter, cannot be 
removed once he embraces it; and unlike the whale, cannot be de­
stroyed without destroying himself. Yet Christmas discovers, ironi­
cally, that he can only achieve social identity by allowing himself to 
be discredited. As Cleanth Brooks writes, "Faulkner's story of Joe 
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Christmas can thus be read as an account of a thoroughly alienated 
individual, a modern Ishmael who lives in chronic revolt against 
every kind of community. . . ."9 It is society's fault that Christmas 
has no identity of his own; by pursuing discreditability, he forces 
society to yield him one. The most we can definitively say about 
Christmas is that he achieves the status of a marked man in Jeffer­
son and that this allows him to transcend his metaphysical isola­
tion. Like the body servant in "Red Leaves," he has no choice but to 
run his life's race. And like the body servant, he has nowhere to run 
but into the hands of his pursuers. 
I 
No character in American fiction emerges as tragically marked as 
Joe Christmas. Unlike Hester or Dimmesdale, Christmas neither 
stands accused nor recognizes his accusers. And unlike Ishmael, 
who defines his condition in metaphysical terms, Christmas cannot 
even understand his crime. His very name a travesty of redemption 
and rebirth, the burden of transcending social, moral, and ontologi­
cal isolation seems to fall to the survivors—Lena, Byron, and High-
tower. As Use Dusoir Lind interprets Christmas's role in the novel, 
"Its relation to the remaining narratives may be schematically indi­
cated as follows: the Christmas tragedy, a tale of personal and social 
violence, poses the problem which the remaining narratives must 
resolve."10 
The relationship between the Christmas story and the remaining 
narratives emphasizes the separation that exists between Christ-
mas's social position and that of the other major characters. Yet 
although the novel concentrates on Christmas's struggle, we might 
describe Light in August as a spectrum of excommunication, of ex­
clusion from community.11 Though each is marked and isolated for 
different reasons, Byron, Lena, Joanna, and Hightower share the 
security Hester Prynne experienced as a result of her well-defined 
social position as an outcast. Their isolation has enabled them to 
achieve social invisibility and a stable anonymity. 
Byron Bunch, self-isolated, stands at one extreme. Byron chooses 
not to participate in the community, keeps his own time on Satur­
days, and does not reveal the details of his intensely private life to 
his fellow workers. "Hightower alone knows where he goes and what 
he does."12 Byron pays no price within the community for his 
anonymity; he occupies the safest position on the spectrum of indi­
vidual isolates.13 Unlike Byron's, Lena Grove's physical appearance 
makes visible the most intimate details of her private life. She 
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senses her own alienation at the same time as she accepts Armstid's 
aid. 
"It's a strange thing," she says. 
"How folks can look at a strange young gal walking the road in your 
shape and know that her husband has left her?" (p. 10) 
Her pregnancy marks her violation of the community's social and 
moral code. Armstid knows "exactly" what his wife will say, and 
thinks, "'But that's the woman of it. Her own self one of the first 
ones to cut the ground from under a sister woman, she'll walk the 
public country herself without shame because she knows that folks, 
menfolks, will take care of her. She don't care nothing about wom­
enfolks. It wasn't any woman that got her into what she don't even 
call trouble. Yes, sir. You just let one of them get married or get into 
trouble without being married, and right then and there is where 
she secedes from the woman race and species and spends the balance 
of her life trying to get joined up with the man race. That's why they 
dip snuff and smoke and want to vote'" (p. 12). Lena's transgression 
is social and her exclusion is social—she is forced to choose between 
shame and "secession from the woman race."14 
Joanna and Hightower both hold positions in the community that 
are considerably less secure than those held by Byron and Lena, yet 
do not approach the degree of instability nor evoke the level of 
violence that Christmas's does. Joanna is shunned and ignored be­
cause the town's remembrance of her ancestors has survived sixty 
years: "But it still lingers about her and about the place: something 
dark and outlandish and threatful, even though she is but a woman 
and but the descendant of them whom the ancestors of the town had 
reason (or thought that they had) to hate and dread. But it is there: 
the descendants of both in their relationship to one another ghosts, 
with between them the phantom of the old spilled blood and the old 
horror and anger and fear" (p. 42). But Joanna has achieved an 
agreement of sorts with the community; she pays for her anonymity 
with isolation and spinsterdom. Even after her death, she pays, 
Faulkner suggests—or she would pay if they could make her pay: 
"They would never forgive her and let her be dead in peace and 
quiet. Not that. Peace is not that often" (p. 273).15 
Hightower's offense involved moral transgression—his wife's 
adultery and suicide—and indirectly the "sacrilege" he preached in 
church. First the community forces him to resign from the pulpit. 
"Then the town was sorry with being glad, as people sometimes are 
sorry for those whom they have at last forced to do as they wanted 
them to" (p. 64). Later, a rumor circulates that Hightower, himself 
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unfaithful with his Negro cook, was responsible for his wife's infidel­
ity. "And that's all it took; all that was lacking. Byron listened 
quietly, thinking to himself how people everywhere are about the 
same, but that it did seem that in a small town, where evil is harder 
to accomplish, where opportunities for privacy are scarcer, that 
people can invent more of it in other people's names. Because that 
was all it required: that idea, that single idle word blown from mind 
to mind" (p. 66). The rumor leads the Klan to lynch Hightower, and 
they almost succeed; they leave him tied to a tree, unconscious. 
Hightower escapes the fate of Christmas—"then all of a sudden the 
whole thing seemed to blow away, like an evil wind" (p. 67). Both a 
white man and a minister, Hightower avoids the wrath of the lynch 
mob, but he is simply and virtually excommunicated—first from his 
church, then from his community.16 
It is finally Christmas who poses the severest threat to the group's 
collective identity. As Frank Baldanza writes, contrasting Lena's 
"indisguisably pregnant condition" with Christmas's plight, 
Christmas "could easily disguise his problem" but "chooses not to 
take advantage of the disguise, and he is also not oblivious to the 
social disapproval, but purposely stimulates the prejudices of whites 
and Negroes alike."17 "Inescapably," therefore, "Joe is forced into 
the ritual of pursuit and lynching performed almost casually by a 
society which has been elaborating it for generations."18 The novel 
considers Christmas's struggle as an ongoing process, as an unsta­
ble, ill-defined, but dynamic and inevitable and even desirable 
movement towards stigmatization, community exclusion, and con­
comitant crucifixion. Precisely the reverse of Lind's formulation of 
the relationship among the several narratives of Light in August, 
the chronology of the novel and the separation the novel creates 
between present and past indicate that Christmas works out the 
personal and social struggles of the other major characters. 
The novel's past includes the history of Joe's childhood and his 
relationship with Joanna. The present time of narration includes 
only the ten days just following the murder of Joanna (the distant 
view of the burning house introduces the reader to the Christmas 
story). The novel suspends resolution of the "present" situation, in 
which Lena is pregnant, Byron alone, and Hightower excommuni­
cated, until Christmas's story can be told. And it does not dramatize 
the isolation or excommunication that the other characters experi­
ence (with the possible exception of Lena). Hightower's confronta­
tion with the Klan, for example, is reported rather than enacted. 
Only in Christmas's case does Faulkner narrate the drama of social 
exclusion. Redemption exists in the Christmas story, Faulkner 
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seems to be saying, only as representation; Christmas reenacts the 
social and metaphysical isolation of every individual cast out from 
community. 
The exposition of Christmas's story does not become dramatic 
until it is placed within a local context. Christmas commits many 
acts of violence and murder that are either dramatized (as with 
McEachern) or reported to us (as with the Northern prostitute 
Christmas almost kills, p. 212). But Christmas's "past" does not 
become "present" until, as Faulkner expresses it, "one afternoon the 
street had become a Mississippi country road" (p. 213). Faulkner 
explores for the space of a novel Christmas's murder of Joanna 
rather than his murder of McEachern because the later murder 
possesses symbolic significance that McEachern's does not.19 As a 
judge might say, Christmas committed an unpremeditated crime, an 
act of passion. But because striking McEachern is an isolated, per­
sonal act (a family matter), it is an act of violence that society, 
composed of institutions rather than individuals, absorbs unaf­
fected. Thus, although we may trace Christmas's act of rage to the 
institutional religious and family pressures that McEachern repre­
sents, the fictional society does not, cannot, interpret it this way. 
Once Christmas enters a community for the first time in his life, his 
actions acquire potential social significance. Joanna becomes a 
symbolic victim of social injustice. 
Light in August emphasizes a distinction between society and 
community. Cleanth Brooks writes, "W. H. Auden has provided us 
with a helpful definition [of community]. It is more than a crowd—a 
crowd is a group of individuals who come together purely at random. 
. .  . A community is also more than a society. A society is a group of 
individuals related by function. . .  . [A community! is a group of 
people held together by common likes and dislikes, loves and hates 
held in common, shared values. Where there is a loss of shared 
values, communities may break down into mere societies or even be 
reduced to mobs."20 The orphanage in which Christmas lives for his 
first five years (an institution, not a home), introduces him to soci-
ety's demands and expectations before he ever learns his place 
within a family or kin (community) group context. He learns that he 
is different from the other children (they call him "nigger" and Doc 
Hines constantly watches him) but at the same time he cannot 
achieve separation from them. His identity derives from his func­
tional position in the orphanage, and he is therefore not surprised 
when Doc Hines takes him away by night—it has happened before 
to other children. When he mutely agrees to accompany McEachern, 
he trades one institution for another. McEachern would have him 
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devout and obedient, but creates only rebellion in Christmas. As an 
individual, Christmas has no place in the McEachern household and 
he constantly tries to achieve separation from it—by cruelty to Mrs. 
McEachern and disobedience to McEachern.21 As if he can find out 
who he is only by achieving this separation, he is a man ever iso­
lated from community but never separated from those institutional 
forces already set in motion at his birth that marked him out, iso­
lated him, before he could ever have become aware of them. As a 
result, he cannot escape mirroring the internal conflicts in his social 
world.22 
Goffman's sociological model of stigma, as I summarized it briefly 
in my discussion of Hawthorne,23 is useful in understanding the 
conflict of identity in Christmas. Born a discreditable individual, he 
looks like a white man (Byron calls him "foreign") but is really (or 
thinks he may be) black. If we compare Christmas's motives before 
he reaches Jefferson, and specifically those before he murders 
Joanna, with his motives after he has committed the murder, we 
find that his basic desire, wherever he goes, is to discredit himself. 
Until he murders Joanna, the attempt is always either temporary or 
unsuccessful. 
While he travels in the South he uses white prostitutes, then tells 
them he is a Negro to avoid paying. In the North this ruse does not 
work. When he meets a woman who does not mind that he is black 
(in effect, does not respond to him as outside her "caste" when he 
discredits himself), he almost kills her. 
He was sick after that. He did not know until then that there were 
white women who would take a man with a black skin. He stayed sick 
for two years. Sometimes he would remember how he had once tricked 
or teased white men into calling him a negro in order to fight them, to 
beat them or be beaten; now he fought the negro who called him 
white. He was in the north now, in Chicago and then Detroit. He lived 
with negroes, shunning white people. He ate with them, slept with 
them, belligerent, unpredictable, uncommunicative. He now lived as 
man and wife with a woman who resembled an ebony carving. At 
night he would lie in bed beside her, sleepless, beginning to breathe 
deep and hard. He would do it deliberately, feeling, even watching, his 
white chest arch deeper and deeper within his ribcage, trying to 
breathe into himself the dark odor, the dark and inscrutable thinking 
and being of negroes, with each suspiration trying to expel from him­
self the white blood and the white thinking and being, (p. 212) 
This passage points out the various ways Christmas attempted to 
achieve isolation from his fellows, in effect to externalize the inner 
isolation he felt by separating himself from the society that created 
him. He had once "tricked or teased" white men into fighting with 
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him—as if even the act of fighting, of finding himself being beaten, 
earned him more of a place among them than he felt while simply 
discreditable. For awhile, the name "Negro" is not enough to 
discredit him, especially in the North—so that he tries to assimilate 
blackness by living with the woman "who resembled an ebony carv­
ing." He wants to make his own situation more visible, to expel from 
himself "the white blood and the white thinking and being" in order 
to achieve permanent discredit. But he is not successful. He is forced 
to fight "the negro who called him white." Later in his life, when he 
walks through Freedman Town in the hours just prior to the mur­
der, he is also "mistaken" for a white man by some Negro men. 
It is not until Christmas enters Jefferson that the nebulous social 
forces at work in him "on the street which was to run for fifteen 
years" manifest themselves. As Peter Swiggart writes, "In her in­
verted religious feeling, in her obsession with the Negro race, and in 
her sexual masochism, Joanna Burden mirrors the important fea­
tures of Joe Christmas's destiny."24 The narrative telescopes from 
the small town of Jefferson to the Burden house to Joanna's kitchen 
and finally to Christmas climbing in the window: "a shadow return­
ing without a sound and without locomotion to the allmother of 
obscurity and darkness" (p. 216). Joanna is the phantom that 
"looms" on Christmas's horizon. The language here ("returning" and 
"allmother") suggests that Christmas finds himself in a familiar 
context, and as he becomes aware of the associations that the 
kitchen generates, he finds himself led "twentyfive years back down 
the street" to Mrs. McEachern. "He ate something from an invisible 
dish, with invisible fingers: invisible food. . . . 'It's peas,' he said 
aloud. Tor sweet Jesus. Field peas cooked with molasses'" (pp. 
216-17). 
Joanna Burden carries the "burden" of southern history—the 
cross of the Negro—and the novel also portrays her as Joe's particu­
lar burden. All of the separate conflicts in his early life—women and 
sex, racial identity and institutional pressures, religion and 
violence—coalesce in his three years with Joanna. Use Dusoir Lind 
comments, "That Faulkner intends to equate Joanna and Joe as 
victims of analogous cultural neuroses is suggested in his designa­
tion of them as name-twins (Joe and Joanna) and in his care to 
supply each with a genealogy covering three generations. . . . An 
astonishing symmetry emerges when the biographical and psycho­
logical data contained in the accounts of Joanna and Joe are assem­
bled. The forces which shaped Christmas are identical with those 
which shaped Joanna."25 The connection is an obvious one; Faulk­
ner does not need to stylize Joanna in order to make the reader 
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aware of the combination of influences she represents for Joe. There 
are moments in the narrative when the connection is made—when 
"invisible food" becomes field peas, for example; or when Christmas 
keeps his bootlegging a secret from Joanna. "Very likely she would 
not have objected. But neither would Mrs McEachern have objected 
to the hidden rope; perhaps he did not tell her for the same reason 
that he did not tell Mrs McEachern. Thinking of Mrs McEachern 
and the rope, and of the waitress whom he had never told where the 
money came from which he gave to her, and now of his present 
mistress and the whiskey, he could almost believe that it was not to 
make money that he sold the whiskey but because he was doomed to 
conceal always something from the women who surrounded him" (p. 
247). Mrs. McEachern in particular prefigures Joe's relationship 
with Joanna, and he throws Joanna's food on the floor just as he did 
when he was a foster child. 
II 
The narrative design rather than an actual narrator (conspicu­
ously absent in Light in August except as the embodiment of a 
"force" in the final third), directs the reader's interpretation of Joe 
Christmas's actions. A summary of the events that take place at the 
beginning of the novel illustrate Faulkner's exploitation of narra­
tive technique—in particular the flashback—to focus the reader's 
attention on the significance of the past as it relates to one particu­
lar event in the present—Joanna's murder. 
Chapter 2 introduces Joe Christmas as an isolate. Byron Bunch 
describes his first appearance at the planing mill and his association 
with the other stranger, Brown. During the next two chapters, 
Hightower sits alone, then with Byron, who mentions the murder. 
At this point the novel still focuses on Byron's encounter with Lena. 
Chapter 5 initiates the abrupt narrative shift to the Christmas 
story. "It was after midnight. Though Christmas had been in bed for 
two hours, he was not yet asleep" (p. 95). This chapter dramatizes 
the few hours just prior to the murder when Christmas both experi­
ences the fatality precedent to an action {"Something is going to 
happen to me. I am going to do something," p. 97) and explains in 
advance his motives ("She ought not to started praying over me"). 
Chapter 6, with equal abruptness, begins the retrospective 
chronological narration of Christmas's life, and throughout this sec­
tion of the novel, Lena and Hightower do not appear. The narration 
of Christmas's past ends with chapter 12 and the last scenes in this 
chapter build up to the moment of the murder, then shift to Christ­
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mas's actions immediately following the murder out on the road — 
the narrative omits the murder itself. It also omits the hours just 
prior to the murder—because these have already been dramatized 
back in chapter 5. 
Both in its content and in its position in the narrative, chapter 
five thus indicates that the murder of Joanna is the central dramatic 
event prior to Christmas's death, the particular action toward which 
the narration of Christmas's past builds, and it stresses Christmas's 
motivation and psychological struggle just prior to the murder.26 
His walk through Jefferson in the few hours before going back to the 
house leads him through Freedman Town and represents in small 
that longer walk on the lonely street that becomes the symbol of 
Christmas's life. "Nothing can look quite as lonely as a big man 
going along an empty street. Yet though he was not large, not tall, 
he contrived somehow to look more lonely than a lone telephone pole 
in the middle of a desert. In the wide, empty, shadow-brooded street 
he looked like a phantom, a spirit, strayed out of its own world, and 
lost" (p. 106). When Christmas entered Freedman Town, however, 
"then he found himself." "On all sides, even within him, the bodiless 
fecund-mellow voices of negro women murmured. It was as though 
he and all other manshaped life about him had been returned to the 
lightless hot wet primogenitive Female" (p. 107). He associates 
blackness with femaleness, and subsequently runs from both. In a 
moment, he associates all the streets of his betrayals (and implicitly 
the street corner where he met Bobbie) with his present actions: "He 
could see the street down which he had come, and the other street, 
the one which had almost betrayed him; and further away and at 
right angles, the far bright rampart of the town itself, and in the 
angle between the black pit from which he had fled with drumming 
heart and glaring lips. No light came from it, from here no breath, 
no odor. It just lay there, black, impenetrable, in its garland of 
Augusttremulous lights. It might have been the original quarry, 
abyss itself (p. 108). The meanings of "quarry"—source, bottomless 
pit, and object of the hunt—all connote Christmas's dilemma in 
these hours prior to the murder: he too contains within himself the 
source of his conflict, yet he has been forced into it by a paradox 
outside his individual control, and is both his own victim and soci-
ety's. He certainly premeditates some kind of action, if not actual 
murder, in these hours: "His way was sure" (p. 108). Joanna is the 
single embodiment of the abyss within Joe's reach. 
In the final outcome of the novel, Joanna's murder is subsidiary to 
Christmas's lynching. After Joanna's murder, however, the 
townspeople emerge as a community acting in concert. Light in Au­
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gust examines the murder from the point of view of the townspeople 
as a necessary prelude to exploring why they lynch Christmas.27 
Unlike "Dry September" or "Red Leaves," in which the fictional 
worlds are limited to an essentially closed system of townspeople 
(the traveling drummers do not live in Jefferson, but none of them 
either enters the town or leaves it within the span of the story), 
Light in August focuses on a man who has never been a member of a 
community—and community, after chapter 12, becomes an obtru­
sive presence for the first time, both in the novel and in Christmas's 
life. 
The first seven pages of chapter 13 recall in detail the language, 
situation, and source of conflict in "Dry September." The short story 
opens with a simile comparing the spread of rumor to "a fire in dry 
grass." Chapter 13 opens with a real fire: "Within five minutes after 
the countrymen found the fire, the people began to gather" (p. 271). 
The people emerge "as though out of thin air"—and begin to func­
tion as a community. Later, in a decided echo of the short story, they 
gather in front of the jail—"the clerks, the idle, the countrymen in 
overalls; the talk. It went here and there about the town, dying and 
borning again like a wind or a fire" (p. 330). The narrative sum­
marizes their initial reaction: "Among them the casual Yankees and 
the poor whites and even the southerners who had lived for a while 
in the north, who believed aloud that it was an anonymous negro 
crime committed not by a negro but by Negro and who knew, be­
lieved, and hoped that she had been ravished too: at least once 
before her throat was cut and at least once afterward" (p. 272). The 
community's reaction lacks a focus at its inception in the novel; nor 
have they found a leader. As yet the men remain anonymous who, 
"with pistols already in their pockets began to canvass about for 
someone to crucify" (p. 272). 
As a result of her murder, Joanna Burden becomes the symbol of a 
threat to community identity in much the same way as Minnie 
Cooper's rumored rape threatened the identity and security of the 
townspeople in "Dry September." The language Faulkner uses 
echoes the short story almost word for word: "And the women came 
too, the idle ones in bright and sometimes hurried garments, with 
secret and passionate and glittering looks and with secret frustrated 
breasts" (p. 273). They rally around Joanna as if she were a battle 
standard ('Murdering a white woman the black son of a," p. 275) in 
spite of the fact that "none of them had ever entered the house. 
While she was alive they would not have allowed their wives to call 
on her" (p. 275). She had been "a foreigner, an outlander" (p. 272), 
although she was born and died in Jefferson. 
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When the sheriff arrives at the scene of the crime, he seizes a 
Negro and begins to question him. The deputy strikes the Negro 
twice with a strap and forces him to reveal that Brown and Christ­
mas lived alone in a cabin in back of the house. The information 
saves the Negro from being lynched himself, but forces within the 
community become manifest and lead shortly to Brown's confession 
that Christmas is a Negro and Joanna's murderer. Faulkner's 
phrase for the unleashing of these forces is "an emotional barbecue" 
(p. 273).28 
The same sentiments that reverberate through the barbershop in 
"Dry September" permeate Light in August as well. "It was as if the 
very initial outrage of the murder carried in its wake and made of 
all subsequent actions something monstrous and paradoxical and 
wrong, in themselves against both reason and nature" (p. 280). The 
atmosphere of McLendon's military defense, preventing the murder 
and violation of "mothers and wives and sisters" in "Dry Septem­
ber," becomes expanded in Light in August in Faulkner's charac­
terization of Percy Grimm. Born too late to fight in World War I, 
until he discovered the "civilian-military act," Grimm was "like a 
man who had been for a long time in a swamp, in the dark. It was as 
though he not only could see no path ahead of him, he knew that 
there was none" (p. 426). It is not Christmas per se who gives 
Grimm's life new direction, but rather his crime that has enabled 
Grimm to achieve at last his position in the community as its civil­
ian defender: 
Then suddenly his life opened definite and clear. . . . He could now 
see his life opening before him, uncomplex and inescapable as a barren 
corridor, completely freed now of ever again having to think or decide, 
the burden which he now assumed and carried as bright and weight­
less and martial as his insignatory brass: a sublime and implicit faith 
in physical courage and blind obedience, and a belief that the white 
race is superior to any and all other races and that the American 
uniform is superior to all men, and that all that would ever be re­
quired of him in payment for this belief, this privilege, would be his 
own life (p. 247, my italics) 
As Cleanth Brooks writes, ". . . Percy Grimm is a man who needs 
desperately to be felt a part of the community. He needs it so much 
that he attempts to seize the community values by violence. He 
yearns to wear a uniform marking him as the community's repre­
sentative and defender . . ." (my italics).29 
Curiously, Faulkner uses comparable language to describe Percy 
Grimm's effect on Christmas. The two passages show that what 
Grimm and Christmas have in common is a desperate desire for an 
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acknowledged position in the community. Chapter 14 dramatizes 
the beginning of the chase, then shifts to Christmas and the perspec­
tive of the fleeing scapegoat. He knows that they are hunting him 
with dogs, and he hears his pursuers track him to the cottonhouse 
where he exchanged his own shoes for a pair of brogans—"the black 
shoes, the black shoes smelling of negro" (p. 313). 
Looking down at the harsh, crude, clumsy shapelessness of them, he 
said "Hah" through his teeth. It seemed to him that he could see him­
self being hunted by white men at last into the black abyss which had 
been waiting, trying, for thirty years to drown him and into which 
now and at last he had actually entered, bearing now upon his ankles 
the definite and ineradicable gauge of its upward moving. . .  . He 
breathes deep and slow, feeling with each breath himself diffuse in the 
neutral grayness, becoming one with loneliness and quiet that has 
never known fury or despair. "That was all I wanted," he thinks, in a 
quiet and slow amazement. "That was all, for thirty years. That didn't 
seem to be a whole lot to ask in thirty years." (p. 313, my italics) 
The passage recalls, and seems to contradict, the earlier moment in 
chapter 5, when Christmas leaves Freedman Town and finds him­
self among white people. He sees "the white faces intent and sharp," 
four people sitting around a card table, and thinks, also, "That's all 
I wanted. That dont seem like a whole lot to ask'" (p. 108). It is the 
peace, sense of security, of "becoming one with loneliness" that the 
moments share in Christmas's longings, and yet, in chapter 14, the 
peace seems to result from Christmas's knowledge that he has be­
come a quarry. 
The days after the murder, and after Christmas has given direc­
tion to the chase by appearing in the Negro church, produce a period 
of clarity for him. He feels a sense of peace now that they are hunt­
ing him at last, now that, by running, he has externalized his inner 
sense of being isolated (his discreditability has become discredit, 
social stigma). The chase becomes for him a ritual similar to the race 
the body servant runs in "Red Leaves." He knows this, and he knows 
that his pursuers know it intuitively, because several people recog­
nize him in broad daylight along the road outside of Jefferson, and 
do not capture him. 
"They recognized me too," he thinks. "Them, and that white woman. 
And the negroes where I ate that day. Any of them could have cap­
tured me, if that's what they want. Since that's what they all want: for 
me to be captured. But they all run first. They all want me to be 
captured, and then when I come up ready to say Here I am Yes I would 
say Here I am I am tired I am tired of running of having to carry my life 
like it was a basket of eggs they all run away. Like there is a rule to 
catch me by, and to capture me that way would not be like the rule 
says." (p. 319, Faulkner's italics). 
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Just as he knew his direction on the road from Freedman Town on 
his way to his confrontation with Joanna, he knows the rules for his 
capture. "Again his direction is straight as a surveyor's line, disre­
garding hill and valley and bog. Yet he is not hurrying. He is like a 
man who knows where he is and where he wants to go and how 
much time to the exact minute he has to get there in" (p. 320). Such 
a description of Christmas suggests a complete revolution in his 
thinking about himself as a result of the previous few days. No 
longer is he a man without direction, without identity. He has be­
come the hunted, the victim, and he "is like a man who knows where 
he is" (p. 320). Christmas, like Grimm, has been "completely freed 
now of ever again having to think or decide" (p. 426). 
The novel dramatizes the lynching as a chess game, in which both 
Grimm and Christmas act as pawns for some Player (pp. 437-39). In 
an echo of the chase in "Red Leaves," the two men look at one 
another, "almost face to face": "For an instant they glared at one 
another, the one stopped in the act of crouching from the leap, the 
other in midstride of running, before Grimm's momentum carried 
him past the corner" (p. 437). Even Grimm's emotional participation 
in his own action is suspended for a moment when he comes upon 
the cabin where he expects to find Christmas: "He knew now that he 
had lost a point. That Christmas had been watching his legs all the 
time beneath the house. He said, 'Good man'" (p. 437). The lynching, 
then, for Grimm and the townspeople, as well as for Christmas, 
partakes of a certain quality of ritual. As Pitavy writes, "Once they 
believe it, he [Christmas] becomes a Negro in their eyes, and they 
treat him as such. The community needs a scapegoat, and that this 
should be a Negro is reassuring: the ritual punishment purges the 
white community after the threat to its integrity, and confirms the 
code for and by which it lives. To doubt the justice of the code would 
be to doubt the identity of the community. . . ."30 
Christmas and Grimm are individual manifestations of forces 
that forever conflict beneath the social surface and that, from time 
to time, emerge in moments of dramatic action, unpredictable in 
advance, yet, as well, completely and absolutely predetermined. The 
predetermined nature of these two men as forces that have erupted 
within the community suggests the way the Calvinist sensibility 
has informed Faulkner's narrative as well as his fictional commu­
nity. The novel becomes "holistic," in the way Harry Henderson uses 
the term in his discussion of The Scarlet Letter.31 As Peter Swiggart 
writes, "The two characters are driven by the same excess of puritan 
zeal even though the one figure is consistently self-righteous and 
the other marks himself as a deserving victim. . . . Together they 
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act out the drama of the Southern puritan mind and its tragic di­
lemma. . . . Thus Joe Christmas becomes his own pursuer and 
Percy Grimm his own victim."32 
Both murderer and Negro, Christmas has committed social trans­
gressions that sufficiently motivate his lynching, but Faulkner 
suggests an additional explanation for the excessive violence 
Christmas ultimately receives. The townspeople speculate: "'He 
dont look any more like a nigger than I do. But it must have been 
the nigger blood in him. It looked like he had set out to get himself 
caught like a man might set out to get married. . . . If he had not 
set fire to the house, they might not have found out about the mur­
der for a month.'" Part of this speaker's incredulity centers on the 
fact that Christmas could easily have escaped. But Christmas 
wanted to be caught, or, like the body servant, recognized the in­
evitability of his capture—and the morning he comes into 
Mottstown, he spends his time going to the barbershop, buying some 
new clothes, and walking up and down the street, waiting for people 
to recognize him. The talk continues: 
" . .  . Halliday saw him and ran up and grabbed him and said, 'Aint 
your name Chistmas?' and the nigger said that it was. He never de­
nied it. He never did anything. He never acted like either a nigger or a 
white man. That was it. That was what made the folks so mad. For 
him to be a murderer and all dressed up and walking the town like he 
dared them to touch him, when he ought to have been skulking and 
hiding in the woods, muddy and dirty and running. It was like he 
never even knew he was a murderer, let alone a nigger too." (p. 331) 
The speaker cannot tolerate the ambiguity of either Christmas's 
behavior or the clothes he wears—the new white man's clothes and 
the second-hand Negro brogans too big for him—which suggest the 
conflict he has struggled with throughout his life. '"He never acted 
like either a nigger or a white man. That was it. That was what 
made the folks so mad." Christmas does not markedly manifest 
either his race or his crime, and it is this that increases the people's 
anger. 
The passage supports the novel's interpretation of Christmas. Be­
cause he is only discreditable instead of visibly discredited, he needs 
to threaten the community severely before they can recognize him 
as an alien, before they will recognize him at all; and because the 
members of the community do not, cannot recognize him for what 
they think he is (black) even after they capture him, the threat to 
them is greater (it seems to come from inside, since Christmas seems 
to be white) and they react violently. Thus Percy Grimm not only 
murders Christmas; he castrates him too ("'Now you'll let white 
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women alone, even in hell,'" p. 439). As Swiggart writes, "The 
crucifixion image which dominates this climactic scene derives its 
meaning less from Joe's martyrdom than from the violence of soci-
ety's retribution. The men who watch the scene are confronted with 
their own need for violent expiation. . . ."33 Yet as Vickery, who 
calls Grimm the "young priest" of the occasion, points out, "the elect 
and white of Jefferson castrate and slay the Negro according to 
ancient custom, but instead of purification, they are left with a sense 
of their own guilt and self-doubt."34 We don't see much of the com­
munity after their catharsis, but "Dry September" teaches us that 
Vickery's conclusion must be accurate. Certainly McLendon in the 
short story is left with a sense of his own "guilt and self-doubt." 
Christmas has learned to expect victimization and crucifixion al­
most from birth. When as a boy he is beaten by McEachern in the 
stable, he faces the man like "a post or tower upon which the sen­
tient part of him mused like a hermit, contemplative and remote 
with ecstasy and selfcrucifixion" (p. 150).35 But he does not free 
himself of the inward-impelling desire for movement and discredit, 
to achieve a permanent position, even of outcast, in the social 
framework, until the town of Jefferson, aiding in his search for 
self-realization, recognizes him as murderer and Negro and hunts 
him with dogs. As Alfred Kazin puts it, "this man is born an abstrac­
tion and is seeking to become a person. . . ." Christmas "attains in 
this first moment of selfhood, the martyrdom that ends it."36 Faulk­
ner himself said about Christmas that "He knew that he would 
never know what he was, and his only salvation in order to live with 
himself was to repudiate mankind, to live outside the human race. 
And he tried to do that but nobody would let him. . . ,"37 Nobody 
would let him because in this very act of trying "to live outside the 
human race," Christmas embodies the divided conscience of his soci-
ety.38 From the viewpoint of the community as well as the indi­
vidual, discreditability is the worst stigma of all. 
Ill 
We see Christmas for the last time in the moment of his death. 
"He just lay there, with his eyes open and empty of everything save 
consciousness" (p. 439), and in that consciousness he finds peace. 
"For a long moment he looked up at them with peaceful and un­
fathomable and unbearable eyes." The imagery connotes resurrec­
tion, and the vision of Christmas that remains "will be there, mus­
ing, quiet, steadfast, not fading and not particularly threatful, but of 
itself alone serene, of itself alone triumphant" (p. 440). If Joanna's 
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murder is the most significant dramatic event in the novel, Christ-
mas's lynching is certainly the most significant symbolic event. Yet 
Faulkner's very emphasis on the quasi-spiritual significance of 
Christmas's death raises the much-debated critical problem of the 
novel's unity.39 In particular, what is Gail Hightower's function in 
the novel, and why does Faulkner place the details of Christmas's 
death (chap. 19) before Hightower's history (chap. 20)? Again the 
novel's design aids our understanding. After Joanna's death, Faulk­
ner explores the community's reaction; after Christmas's lynching, 
he explores Hightower's reaction. Faulkner's study of Grimm pre­
ceding the lynching articulates his examination of the communal 
impulse to violent action; his subsequent exploration of Hightower 
is a study of enlightened reaction, where Hightower, even in his 
name, becomes a register of symbolic significance for the reader. 
Hightower's narrative of position contrasts with Christmas's nar­
rative of process.40 We see Hightower mainly, although not exclu­
sively, sitting in his study window looking down on the street. Even 
the sign in front of his house Hightower himself refers to as "his 
monument" (p. 52). He indicates that he has long ago accepted what 
the townspeople did to him, telling Byron, "They are good people. 
They must believe what they must believe, especially as it was I who 
was at one time both master and servant of their believing. And so it 
is not for me to outrage their believing nor for Byron Bunch to say 
that they are wrong. Because all that any man can hope for is to be 
permitted to live quietly among his fellows'" (p. 69). When Byron 
indirectly narrates Hightower's history in the opening chapters, it is 
as history that we are aware of it—because nothing in the novel's 
present moment interferes with Hightower's tranquillity until he 
hears about Joe Christmas. 
Before the flashback to Christmas's childhood interrupts the 
Hightower narrative, it is clear (chaps. 3 and 4) that Hightower feels 
affected in some way by Christmas's ontological situation, before he 
even knows what Christmas has done. As Byron begins to report the 
fire and his encounter with Lena, one detail in his story moves 
Hightower. "Tart negro,' Hightower says. His voice sounds light, 
trivial, like a thistle bloom falling into silence without a sound, 
without any weight. He does not move. For a moment longer he does 
not move. Then there seems to come over his whole body, as if its 
parts were mobile like face features, that shrinking and denial, and 
Byron sees that the still, flaccid, big face is suddenly slick with 
sweat. But his voice is light and calm. 'What about Christmas and 
Brown and yesterday?' he says." (p. 83) When Byron finishes relat­
ing the event of "yesterday," Hightower is deeply affected. Byron 
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sits, "watching across the desk the man who sits there with his eyes 
closed and the sweat running down his face like tears. Hightower 
speaks: 'Is it certain, proved, that he has negro blood? Think, Byron; 
what it will mean when the people—if they catch. . . . Poor man. 
Poor mankind'" (p. 93). Among all the outcast characters in Light in 
August, it is Hightower who speaks, Hightower who is deeply 
touched, because Hightower has confronted the lynch mob. His posi­
tion, more than any of the others, approaches the Negro's on the 
spectrum of social exclusion. Neither his sacrilege nor his moral 
failings incensed the town as much as the suggestion that he has 
committed a crime against society—that "he was not a natural hus­
band, a natural man, and that the negro woman was the reason" (p. 
65). Hightower has experienced the power of social rumor, and his 
sweat indicates that his concern for Christmas goes deeper than 
empathy—as deep as fear. 
When the narrative returns to Hightower after Joanna's murder, 
it finds him engaged in internal conflict. The tranquillity he pos­
sessed before he heard about Chistmas is gone. When he goes to the 
market, the earth seems to rock beneath him, and he thinks, "I 
wont! I wont! I have bought immunity. I have paid. I have paid'" (p. 
292). Later, approaching "his sanctuary," his house, he repeats, "'I 
paid for it. I didn't quibble about the price. No man can say that. I 
just wanted peace; I paid them their price without quibbling'" (p. 
293). Hightower feels involved with Joe Christmas before Byron 
ever approaches him with Mrs. Hines's appeal. The language of his 
denial, before meeting the Hineses and afterwards ("'It's not be­
cause I cant, dont dare to . .  . it's because I wont! I wont! do you 
hear?,'" p. 370), suggests that Hightower is at some level reexperi­
encing his own excommunication as he witnesses Christmas's 
struggle, and that his refusal to take any part is an inability to 
understand his own past. 
Not until Christmas dies does Hightower experience a clearer 
understanding. Hightower's own involvement in the lynching re­
calls Hawkshaw's attempt to stop McLendon in "Dry September." In 
the short story, Hawkshaw finds himself among the lynch mob (al­
though not with them in principle) when they pick up Will Mayes. 
When Mayes strikes the members of the group, he strikes 
Hawkshaw, and Hawkshaw strikes him back. The ineffectiveness of 
his attempts to stop the lynching and his contradictory act of strik­
ing Mayes both lead Hawkshaw to jump out of the car. He is aware 
of the futility of his actions, and he retches beneath the moon. In 
Light in August, Hightower also finds himself among the lynchers, 
but when Christmas strikes him, he does not strike back. Instead, 
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too late, he tries to protect him. The time when he might have been 
effective has passed, however, and he is permitted to make no sac­
rifices for Christmas. At the same time, his attempt suggests that he 
participates emotionally in Christmas's conflict. 
Faulkner does not stress the act of Christmas's death as much as 
the necessity for Hightower to vicariously participate in it by wit­
nessing. This explains why the description of Joe's death cannot be 
omitted as Joanna's is. Hightower stands with Percy Grimm at the 
crucifixion; and later in the evening, once again sitting at his study 
window, he begins to imaginatively relive his past. Because he has 
participated in crucifixion, first as victim, and now as implicated 
bystander, he begins to see how much guilt and responsibility he 
must bear for his own martyrdom. As he waits for the moment of 
sunset, when he expects to hear the galloping hooves, he watches 
the faces from his past moving before him on a wheel. The "wheel 
of thinking" begins to slow for him, "the power which propels it not 
yet aware" (p. 462), and Hightower begins to face his own unworthi­
ness. 
He sees himself offer as a sop fortitude and forbearance and dignity, 
making it appear that he resigned his pulpit for a martyr's reasons 
. . . making it appear that he was being driven, uncomplaining, into 
that which he did not even then admit had been his desire since before 
he entered the seminary . . . allowing himself to be persecuted, to be 
dragged from his bed at night and carried into the woods and beaten 
with sticks, he all the while bearing in the town's sight and hearing, 
without shame, with that patient and voluptuos ego of the martyr, the 
air, the behavior, the How long, O Lord until, inside his house again 
and the door locked, he lifted the mask with voluptuous and trium­
phant glee: Ah. That's done now. That's past now. That's bought and 
paid for now (p. 464)41 
Hightower's single desire, that which led him to the seminary, into 
marriage, and finally to Jefferson, is for detachment and supension, 
or a "high tower": "That was what the word seminary meant: quiet 
and safe walls within which the hampered and garmentworried 
spirit could learn anew serenity to contemplate without horror or 
alarm its own nakedness" (p. 453). Participating in Christmas's 
crucifixion by witnessing it catalyzes his contemplation of the self-
horror and leads him into a kind of meditation. 
Hightower's final catharsis occurs when he sees Christmas's face, 
and then one which he recognizes, finally, as Percy Grimm's— 
"Then it seems to him that some ultimate dammed flood within him 
breaks and rushes away" (p. 466). Hightower recognizes that he is 
both Christmas and Percy Grimm, both victim and accuser, and his 
realization leaves him "empty and lighter than a forgotten leaf and 
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even more trivial than flotsam lying spent and still upon the win­
dow ledge which has no solidity beneath hands that have no weight" 
(p. 466). 
It is necessary for Hightower to have witnessed before he gains 
understanding; Christmas's conflict becomes Hightower's (and the 
community's) vehicle for working out the meaning of communal 
exclusion. Christmas's death is justifiable because it leads High-
tower to the moment of apocalyptic vision he has been waiting to 
have his entire life. Hightower has sat at his window before and 
seen his grandfather's cavalry rush by: "They have thundered past 
now and crashed silently on into the dusk; night has fully come" (p. 
70). Earlier in the novel, the moment is not accompanied by vision. 
However, after Christmas's death, Hightower experiences a delay 
before he hears the hooves. "It is as though they had merely waited 
until he could find something to pant with, to be reaffirmed in 
triumph and desire with. . . ." (p. 466). Once he does hear them, 
they do not dissipate; "it seems to him that he still hears them: the 
wild bugles and the clashing sabres and the dying thunder of 
hooves" (p. 467). 
In terms of the Hightower narrative, then, the significance of 
placing Christmas's death prior to Hightower's vision is clear. In 
order to understand fully the implications of the novel's design, we 
need to phrase the same question differently: why does Hightower's 
vision succeed Christmas's death? I have shown what meaning 
Christmas's crucifixion has for Hightower; what clarification, re­
trospectively, does Hightower's vision provide for understanding 
Christmas's death? 
The relationship of meaning between the two narratives operates 
tautologically. Consider at least one other alternative Faulkner 
might have adopted: he might have reversed the order of chapters 19 
and 20. Hightower's vision might have preceded Christmas's 
crucifixion in the narrative. Such an order, although it would retain 
the symbolic significance of the crucifixion for Hightower, would fail 
to stress the reciprocal significance of Hightower's vision for 
Christmas's death. Faulkner, then, risks anticlimax but with the 
effect of enlarging meaning, in spite of the fact that, as a result, 
critics in the past have failed to apprehend fully Hightower's func­
tion in the novel. 
For Hightower demythologizes Christmas's crucifixion. High-
tower's vision at the end of chapter 20 is not a religious revelation, 
what Beach Langston calls "his own limited 'imitation of Christ,'"42 
but rather an intense reliving of his grandfather's galloping hooves. 
In spite of the fact that Hightower is excommunicated from his 
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church, he is still presented as the most orthodox religious figure in 
Light in August, and if any character is theologically and spiritually 
prepared for a Christological vision, that person is Hightower. Of a 
different nature entirely, his revelation acts as a corrective to a 
merely symbolic Christian interpretation of Christmas's death. I do 
not mean to imply that Faulkner avoids Christ-symbolism—this is 
certainly not the case—but rather that his broader interpretation of 
the Christian passion provide the framework for an exploration of 
religion as a community tool.43 It is not enough to state, as Hugh 
Holman does, that the unity of Light in August is a product of 
"Faulkner's uses of the Christ story."44 It is not Faulkner who "uses" 
the Christ story but the tradition of American community ritual 
since the Puritans—whose "use" or "misuse" amounted to investing 
social sanctions with religious significance. Part of Hightower's 
function in the novel is to expose the community's use of religion to 
provoke and excuse its own violent social fanaticism. 
The Presbyterian church originated theories for the divine sanc­
tion of slavery during the religious controversies just prior to the 
war, and, as William Cash points out in The Mind of the South, 
certain issues took on religious significance for the southerner— 
before and during the war, social symbols were made sacred. The 
southern woman became one source of spiritual inspiration (con­
sider McLendon's call to "war" in "Dry September"). As Cash ex­
presses it, in the wake of northern accusations of southern miscege­
nation, the southern white woman became "the South's 
Palladium"—"the standard for its rallying, the mystic symbol of its 
nationality in the face of the foe. . . . And—she was the pitiful 
Mother of God. Merely to mention her was to send strong men into 
tears—or shouts. There was hardly a sermon that did not begin and 
end with tributes in her honor, hardly a brave speech that did not 
open and close with the clashing of shields and the flourishing of 
swords for her glory. At the last, I verily believe, the ranks of the 
Confederacy went rolling into battle in the misty conviction that it 
was wholly for her that they fought."45 Furthermore, when the war 
was over, these sacred symbols continued to be catalysts for intense 
emotional patriotism. 
Local patriotism was far from being dead in them, but nobody re­
membered now that they had ever gone out to die merely for Virginia 
or Carolina or Georgia. In their years together, a hundred control 
phrases, struck from the eloquent lips of their captains in the smoke 
and heat of battle, had burned themselves into their brains—phrases 
which would ever after be to them as the sounding of trumpets and the 
rolling of drums, to set their blood to mounting, their muscles to 
tensing, their eyes to stinging, to call forth in them the highest loyal­
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ties and the most active responses. And of these phrases the great 
master key was in every case the adjective Southern.46 
In Light in August, elements of community identity are similarly 
imbued with sacred meaning. Hence the profusion of "ministers" of 
various kinds: McEachern the fundamentalist who acts as Christ-
mas's spiritual guardian, preaching self-sacrifice, unquestioning 
devotion, and obedience—to McEachern; Joanna's father, who made 
the Negro his religion and preached abolition; Doc Hines, the minis­
ter of white supremacy, seizing the pulpit in Negro churches, "him­
self his own exhibit A" (p. 325); Percy Grimm, who ad-ministers 
community justice; Christmas himself, preaching no particular 
message, disrupting a Negro church service with shouts and 
anathema; and certainly Hightower, descendant of an avatar of 
heroism and glory (his grandfather killed in a chicken coop) and a 
rabid abolitionist (his father), who chooses the pulpit because he 
believes in more than his grandfather's legend—"He had believed in 
the church too, in all that it ramified and evoked" (p. 453). Lena 
Grove, herself not a minister, is looking for one. 
Without exception, religion for each of these so-called ministers 
acts as an effective social defense, a preserving or sanctifying force 
for whatever personal conflict produces a need for bolstering princi­
ple or self-image. The clearest examples of the use of religion as a 
preserving element may be seen in Doc Hines, Joanna, and High-
tower. Mrs. Hines tells how her husband came to be in jail the night 
Milly was born: '"He said he had to fight because he is littler than 
most men and so folks would try to put on him. . . . But I told him it 
was because the devil was in him. . . . And so he took it to himself 
then, because it was a sign'" (p. 352). Joanna sees herself as a savior, 
burdened with a black cross. She tells Joe, '"Escape it you cannot. 
The curse of the black race is God's curse. But the curse of the white 
race is the black man who will be forever God's chosen own because 
He once cursed him'" (p. 240). In other words, for Joanna, whom 
Faulkner describes as "the New England glacier exposed suddenly 
to the fire of the New England biblical hell,"47 the black man's 
"curse" is his own humanity; the white man, attempting to deny his, 
is burdened with the black man as a symbol for the abnegation and 
denial. By installing herself as the spiritual advisor and private 
benefactress of the Negro colleges, Joanna protects herself from see­
ing her own "blackness," from recognizing her own repressed hu­
manity. When it emerges, she ecstatically screams "'Negro! Negro!'" 
at Christmas—but she returns to prayer. Religion is her final de­
fense: and significantly because she prays Christmas feels compelled 
to kill her. Hightower uses his pulpit to defend his calling to Jeffer­
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son and refers to his compulsion to seek the bulwark of religion as 
the spirit's "nakedness" (p. 453). The further this "nakedness" is 
removed from theology, the more violent its defense becomes. And 
Doc Hines is a raving fanatic. His preaching in the Negro churches 
does not even pretend to be consistent with any theology what­
soever. 
In this context, the etymological distinction between "religion" 
and "theology" is as significant for Hightower as it was for Ishmael. 
"Theology" derives from Greek words meaning "the word of God," 
and has come to signify particular doctrine of particular gods. "Reli­
gion" has a much less specific origin. It means "to tie back, to bind 
back," to some source, some roots. For the fanatics in Light in Au­
gust, and for the community that adopts violence in the name of 
God, religion involves binding, constricting, and protecting their 
root identity, their self-image ("'He said he had to fight because he is 
littler than most men'"), or their moral position (on the Negro). The 
violence that accompanies the personal fundamentalism of Hines 
and McEachern is manifest at a social level as well. Religion, not 
theology, becomes the principle of social exclusion and hence of 
community definition.48 
At the same time, it becomes the vehicle for exclusion: it sanctions 
doing battle on the Lord's side—for McLendon and Percy Grimm. 
Religion becomes violence as well as the legal and political sanction 
for violence within the community that wishes to protect itself from 
internal conflict. Hightower is significant for Faulkner because he 
embraces theology rather than religion—he attempts to hide his 
nakedness behind his pulpit. However, it is not his sacrilege that 
provokes his excommunication but rather his reputed violation of 
"sacred" social code. When Hightower faces the Klan, theology 
yields to religious fanaticism. Hightower's significance for our un­
derstanding of community violence as it enacts Christmas's death is 
then clear: Hightower provides a vehicle by which Faulkner distin­
guishes between religion and theology, and religion becomes a social 
force. 
Religion is the greatest barrier to Christmas's acceptance by soci­
ety from his birth—because what the religious impulse refuses to 
tolerate more than anything else is ambiguity. When in doubt, soci­
ety condemns. Anyone not clearly innocent is judged guilty. Salva­
tion must be conclusively provided; damnation is inherent in the 
human condition. Thus, Christmas's moments of greatest violence 
are provoked by the religious impulse operating to sanction him: 
and he strikes McEachern, who would have him catechismically 
internalize the very forces that excommunicated him at birth; and 
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he kills Joanna, because she wants him to join those same forces in 
prayer. He joins once—when he disrupts the Negro church 
service—and thus ironically makes use of the forces of exclusion for 
his own ends: knowing that society will never recognize him as a 
person, he is satisfied with being a marked man and a martyr in a 
community. 
Gail Hightower thinks his own martyrdom has bought him im­
munity from further suffering. When he hears about Christmas, he 
begins to realize it has not. Hightower is forced to emerge from his 
sanctuary to listen to Byron, to feel compassion for Mrs. Hines, to 
deliver Lena's baby, and finally to speak out for Christmas. High-
tower sees himself as paying again. Several times, referring espe­
cially to demands Byron makes on him, he says, "Perhaps this too is 
reserved for me." Once he says it, and the narrator replies, "But it is 
not all. There is one thing more reserved for him" (p. 392), referring 
to the witness that will be required of him at Christmas's execution. 
Hightower, then, is not permitted to be a martyr—just as he is not 
"permitted to live quietly among his fellows." 
The night before Christmas's death, Hightower sits in his study 
window listening to the organ music from three churches in Jeffer­
son. The passage is crucial to understanding Light in August, and it 
anticipates Ellison's treatment of "social" religion in Invisible Man. 
The organ strains come rich and resonant through the summer night, 
blended, sonorous, with that quality of abjectness and sublimation, as 
if the freed voices themselves were assuming the shapes and attitudes 
of crucifixions, ecstatic, solemn, and profound in gathering volume. 
Yet even then the music has still a quality stern and implacable, 
deliberate and without passion so much as immolation, pleading, ask­
ing, for not love, not life, forbidding it to others, demanding in sonor­
ous tones death as though death were the boon, like all Protestant 
music, (p. 347) 
The voices singing the music of the Protestant passion are "freed" by 
"assuming the shapes and attitudes of crucifixions." Each person in 
the congregation wants to be a martyr, hopes for crucifixion, be­
cause martyrdom ends quickly; it is only sainthood, absolute self-
righteousness, that must be sustained for a lifetime. So they ask not 
for love, not for life, but for immolation, for death. Hightower lis­
tens: "he seems to hear within it the apotheosis of his own history, 
his own land, his own environed blood: that people from which he 
sprang and among which he lives who can never take either plea­
sure or catastrophe or escape from either, without brawling over it. 
Pleasure, ecstasy, they cannot seem to bear: their escape from it is in 
violence, in drinking and fighting and praying; catastrophe too, the 
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violence identical and apparently inescapable" (p. 347). Hightower 
sees a society where the only pleasure is pain; where the only 
ecstasy is stasis; and where violence is therefore necessary to main­
tain these contradictions in oxymoronic equilibrium. Religion for 
the community of Jefferson becomes the point of balance; it is the 
only field of life where the pain and the stasis may be exalted, may 
be sung about, may be orgiastically and emotionally witnessed. 
The epigraph to Flannery O'Connor's novel, The Violent Bear It 
Away, reads as follows: 
"From the days of John the Baptist until now, the Kingdom of Heaven 
suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Matthew 11:12 
Flannery O'Connor extends Faulkner's exploration of the reciprocal 
transmutation of religion to violence, and her epigraph clarifies 
Faulkner's own focus. The word suffereth has two Biblical senses: 
one certainly connotes the experience of pain; the other, however, 
means to permit, or to encourage. Violent is etymologically akin to 
two other English words, to violate, and the noun, vim (as in vim and 
vigor). These words derive from the Latin vis, meaning strength, and 
The Oxford English Dictionary also links the Greek hiesthai, to 
hurry, and the Old english wdth, pursuit. The Bible verse directly 
links violence with religious fervor, strength of feeling, and extreme 
or urgent expressions of that feeling. Matthew states that Heaven 
"suffereth" this violence, which I interpret to mean "permits" and 
"bears" violence within itself. "And the violent bear it away." It is 
the violent one, the individual possessed by religious fervor, who 
carries the Kingdom of Heaven with(in) him. 
"'And so why should not their religion drive them to crucifixion of 
themselves and one another?' he thinks" (p. 348). Hightower hears 
within the music "the declaration and dedication of that which they 
know that on the morrow they will have to do." He thinks of Joe 
Christmas, seems to hear them saluting not any god but "the 
doomed man in the barred cell." He knows they will do it gladly. 
"'Since to pity him would be to admit selfdoubt and to hope for and 
need pity themselves. They will do it gladly, gladly. That's why it is 
so terrible, terrible, terrible'" (p. 348). The need for the transcenden­
tal Absolute is felt as absolutely in Faulkner's South as it ever was 
in Puritan New England. Self-doubt cannot be admitted. And so the 
community will crucify gladly. It is "terrible" because they move 
farther away from the Absolute as they try to cling more closely to 
it. 
Use Dusoir Lind states, "And yet Hightower's equation of South­
ern religion with Southern violence is not quite Faulkner's. . .  . He 
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makes this formulation early in his narrative; later he will progress 
to a better understanding of the Southern religious problem than 
this."49 Hightower's statement appears "early in the narrative" in 
the sense that it appears before the dramatization of Christmas's 
death; but within the chronology of Hightower's narrative, it is the 
last time we see him alone before we see him again as a witness (the 
intervening conversation with the Hineses prepares for Hightower's 
defense of Christmas in the execution scene). Whether or not we 
want to "equate" Hightower's formulation with Faulkner's, Light in 
August certainly implies that Hightower is the only character who 
not only understands the social function of religion in the commu­
nity, but is also allowed to transcend his place as excommuni-
cant—whether for a moment of vision or for a lifetime is uncertain, 
and indeterminable from the text. 
Some critics, Hugh Holman among them, claim that Hightower 
actually dies at the end of chapter 20. Others, myself included, 
interpret the scene as a moment of vision instead. Faulkner cer­
tainly does not make it clear that Hightower dies; nevertheless it is 
conceivable that he is no longer alive, at least symbolically—he 
thinks he is dying, after all; his hands become weightless; "the dust 
swirls skyward sucking, fades away into the night which has fully 
come"; and his head leans forward, "huge and without depth," upon 
"the twin blobs of his hands" (p. 467). Without testing the patience 
and credulity of the reader by narratively raising Hightower 
straight to heaven, Faulkner at the same time implies that some­
thing of this nature has happened.50 Hightower has transcended; 
and whether the nature of his transcendance approaches that of the 
Eastern nirvana,51 its literary prototype in Ishmael's transcenden­
tal masthead consciousness, or the Christian resurrection into 
heaven, Faulkner suggests that if Christmas is a martyr, Hightower 
is some kind of social saint. But not the Christian kind, where 
"saint" may also mean "savior"; Hightower is a saint because, un­
like Christmas, whose agony is over in a moment, he "suffers" at the 
hands of society throughout his life. As a student once mentioned to 
me, in a different context, it is easier to be a martyr than a saint— 
assured the same glory "over yonder," the price here is quicker 
paid.52 
V 
In its total scope, Light in August is more than a community 
study. Joe Christmas, an individual who mirrors society's internal 
conflict, is balanced by Byron Bunch and Lena Grove, characters 
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who live outside of society, who transcend the relative flux and 
change of human institutions—individuals who exist in the realm of 
the absolute, in the realm of the beauty and truth of Keats's "Ode on 
a Grecian Urn."53 
Byron Bunch, whose very name ironically suggests an aggregate, 
lives his life separate from the community. When we first see him in 
the novel, he is working alone on Saturday afternoon at the planing 
mill. For the townspeople, he is a "man of mystery" (p. 44). Yet 
although Byron does not participate in the community of Jefferson, 
he comes to be a catalyst for community in its larger, more spiritual 
sense, drawing together the lives of Lena Grove, Hightower, Mrs. 
Hines, and Joe Christmas. Faulkner states, referring to Byron's 
position in Jefferson, "Man knows so little about his fellows" (p. 43). 
There are depths to Byron that the townspeople cannot fathom. 
Byron is not a marked man. He is described as being "nondes­
cript" (p. 44), someone who does not manifest his character as 
characteristic. His habits are his own, and most significant among 
these habits are his late-night talks with Hightower and his 
weekend rides thirty miles into the country where he "spends Sun­
day leading the choir in a country church—a service which lasts all 
day long" (p. 43). Faulkner does not stress Byron's religion; and 
Byron himself hides it from the community of Jefferson. In light of 
the blatant presence of religious fanaticism in the town and in the 
novel, the lack of emphasis comes to have the effect of underlining 
its importance. For Byron, who "'would injure no man'" (p. 50), who 
states to Hightower, "'It was a strange thing. I thought that if there 
ever was a place where a man would be where the chance to do harm 
could not have found him it would have been out there at the mill on 
a Saturday evening"' (p. 71), the religious impulse leads him again 
and again to action that is noble and absolute and inevitable. 
For Faulkner, Byron represents an alternative to violence as a 
means of resolving conflict. Hightower, in a tone of irony and bitter­
ness, his voice "high and thin," calls Byron "the guardian of public 
weal and morality. The gainer, the inheritor of rewards" (p. 344). If 
Hightower is bitter, however, Faulkner is not—for Byron acts as a 
social and spiritual mediator for the reader. Alone among the 
townspeople, Byron does not excommunicate Hightower and he does 
not care whether Christmas is black or white. Byron not only exists 
outside his community, but beyond the social domain as well: he 
refuses to acknowledge or participate in social expectations and 
proscriptions. 
In addition, Byron acts primarily out of compassion and love for 
Lena. Byron's stable and consistent and impelling attraction for 
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Lena is a cosmic force. Lena is literally one center of creation in the 
novel as a pregnant woman; but she also becomes the focus of By-
ron's creative energy that sustains his action. "'I done come too far 
now,' he says, 'I be dog if I'm going to quit now.' . . . 'Aint nobody 
never said for you to quit,' she says" (p. 479). Byron is a religious 
man in that special sense of the word I discussed earlier: he is try­
ing, through his love for Lena, to "bind [or bunch] himself back" to 
the source of creation. Such a spiritual impulse evokes no violence 
within Byron; and unlike the other women in the novel, Lena is 
innocently capable of pleasure, of laughter, or wonder. Byron and 
Lena possess the power of spirituality that remains hidden, of reli­
gion that is not a manifest part of individual or social identity, that 
does not become a tool of social exclusion but rather a means of 
appropriating life. 
Light in August remains a novel that focuses on Joe Christmas 
and explores the process by which the religious impulse becomes 
transformed into violence. Faulkner's narrative frame—Lena's slow 
advance, "like something moving forever and without progress 
across an urn" (p. 5)—is his "attic shape," his artistic container, the 
"silent form" of the Keats poem. The central narratives (of Christ­
mas and Hightower) explore as explorations or interpretations of 
these lines from Keats: 
What men or gods are these? What maidens loth? 
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape? 
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy? 
Yet these questions are generated by the urn's surface only. The 
deeper paradox of the Keats poem is suggested by these lines: 
Bold lover, never, never canst thou kiss, 
Though winning near the goal—yet do not grieve; 
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss, 
Forever wilt thou love and she be fair. 
In the frozen circular tableau of the urn, Keats finds mad pursuit 
that will never gain the goal; struggle to escape that must always 
fail; yet beauty in the stasis of eternity—the goal and the struggle 
remain as life-supporting forces. Faulkner's novel contains no fair 
maidens, and is not concerned with the fading of female charm; but 
Faulkner derives the same level of truth from the stasis of strug-
gle.54 
Throughout Light in August, there are moments of conflict where 
time seems to stop momentarily and pursuer and pursued regard 
each other across a chasm. One such moment occurs when Byron 
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watches from a distance as Brown jumps the train: "They see one 
another at the same moment: the two faces, the mild, nondescript, 
bloody one and the lean, harried, desperate one contorted now in a 
soundless shouting above the noise of the train, passing one another 
as though on opposite orbits and with an effect as of phantoms or 
apparitions" (p. 417). Another occurs during Grimm's pursuit of 
Christmas: "For an instant they looked at one another almost face to 
face. . . . For an instant they glared at one another, the one stopped 
in the act of crouching for the leap, the other in midstride of run­
ning" (p. 437). The visual effect of these moments is like that pro­
duced by the urn, where pursuer and pursued seem to regard each 
other, or struggle with each other, without resolution. Then drama­
tic action begins again, and following these moments, conflict be­
comes externalized, actualized; and in imagination as well as in 
reality the pursuer and the pursued coalesce, in the same way that, 
for Hightower, Percy Grimm's and Joe Christmas's faces seem to 
blend into each other. The distance symbolized by the urn dissolves, 
the individuals become part of cosmic process, and in the juxtaposi­
tion of opposites, some release occurs. 
Harold Kaplan writes, 
The modern mind is dialectical to an extreme; it looks for division, it 
dramatizes opposition. For this emphasis, Faulkner's Light in August 
is a classic of the modern imagination as well as perhaps the most 
representative of his works. We have in it a series of oppositions which 
intensify drama to the point of freezing; hard blocks of force are held 
in arrest as if resolution could never come. The characters have al­
most allegorical simplicity of function in conflict, divided against each 
other and divided within themselves.55 
The dynamic moments of the novel are Faulkner's attempts to ex­
plore the conflict between pursuer and pursued. This eternal strug­
gle and conflict creates the effect of a closed circle for Christmas and 
Byron. Only in capture is the circle momentarily transcended on an 
individual basis. Thus violence acts to momentarily close the circle, 
as well as to creatively open it. At the surface, the pursuit is mighty 
and the resulting achievement is violence. At a greater distance, 
Lena keeps on moving across the urn, time is frozen, and the forces 
of birth and death, comedy and tragedy, become cosmic in scope. As 
Frank Baldanza points out, "Lena conducts the classic comic pursuit 
of her seducer just as relentlessly as nearly everyone else co­
operates in the tragic pursuit of Joe. . . ,"56 Thus the final resolu­
tion of the novel becomes bedtime entertainment for the furniture 
dealer's wife—and the situation is about to involve her more di­
rectly than she knows: "'I just showed you once. You aint ready to be 
showed again, are you?'" (p. 472). 
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In one sense, Hawthorne's marking and Melville's cetology have 
no technical analogues in Light in August; there is no single symbol 
or subject that a narrator pursues, mantra-like, to arrive at signifi­
cance in the work. Byron Bunch comes close to narrating the novel, 
but there is always some other presence there to say "Byron Bunch 
knows this" (p. 27). Yet what Byron finally knows is no substitute 
for the omniscience of an Ishmael. Unlike Hawthorne's narrator of 
"The Custom-House," and unlike Ishmael, who both move towards 
narrative omniscience but who remain within the limits of allegori­
cal and analogical method, Faulkner's narrator never emerges in 
Light in August as a force of control. The text itself in its narrative 
design bears the full burden of pointing meaning in the novel. 
When Christmas accepts his position as a socially discredited in­
dividual, when he "floats on the margin" of the community, Faulk­
ner demonstrates what happens when a society is unable to tolerate 
ambiguity. The absence of a conspicuous narrator in Light in Au­
gust suggests Faulkner's view of the role of prose fiction in such a 
society: the novel must demonstrate what Keats termed "negative 
capability." Hawthorne's retreat into allegory and Melville's 
tragedy of temporary vision do not provide means for the individual 
to transcend social and metaphysical isolation. Only a novel such as 
Light in August, which can allow us never to know the truth of 
Christmas's identity, which can create a vision, Hightower's, which 
points no allegorical or analogical meaning, and which can set 
Byron and Lena in perpetual motion without bringing them to rest, 
can truly be said to have achieved that "negative capability," to 
have passed beyond the limits of marking or symbolizing in the 
creation of a fictional world. 
Faulkner's subject, social stigma, is sociological; but it is true 
that, as some critics have stated, Light in August is not a sociologi­
cal novel.57 Faulkner refuses to commit the crime he portrays. His 
very refusal to symbolize, to mark significance, to "stigmatize" his 
own characters, in effect, by making them carry allegorical burdens 
in addition to their historical and sociological ones, indicates the 
way in which American fiction can transcend its Puritan heritage. 
By refusing to insist on revealed meaning, the American narrator 
can counter our sociology with a vision of authentic community. 
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Invisible Man: The World in a Man-of-War 
My exploration of marked characters in American fiction ends with 
the following discussion of Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. There are 
conspicuous omissions from my study, as I discussed in chapter 1; 
however, only Ellison's novel attempts the epic scope Hawthorne, 
Melville, and Faulkner achieve. The Scarlet Letter, Moby-Dick, 
Light in August, and Invisible Man are all appropriately described 
as quest narratives. The pursuit that begins with Hawthorne's 
study of social exclusion, that Melville develops in his narrative of 
Ishmael, who chooses to isolate himself in order to achieve omnisci­
ence, and that Faulkner explores as emblematic of a search for iden­
tity in Christmas's self-exclusion, reaches its most recent variation 
in Ellison's novel, a twentieth-century fusion of the "heroic fugitive" 
school of Negro writers of the early and mid-nineteenth century (the 
most significant text is Frederick Douglass's autobiographical Nar­
rative of 1845) and the heritage of the American transcendentalists, 
which has gone "underground," like Ellison's narrator, since the 
1840s. 
Like Joe Christmas, Ellison's Invisible Man is a victim of society's 
insistence on revealed meaning. What his stigma—that he is 
black—reveals hides the person he thinks he is. The irony of the 
novel is that invisibility becomes a stigma that Invisible Man em­
braces. However, his affirmation of invisibility is much more com­
plex than Joe Christmas's choice to become a marked member of his 
community. As Hightower's transcendence and Byron's love for 
Lena ultimately show, the outcast's crucifixion may lead to social 
transfiguration. That is, Christmas's martydom, in spite of its tragic 
indictment of the community of Jefferson, contributes to comic reso­
lution at the end of the novel. Christmas himself dies, but in the 
aesthetic distance Faulkner achieves in Byron's eternal pursuit, he 
suggests the possibility of redemption. 
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Like Faulkner, Ellison attempts to transcend the limitations 
Puritanism has imposed in American society. Ellison uses comedy to 
avoid imposing "revealed meaning" on chaos; like Faulkner's nar­
rator, Invisible Man embraces ambiguity.1 Yet Faulkner's vision 
yields to Ellison's insistence that humanity must precede commu­
nity. Unlike Faulkner, Ellison has no vision of community to offer 
us. Yet in Shadow and Act, he accords Faulkner the highest praise 
when he states, 
Indeed, through his many novels and short stories, Faulkner fights 
out the moral problem which was repressed after the nineteenth cen­
tury, and it was shocking for some to discover that for all his concern 
with the South, Faulkner was actually seeking out the nature of man. 
Thus we must turn to him for that continuity of moral purpose which 
made for the greatness of our classics. As for the Negro minority, he 
has been more willing perhaps than any other artist to start with the 
stereotype, accept it as true, and then seek out the human truth which 
it hides.2 
The "human truth" for Ellison involves more than an individual's 
relation to the community; it requires recognition of those elements 
of personal identity that are "invisible" to society. In spite of Invisi­
ble Man's incessant search for "brotherhood," the novel focuses on 
the individual. As I will discuss in this chapter, Invisible Man's 
search for a badge of acceptance in a group allies him with Ahab; 
when he fails, he manages to become an Ishmael. In attempting to 
"join," he demonstrates Christmas's despair; when he goes un­
derground at last, he learns the comic force of Byron's "religion," by 
which he "binds himself back" to his source. 
Robert Bone writes, "The bursting forth of Negro personality from 
the fixed boundaries of Southern life is Ellison's essential theme. 
And it is this, at bottom, that attracts him to the transcendentalists. 
. .  . In broader terms, it may be said that Ellison's ontology derives 
from transcendentalism."3 Ellison explores his narrator's relation­
ship to American history and American literary history and indi­
cates that the American identity remains an object of transcenden­
tal quest. In Invisible Man, naming is an analogue for marking: by 
emerging gradually from one experience after another with people 
who would keep him anonymous, the narrator earns his self-
assigned name. Like Hawthorne, Melville, and Faulkner, Ellison 
too, as Robert Bone suggests, epitomizes the pervasive presence of 
the transcendental imagination in American fiction. 
I 
The Epilogue to Invisible Man ends with a question: "Who knows 
but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?"4 The Prologue 
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begins with a statement: "I am an invisible man." It has become a 
critical cliche to interpret ends of literary works as recycling mech­
anisms, redirecting the reader back into the text. Ralph Ellison is 
conscious of this paradigm, and his narrator explicitly states in the 
Prologue, "the end is in the beginning" (p. 9). The beginning, the 
narrator's opening statement, is also his goal of affirmation and 
realization. If we view the closing question with the opening state­
ment in mind, we are compelled to ponder how Ellison's narrator 
does indeed speak for us. To what extent does the reader become the 
protagonist; to what extent does he share the narrator's invisibil-
ity?5 
It comes as a surprise to the literary critic to face such a question 
in response to the work, and perhaps his first inclination may be to 
avoid doing so. If he chooses instead to explore the novel's central 
theme—invisibility—he is partially foiled by Ellison's narrator, 
who insists on interpreting the novel for us in the Prologue-Epi-
logue frame. What is left to the critic but revelation and reiteration 
of the obvious? The narrator admits as much in the last paragraph 
of the Epilogue when he states, 
"Ah," I can hear you say, "so it was all a build-up to bore us with his 
buggy jiving. He only wanted us to listen to him rave!" But only 
partially true: Being invisible and without substance, a disembodied 
voice, as it were, what else could I do? What else but try to tell you 
what was really happening when your eyes were looking through? (p. 
503) 
He addresses us as contributors to his invisibility, as conspirators 
with those people who "refuse to see me": "When they approach me 
they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their 
imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me" (p. 7). 
But he speaks also as a narrator to his readers, justifying his role as 
commentator and interpreter. And as such, he directs our attempts 
to explain "what was really happening" in the novel. His justifica­
tion for blocking our literary critical attempts is enlightening: it is 
to compensate for his substancelessness, his "disembodied voice." 
Preventing, by answering, the critical question, What is the novel 
about?, the narrator forces the more personal question, Who is the 
novel, about? If we succeed in reading the novel without asking this 
question, we run the risk of Ellison's invisibility. We become, 
likewise, a disembodied voice. 
In what amounts to a theory of literary criticism, Ellison states in 
a footnote in Shadow and Act: 
Perhaps the ideal approach to the work of literature would be one 
allowing for insight into the deepest psychological motives of the wri­
ter at the same time that it examined all external sociological factors 
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operating within a given milieu. For while objectively a social reality, 
the work of art is, in its genesis, a projection of a deeply personal 
process, and any approach that ignores the personal at the expense of 
the social is necessarily incomplete, (p. 27) 
In what way is it possible to write about Invisible Man in terms of 
Ellison's own "theory" of literary criticism? Ellison stresses that 
personal and sociological motives operate "at the same time." It 
would not seem appropriate for the reader to catalog his own experi­
ences of invisibility. To do so would be not to participate in Ellison's 
dialogue but to write another novel. What the narrator needs in 
order to achieve self-realization is a social and historical context. He 
decides to emerge from hibernation, to "come out" of the hole he is 
in, but not yet. The reader's half of the exchange must provide this 
context, must embody the voice. If the narrator's final appeal to our 
"lower frequencies" succeeds, he is out of his hole. We let him out, 
because we put him in. And we do the same for ourselves. 
What context does the narrator demand? The range of pos­
sibilities for his "coming out" is as vastly protean as the range of 
possibilities the invisible man himself sees as the "next phase" of his 
conflict: "Until some gang succeeds in putting the world in a strait 
jacket, its definition is possibility. Step outside the narrow borders 
of what men call reality and you step into chaos—ask Rinehart, he's 
a master of it—or imagination" (p. 498). The "narrow borders of 
what men call reality" is a euphemism in the novel for history, as 
history is one reconstruction of chaos, one definition. The narrator 
reflects that Tod Clifton died for his right to "plunge outside of 
history . . . into nothingness, into the void of faceless faces, of sound­
less voices lying outside history" (p. 379). He looks about him on the 
subway at "men out of time, who would soon be gone and forgotten" 
(p. 381). Who would record and document the lives of these men like 
Clifton? "They were outside the groove of history, and it was my job 
to get them in, all of them" (p. 383). Thus it becomes Invisible Man's 
responsibility at Clifton's funeral "to put his integrity together 
again" (p. 387). 
He states in his eulogy that Clifton "lost his hold on reality" (p. 
395). Invisible Man translates Clifton's coffin into the ghetto "box," 
attempting to remind the mourners of their reality: 
"It has a cracked ceiling and a clogged-up toilet in the hall. It has rats 
and roaches, and it's far, far too expensive a dwelling. The air is bad 
and it'll be cold this winter. Tod Clifton is crowded and he needs the 
room. 'Tell them to get out of the box,' that's what he would say if you 
could hear him. 'Tell them to get out of the box and go teach the cops to 
forget that rhyme. Tell them to teach them that when they call you 
nigger to make a rhyme with trigger it makes the gun backfire.'" (p. 
396) 
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When he finishes his speech he states, "as I took one last look I saw 
not a crowd but the set faces of individual men and women. . . . Tod 
Clifton was underground." The reconstruction of Clifton's history 
permits Invisible Man to see the individuality of faces in the crowd; 
each individual becomes a manifestation of the dead man, "our hope 
shot down." Similarly, by becoming such a manifestation of the nar­
rator, in admitting the invisibility we share, we in turn pull him out 
of his box, his hole. The attempt involves nothing less than a rewrit­
ing of history, a new Reconstruction. 
The gun that backfires is the grandfather's gun. The grand-
father's deathbed advice, in the opening pages of the novel, creates a 
puzzle that the narrator discovers he must recreate in order to re­
solve: "'Son, after I'm gone I want you to keep up the good fight. I 
never told you, but our life is a war and I have been a traitor all my 
born days, a spy in the enemy's country ever since I give up my gun 
back in the Reconstruction'" (p. 29). But it becomes the reader's gun 
as well, and the reader's puzzle. 
Historically wars and revolutions form the background for the high 
periods of the novel, and civil wars, Hemingway has written, are the 
best wars for the writer. To which we would add, yes, because they 
have a way of continuing long after wars between nations are re­
solved; because, with the combatants being the same people, civil 
wars are never really won; and because their most devastating en­
gagements are fought within the individual human heart.6 
The combatants are the same people; the reader is one of the indi­
vidual faces in the crowd at Clifton's death; history is our recon­
struction; we are all invisible; and until we recognize our internal 
state of civil war, we are trapped underground. 
In Shadow and Act, Ellison analyzes the effects of the Civil War 
on the American consciousness. In reading Whitman, Emerson, 
Thoreau, Hawthorne, Melville, and Mark Twain, "we are reminded 
that from 1776 to 1876 there was a conception of democracy current 
in this country that allowed the writer to identify himself with the 
Negro." For his nineteenth-century predecessors, "slavery (it was 
not termed a 'Negro problem' then) was a vital issue in the Ameri­
can consciousness, symbolic of the condition of Man, and a valid 
aspect of the writer's reality." In what Ellison terms "the counter­
revolution of 1876, . . . the Negro issue [was] pushed into the un­
derground of the American conscience and ignored" (p. 98). "I felt 
that except for the work of William Faulkner something vital had 
gone out of American prose after Mark Twain. . . . Whatever [the 
nineteenth-century novelists] thought of my people per se, in their 
imaginative economy the Negro symbolized both the man lowest 
down and the mysterious, underground aspect of human personal­
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ity. In a sense the Negro was the gauge of the human condition as it 
waxed and waned in our democracy" (p. 104). The difference be­
tween the "underground of the American conscience," and that "un­
derground aspect of human personality" in which "the Negro was 
the gauge of the human condition," is the difference between a cold 
hole and a warm hole. As the narrator of the novel's Prologue warns, 
"Now don't jump to the conclusion that because I call my home a 
'hole' it is damp and cold like a grave; there are cold holes and warm 
holes. Mine is a warm hole . . . warm and full of light" (p. 9). Invisi­
ble Man prefers his state of hibernation to the version of American 
reality that would term his "hole" a grave. 
R. W. B. Lewis acknowledges Invisible Man's position in the heri­
tage of the American Adam, "the authentic . . . figure of heroic inno­
cence and vast potentialities, poised at the start of a new history."7 
For Lewis, a study of the all-but-lost archetype of emancipation, 
innocence, and self-reliance may be one means of "hoisting" the 
American identity to a higher "plane of understanding." "We stand 
in need of more stirring impulsions, of greater perspectives and 
more penetrating controversies. Perhaps a review of that earlier 
debate can help us on our way. We can hardly expect to be persuaded 
any longer by this historic dream of the new Adam. But it can pose 
anew, in the classic way of illumination as it did in the nineteenth 
century, the picture of what might be against the knowledge of what 
is, and become once more a stimulus to enterprise and a resource for 
literature."8 Invisible Man's lighted hole acts precisely as this kind 
of "classic illumination," and the only impetus to rebirth that is 
lacking is "a review of that earlier debate," the dialogue of Ellison's 
socially conscious literary criticism. 
The novel urges, then, that the reader place Invisible Man back 
into history and provide his embodiment, his American context. It is 
to this end that the multitude of symbols and structures the novel 
provides must be interpreted. For the invisible man, "to be unaware 
of one's form is to live a death" (p. 10). To free ourselves from the 
same formlessness of invisibility, it is necessary to reintegrate our 
awareness of the historical, literary, and sociological aspects of the 
changing American identity that lead to Invisible Man's self-
realization. 
II 
The first six chapters take place in the South, converting into 
"symbolic action" the necessity that the protagonist move North.51 In 
a Paris Review interview reprinted in Shadow and Act, Ellison 
states: 
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In my novel the narrator's development is one through blackness to 
light; that is, from ignorance to enlightenment: invisibility to visibil­
ity. He leaves the South and goes North; this, as you will notice in 
reading Negro folktales, is always the road to freedom—the move­
ment upward. You have the same thing again when he leaves his 
underground cave for the open. (p. 173) 
Historically, as Ellison suggests, the road North was "the road to 
freedom"—for Frederick Douglass, Eliza, Uncle Toms Children, 
James Baldwin's Florence in Go Tell It on the Mountain, and Elli-
son's Brother Tarp, who reminds Invisible Man of his slave history 
by giving him the filed chain link. With the gift, Invisible Man 
inherits an obligation to become, himself, a link in the chain of black 
emancipation. Tarp acted nobly and essentially: "'I lost my wife and 
my boys and my piece of land. . .  . I said no to a man who wanted to 
take something from me'" (p. 335). By the same means, as he wrote 
in his autobiographical Narrative of 1845, Frederick Douglass began 
his escape from slavery—by physical resistance to Edward Covey. 
"You have seen how a man was made a slave; you shall see how a 
slave was made a man."10 The same resistance ultimately per­
meates Invisible Man and other contemporary fiction. As Thomas 
Vogler expresses it, "the novelists seem to agree that violence and 
distortion must be the means of projecting a vision to which society 
is hostile. They seem further to agree that the contemporary world 
presents a continued affront to man, and that his response must 
therefore be at least in part that of the rebel."11 In the literal sense 
of his name, however, Tarp acts as a "cover"—for emancipation has 
become a false construct for the contemporary heroic fugitive. The 
intellectual rebel no longer confronts a tangible bondage—as Elli­
son writes, "reality is difficult to come by."12 
In retrospect, the narrator's "beautiful college" in green and white 
becomes a "flower-studded wasteland" (p. 38). His memory of the 
bronze statue of the Founder, "hands outstretched . . . above the face 
of a kneeling slave," is altered by his later perception, in which he is 
"unable to decide whether the veil is really being lifted, or lowered 
more firmly in place" (p. 37). Yet he realizes that at one time, in his 
pastoral innocence, he was unable to hear the "stagnant stillness" 
for the humming of bees and the sound of mockingbirds. Part of the 
pastoral nostalgia that Invisible Man feels for the South he owes to 
that historical road, open to the slave, that is no longer open to him. 
Filing a chain link, real as well as symbolic action, literally frees. 
When external conflict becomes internalized, "repressed," as Ellison 
would have it, reality becomes pastoralized and man, "invisible." 
The South, as the narrator remembers it, is only a beautiful place 
for those who lack consciousness, and retrospectively it bears the 
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burden for his suffering. "Since then I've sometimes been overcome 
with a passion to return into that 'heart of darkness' across the 
Mason-Dixon line, but then I remind myself that the true darkness 
lies within my own mind, and the idea loses itself in the gloom. Still 
the passion persists. Sometimes I feel the need to reaffirm all of it, 
the whole unhappy territory and all the things loved and unlovable 
in it, for all of it is part of me. Till now, however, this is as far as I've 
ever gotten, for all life seen from the hole of invisibility is absurd" 
(p. 501). What is "absurd" about the South, for Invisible Man, is not 
the "darkness" but the unreality. He sees his college as defined 
totally in terms of black and white—even to the white line on the 
highway that separates the college from the "trash" section of 
town—and more important, as totally defined. For example, Norton 
implies that Invisible Man may choose his "fate" from among a 
multitude of possibilities: "fIf you become a good farmer, a chef, a 
preacher, doctor, singer, mechanic—whatever you become, and even 
if you fail, you are my fate'" (p. 44). In fact Norton's very catalog, 
omitting artist, intellectual, statesman, teacher, and capitalist, also 
expresses the limitations of that fate. 
What Vogler calls the "vestigial aura of Edenic simplicity"13 
which Ellison, like Faulkner, attributes to the South, is the simplic­
ity of definition, the American Adam's ability to create "language 
itself by naming the elements of the scene about him."14 Invisible 
Man is named, defined, categorized—in the South by Norton and 
Bledsoe, in the North by the Brotherhood—until he begins to 
"awake" from the nightmare of (his own) history. Yet even though 
he claims as his own the power that for so long worked against him, 
he does not find the strength to emerge from his hole. He leaves the 
South in order to extend his range of possibilities but ends still 
choosing definition (even if, this time, it is self-definition) as a sub­
stitute for reality—"Until some gang succeeds in putting the world 
in a strait jacket, its definition is possibility" (p. 498). Leaving the 
South is only useful as a metaphor for liberation. The North (con­
trolled by the Nortons, Emersons, and Brother Jacks) falsifies and 
demythologizes the metaphor for Invisible Man. In viewing the 
South with pastoral eyes, as a region from which he has "escaped" 
and to which he cannot return, Invisible Man fails to perceive how 
clearly he carries his own "south" within him into Harlem. 
The theme of escape from the South runs through white as well as 
black fiction, and includes William Styron's Peyton Loftis, Eudora 
Welty's King MacLain in The Golden Apples, and Faulkner's Quen­
tin Compson, whose attempt to come to terms with his Southern 
heritage leads to suicide. Quentin protests to Shreve in Absalom, 
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Absalom!, '"Gettysburg. . . . You can't understand it. You would 
have to be born there.'"15 The articulation of this theme in Invisible 
Man and all of southern fiction poses a challenge to northern read­
ers, who were not "born there." Unlike Invisible Man, northern 
readers do not have open to them even a symbolic avenue of escape. 
Keats's "negative capability" comes close to characterizing the move 
North as Faulkner and Ellison explore it, and historically, Keats's 
expression finds no more appropriately American symbol than the 
myth of the Mason-Dixon line. As Invisible Man puts it, "In the 
South everyone knew you, but coming North was a jump into the 
unknown" (p. 431). 
It is one of the ironic attractions of southern literature and black 
literature, for many of us, that we can get outside the southern and 
black experience precisely because we were born outside it. We can 
look at it because we are not it. But the semantics of this distinction 
may trap us, blind us as it does the Indians in "Red Leaves." Faulk­
ner realized that definition is only possible through negation, what 
Erich Neumann called "the acceptance of the shadow."16 In "Red 
Leaves," the Negro body servant experiences what life means by 
becoming a heroic fugitive from death. Quentin Compson goes 
North to find out his southern identity, and, unable to affirm it, 
succeeds at least in denying his denial. Shreve asks him, at the end 
of Absalom, why he hates the South. The passion of ambivalence 
Quentin reveals—"fI dont hate it! I dont hate it!'"17—cannot be 
understood by Shreve; but it is understood by Ralph Ellison, who 
would suggest that the North/South dichotomy is only part of the 
"American" experience. By the intuitive logic of this argument, it 
should be easier for the northerner and the white reader to realize 
the affirmation Quentin and Invisible Man just fail to achieve. We 
need only direct our attention—we need only look—in order to see 
and thus restore the narrator and ourselves to visibility: "I am invis­
ible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me" (p. 7). 
A problem emerges. Given our refusal to see, is it possible for 
Invisible Man, one representative of a mass of white and black indi­
viduals, to achieve by moving North an alternative identity that 
will endure for an individual, a group, or a race? Ellison offers the 
blues as a lyrical expression of personal catastrophe, and states, 
"They fall short of tragedy only in that they provide no solution, 
offer no scapegoat but the self."18 Ellison's alternative to a redemp­
tion that depends on the recognition of his visibility lies in self-
sacrifice. He defines "humanism" as "man's basic attitude toward a 
social order which he accepts, and individualism his basic attitude 
toward one he rejects."19 Individualism becomes a means of affirma­
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tion, but its price is great: there is "no scapegoat but the self." 
Moving North becomes a move to anonymity: "How many days could 
you walk the streets of the big city without encountering anyone 
who knew you, and how many nights?" (p. 431). But it also cuts him 
off from community. Ellison explains, 
The pre-individualistic black community discourages individuality 
out of self-defense. Having learned through experience that the whole 
group is punished for the actions of the single member, it has worked 
out efficient techniques of behavior control. . . . 
Personal warmth is accompanied by an equally personal coldness, 
kindliness by cruelty, regard by malice. And these opposites are as 
quickly set off against the member who gestures toward individuality 
as a lynch mob forms at the cry of rape.20 
"The horrible thing," Ellison stresses, "is that the cruelty is also an 
expression of concern, of love." 
Ill 
It is not surprising, in the attempt to depict a society where "there 
is in progress between black and white Americans a struggle over 
the nature of reality,"21 that naturalism should not be an effective or 
even an appropriate mode of aesthetic discourse. Ellison explains, in 
part, his choice of allegorical mode: "I was forced to conceive of a 
novel unburdened by the narrow naturalism which has led, after so 
many triumphs, to the final and unrelieved despair which marks so 
much of our current fiction."22 As a novelist Ellison confronts the 
problem his narrator expresses in the Prologue: "Responsibility 
rests upon recognition, and recognition is a form of agreement" (p. 
16). Invisible Man justifies here his own withdrawal from "social 
responsibility" when he goes underground—the terms of "agree­
ment" between himself and his society have not been mutually ac­
ceptable. It is not "final and unrelieved despair" that Ellison's nar­
rator avoids when he avoids naturalism, but a presentation of real­
ity that might be subject to "agreement."23 
To understand this, it is only necessary to review controversies 
over two novels about black protagonists, Richard Wright's Native 
Son and William Styron's The Confessions of Nat Turner. Ellison 
summarizes the complaints against Native Son in Shadow and Act: 
"I felt that Wright was overcommitted to ideology. . . . You might 
say that I was much less a social determinist. But I suppose that 
basically it comes down to a difference in our concepts of the indi­
vidual. I, for instance, found it disturbing that Bigger Thomas had 
none of the finer qualities of Richard Wright, none of the imagina­
tion, none of the sense of poetry, none of the gaiety. And I preferred 
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Richard Wright to Bigger Thomas" (p. 16). This statement amounts 
to an attack on the novel's presentation of reality and recalls an 
earlier criticism by James Baldwin, "Everybody's Protest Novel": 
"The failure of the protest novel lies in its rejection of life, the 
human being, the denial of his beauty, dread, power, in its insis­
tence that it is his categorization alone which is real and which 
cannot be transcended."24 Irving Howe, in his famous essay "Black 
Boys and Native Sons," defends Richard Wright. "How could a 
Negro put pen to paper, how could he so much as think or breathe, 
without some impulsion to protest, be it harsh or mild, political or 
private, released or buried? The 'sociology' of his existence formed a 
constant pressure on his literary work, and not merely in the way 
this might be true for any writer, but with a pain and ferocity that 
nothing could remove."25 He goes on to attribute the success of 
"younger novelists," Baldwin and Ellison, in moving "beyond 
Wright's harsh naturalism and toward more supple modes of fiction" 
to the fact that "Wright has been there first, courageous enough to 
release the full weight of his anger."26 
Robert Bone agrees with Baldwin's statement when he writes, 
"Protest fiction, by portraying sociological types, holds its readers at 
a distance from the human person."27 In Wright's insistence that it 
is "categorization alone which is real and which cannot be trans­
cended," to use Baldwin's words, he expresses the problem of 
naturalism where there is disagreement over the nature of reality. 
Allegory automatically forces the reader to "transcend" social 
categories in order to determine the significance of the work. Alle­
gory is symbolic, comprised of representative men. Therefore in 
writing allegory, Ellison compels even his white readers to "trans­
cend" the very "reality" they would not have otherwise agreed upon 
long enough to ponder its meaning. 
It is clear how this works if we consider one contrast between Joe 
Christmas and Invisible Man. Howe writes about Wright's Bigger 
Thomas, "only through violence does he gather a little meaning in 
life, pitifully little."28 The same statement holds true when applied 
to Joe Christmas, even though Faulkner's novel does not begin to 
approach the harshness of Wright's. When Christmas is castrated by 
Percy Grimm, the novel soars to its "unbelievable crescendo"29 in a 
catharsis of pain. The closest Invisible Man comes to castration is 
his dream about it at the end of the novel, and even there, as I will 
discuss later in this chapter, Ellison uses castration not re­
ferentially but symbolically, as an image of blinding. 
Similar conflict inspires the essays in Nat Turner: Ten Black 
Writers Respond. John Oliver Killens sums up the collective thesis 
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of these essays, calling Styron's "pretense" to adopt Turner's point of 
view "a colossal error, one that required tremendous arrogance."30 
"This is all just a way of saying that the story of Nat Turner is still 
to be written, and it will be up to a black man to write this great 
American tragedy."31 Naturalism becomes an epistemological tool 
in the struggle over the nature of white and black reality, as if the 
vehemence of argument served as a catalyst for social change. 
Ellison denies the assumption and rejects naturalism. However, 
this artistic repudiation places limitations on Ellison's narrator-
protagonist. "You ache," he says in the Prologue, "with the need to 
convince yourself that you do exist in the real world" (p. 7). We 
might ask whether or not the protagonist of the novel, in achieving a 
new identity, succeeds in convincing himself of his reality. More 
important, does he convince anyone else? The problem of naturalism 
for the narrator and the protagonist's ache for reality become part of 
the same dilemma. "'I too have become acquainted with ambiva­
lence. . . . That's why I'm here,'" Invisible Man writes in the Pro­
logue. He proposes this ambivalence, underground, as a solution to 
his conflict in the real world. Paradoxically, just as he discovers his 
southern identity in the North—"I yam what I am" (p. 231)—so he 
resolves his anonymity by making visible his invisibility. The pro-
tagonist's struggle becomes the narrator's allegory: "I am an invisi­
ble man." 
To the extent that the narrator's fictional world articulates 
ambivalence—as he states in the Epilogue, "too much of your life 
will be lost, its meaning lost, unless you approach it as much 
through love as through hate" (p. 501)—the particular characters 
within it become less free to do the same. The protagonist encoun­
ters other people as symbols, refusing or unable to see them as less 
phantom-like than himself, as Clifton's funeral and his emotional 
transactions with Mary Rambo or Brother Trap indicate. Ellison 
says in the Paris Review interview, "I felt that such a man as this 
character would have been incapable of a love affair; it would have 
been inconsistent with his personality."32 There is more than the 
lack of a love affair that strikes the reader—there is a lack of love, 
constraining the protagonist and inhibiting the narrator. His depic­
tion of characters becomes "black and white." Only after Clifton 
achieves mythical proportions for Invisible Man does he elicit the 
protagonist's "love." The narrator chooses "symbolic action" as 
method and response to his lack of reality. 
As The Scarlet Letter demonstrates, at the moment when ques­
tions of art become real confrontations (when Chillingworth views 
Dimmesdale's naked breast but Hawthorne's narrator averts his 
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eyes), Hawthorne withdraws into allegory. In so doing, Hawthorne 
expresses his Puritanism, his need for a container, for a scaffolding 
on which to rest his narrative. Ellison's choice of allegory is not 
quite a withdrawal. Ellison needs aesthetic distance and he also 
does not believe white readers will accept his naturalistic version of 
reality. In order to prevent disagreement, Ellison transcends the 
literal and embraces the allegorical mode. Allegory, for Ellison as 
much as for Hawthorne, if for different reasons, becomes a form of 
artistic "underground."33 
IV 
In his allegorical interpretation of his protagonist's behavior, the 
narrator of Invisible Man attempts to break out of his isolation. 
Erving Goffman's distinction, in Stigma, between persons who feel 
visibly "discredited" and those who feel relatively invisible but still 
"discreditable" provides a model for interpreting this isolation 
sociologically as well as historically. As Goffman implies, visual 
discredit limits social behavior in a predictable and therefore man­
ageable way; whereas the individual who remains only discreditable 
attempts to "pass" but chronically experiences the fear that his 
stigma will be recognized and his behavior then limited. To the 
extent that he "passes," we might call him successfully invisible: he 
wears a mask of social ease to cover up real or imaginary, social or 
psychic "dis-ease."34 Even the most visibly marked individual is not 
stigmatized in every social group, however—especially when the 
group itself holds a particular stigma as its principle of organiza­
tion. Thus Richard Wright is not born with the knowledge of his 
"blackness" because he is born into an all-black community. He 
learns it as he learns, in Black Boy, that he is stigmatized in the 
presence of whites. There is something "wrong" with him. Wright's 
friends, Griggs in particular, try to teach him that playing the "nig­
ger" role is a more "manageable" and physically safer way of dealing 
with the white world. 
Quentin Compson summarized the complexity of the problem in 
The Sound and the Fury: 
When I first came East I kept thinking You've got to remember to 
think of them as coloured people not niggers, and if it hadn't happened 
that I wasn't thrown with many of them, I'd have wasted a lot of time 
and trouble before I learned that the best way to take all people, black 
or white, is to take them for what they think they are, then leave them 
alone. That was when I realized that a nigger is not a person so much 
as a form of behaviour; a sort of obverse reflection of the white people 
he lives among.35 
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A "nigger" is an "obverse reflection" in the sense that his behavior 
conforms to white expectations; "nigger" behavior makes visible 
those human qualities that "white people" do not choose to recognize 
in themselves. It is ironically by reflecting white expectations that 
the "nigger" displays most clearly what the "white" wishes to re­
main hidden. In suggesting this paradox, Quentin suggests the 
realization that will reverse the obverse: and, as Ellison's pro­
tagonist learns, in recognizing that "nigger" is a form of behavior, a 
social role, he becomes a person. 
It is clear that the more the "nigger" role is overplayed, the more 
visible it is, the more it earns the player a measure of anonymity, of 
invisibility. Melville explored this in Benito Cereno, where the art­
ful subservience of Babo and Atufal hides their actual command 
over the San Dominick from Captain Delano of the Bachelor's De­
light. Any assertion of individual decency, responsibility, or intelli­
gence may serve to differentiate one Negro from his fellows and put 
him next in line for real or ritual lynching. These human qualities, 
then, must be hidden if not completely denied, in order to prevent 
the individuality of the Negro from becoming visible to whites.36 In 
the novella, when Don Benito's friend Aranda describes the Negroes 
as "tractable," he ironically indicates the potential success of the 
blacks' plan for revolt from the slavery to which they are being 
transported. The black's "brain, not body, had schemed and led the 
revolt, with the plot"37 and the San Dominick only fails in its 
mutiny because of the superior arms of Captain Delano's crew. 
Just as it is for Will Mayes in Faulkner's "Dry September," for the 
nineteenth-century Negro in the South, individuality was a death 
warrant. The man who rebelled against the acceptance of stigma, 
who refused to accept the subordination of his own identity into the 
shadow of blackness, could hope only to go North, where he might 
lose his stigma. Melville's literary analogue is the shipboard 
mutiny. The shadow the Negro casts on Don Benito, even after he 
has been saved, symbolizes the failure of all men to escape bondage, 
even when they have proven themselves morally and intellectually 
superior to the bonds that physically constrain them. Similarly, El-
lison's novel explodes the myth of the North as the road to freedom; 
for it is in New York that the protagonist first begins to experience 
invisibility. 
In Goffman's terms, Invisible Man does not lose his stigma in the 
move North but rather undergoes a transformation from discredit to 
discreditability—from a position of social certainty to one of inse­
curity. In this way Invisible Man shares the experience of both Hes­
ter and Dimmesdale, and resembles Joe Christmas in his inability, 
in the North, to be certain who he is. At his southern college, im­
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plicitly accepting his discredit (without "seeing" that he was doing 
so), he enjoyed the security and protection of the Founder's benevo­
lence (as well as the limits of vision the blindfold symbolizes). He 
first begins to recognize his invisibility when Bledsoe, in forcing him 
to leave, denies this security. The concept of invisibility "embodies 
the complex psychological dilemmas of men without a sense of vital 
group identity, whose sense of individual human identity is often 
denied by the dominant society."38 Learning the distinction between 
"group identity" and "individual human identity" is one means of 
overcoming the split Goffman's stigmatized individual experiences, 
between his "virtual social identity" (our expectations of his charac­
ter, appearance, and occupation) and his "actual social identity" (the 
category and attributes he could in fact be proved to possess).39 
Ellison's protagonist, at the beginning of chapter 1, does not recog­
nize the distinction. His role as an ambitious student who wants to 
follow Bledsoe's example provides him with his "vital group iden­
tity." He equates his personal responsibility with his social respon­
sibility, equates his identity with his social role. The narrator, re­
trospectively, attributes this equation to Invisible Man's blindness. 
As an ambitious student, Invisible Man wants recognition; he 
wants to distinguish himself in Bledsoe's eyes from the mass of his 
schoolmates, and his assignment to act as chauffeur for Mr. Norton 
becomes his "golden" opportunity to do so. Thus his crime originates 
in his desire for visibility; and, ironically, he achieves "recognition" 
from Bledsoe, even though he doesn't understand his expulsion this 
way. The punishment results not from his action—as Norton ex­
plains, "nor was the boy responsible" (p. 94)—but from the visibility 
he acquires in performing it. Unlike the escaping slave, Invisible 
Man does not see his move North as an escape—because he does not 
choose to act. Both Bledsoe and, in effect, his historical situation 
make his choice for him. 
Invisible Man's social exclusion is a kind of "lynching"; Bledsoe 
cuts him off from the opportunity to distinguish himself. Such dis­
tinction presupposes membership in a group. Thus, once in the 
North, even after Bledsoe's letter to Emerson destroys his dream of 
re integration with his college, Invisible Man continues to associate 
the pursuit of identity with membership and distinction in an 
organization—Men's House, the union meeting at Liberty Paints, 
finally the Brotherhood. He doesn't realize that the only member­
ship card he can hope to receive is the mark of exclusion, the stigma 
of social difference. 
At the opening smoker, the protagonist merited the audience's 
laughter when he used the phrase "social responsibility," which he 
envisions as "social equality" and which they translate as "you've 
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got to know your place at all times" (pp. 32-33).40 In the last meet­
ing with the Brotherhood, he explains that he acted on his own 
"personal responsibility" (p. 400) in deciding to hold a public funeral 
for Tod Clifton; Brother Jack replies, "You were not hired to think" 
(p. 405). The social yields to the personal for the narrator by the end; 
Invisible Man tries to separate his identity from his social role. 
Thus, although his desire throughout the novel to become an inte­
gral part of a community seems to reflect his "social responsibility," 
his failure to do so becomes his path to self-discovery. He wants to 
"join" an established unity because he has not yet become aware 
that the strength and power that originate in union lie within him­
self. His isolation is metaphysical as well as social. 
V 
In an interview with Allen Geller, Ellison agreed to term Invisible 
Man "an example of a social rebel," but stated that "'he doesn't have 
that level of conscious revolt'" that might make him, like Ahab, a 
metaphysical rebel.41 At the same time, in Shadow and Act, Ellison 
states that the novel expresses Invisible Man's "restlessness of 
spirit, . .  . an American condition that transcends geography, sociol­
ogy, and past condition of servitude" (p. 57). Ellison's debt to Mel­
ville has been more often attributed to The Confidence Man than 
other works, but it may also be read within the tradition of Moby-
Dick and Ishmael's own "restlessness of spirit." Ellison's interpreta­
tion to the contrary, his own narrator moves beyond Ahab's explora­
tion of the metaphysical. 
In Moby-Dick Ahab fails to see himself as viewing the world from 
behind a mask, but rather sees the world itself—"all visible 
objects"—as the mask. Unlike Ishmael, who accepts the existence of 
the metaphysical in the physical world, for Ahab, all outward man­
ifestations are unreasoning walls that must be thrust beyond. Thus 
the external world, which the white whale symbolizes for Ahab, 
limits his vision. He hates "that inscrutable thing" precisely be­
cause it is inscrutable, cannot be scrutinized, can only be made 
visible by destroying it and destroying himself in the process. 
The character in Invisible Man who most closely resembles Ahab 
in his hatred is not the protagonist but rather Ras the Exhorter. For 
Ras, as for Ahab, white symbolizes evil; and Clifton and Invisible 
Man are two of evil's agents. His view prevents him from seeing 
beyond the wall, so that the protagonist is as invisible to Ras as he is 
to the Brotherhood. In the triumphant action that places him in 
immediate jeopardy and motivates his descent underground, Invisi­
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ble Man confronts Ras on the streets of Harlem at the culmination of 
the riot. Ras spots him, as if he has been looking for him, shouts 
"'Betrayer!'" and "flung, of all things, a spear" (p. 482). The spear 
may be the African symbol of Ras's chosen identity—as Vogler 
points out, "Ras" may be pronounced "race"—but it is also Ahab's 
harpoon. Ahab tries to kill the whale moments before his own death: 
"T/iws, I give up the spear!'"42 
Invisible Man recognizes the double futility of Ras's action and his 
own passive "agreement." 
I stood there, knowing that by dying, that by being hanged by Ras on 
this street in this destructive night I would perhaps move them one 
fraction of a bloody step closer to a definition of who they were and of 
what I was and had been. But the definition would have been too 
narrow; I was invisible, and hanging would not bring me to visibility, 
even to their eyes, since they wanted my death not for myself alone 
but for the chase I'd been on all my life; because of the way I'd run, 
been run, chased, operated, purged—although to a great extent I 
could have done nothing else, given their blindness (didn't they toler­
ate both Rinehart and Bledsoe?) and my invisibility. . . . And I knew 
that it was better to live out one's one absurdity than to die for that of 
others, whether for Ras's or Jack's, (pp. 483-84) 
The "stricken whale" carries Ahab, the Pequod, and all its crew 
except Ishmael into the vortex. Faulkner's body servant and Joe 
Christmas run their captors' race. Invisible Man dodges the spear, 
refusing to be drawn into Ras's absurdity and instead of continuing 
to run, he throws it right back: 
So when Ras yelled, "Hang him!" I let fly the spear and it was as 
though for a moment I had surrendered my life and begun to live 
again, watching it catch him as he turned his head to shout, ripping 
through both cheeks, and saw the surprised pause of the crowd as Ras 
wrestled with the spear that locked his jaws. (p. 484) 
The impulsive and decisive act sends Invisible Man underground as 
he flees from capture, and it makes his narrative necessary, as a 
means of further exploration and understanding. In this action In­
visible Man cannot be compared to Ahab, but rather tries to achieve 
the "transcendence" of an Ishmael. 
Ellison denies the metaphysical implications of Invisible Man's 
search because, as he states in the interview, "This is not a God-
constructed world. I don't think God constructed society. I think it's 
man-made."43 In spite of Ellison's remarks, Invisible Man resembles 
a twentieth-century version of Ishmael. Ishmael chooses a masthead 
distance; Ellison's protagonist climbs the ghetto steps and the stage 
podium—his variation of Ras's ladder— and ends even further re­
moved, ends underground. Like the dramatic chapters of Moby-Dick 
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and Ishmael's withdrawal as omniscient narrator, the "symbolic ac­
tion" of Invisible Man achieves metaphysical distance for Ellison's 
narrator. Both Ishmael and Invisible Man have earned self-
designated names that express their namelessness. Both recognize 
that their invisibility is the price of vision; and both see their search 
as motivated by internal need for light. 
In the Prologue to Invisible Man, the narrator compares his own 
search to the whaleman's search for light, and states that the black­
ness of invisibility puts you "glory, glory, Oh my Lawd, in the 
WHALE'S BELLY" (p. 13). Like Jonah, Invisible Man tried for a 
long time to avoid his mission by not recognizing it. And like 
Ishmael, he fuses his social search with his soul's search: "I carried 
my sickness and though for a long time I tried to place it in the 
outside world, the attempt to write it down shows me that at least 
half of it lay within me" (pp. 497-98). It may not be a God-
constructed world. As Ellison suggest, it may be only the social 
equivalent of the Leviathan that a man may now pursue. But within 
their different historical spheres, Ishmael and Invisible Man end by 
confronting the same problem. Ishmael's moment of transcendence 
is only temporary: when he is picked up by the "errant" Rachel, he is 
pulled back into the physical world with its old problems and no new 
solutions. Invisible Man does not let himself get picked up by the 
Rachel (or her counterpart, Mary Rambo); yet, as he contemplates 
returning above ground, he faces a question he cannot answer: does 
he return to a world that is all model, that may be adequately 
explained by sociologists, that cannot "see" his invisibility and thus 
make possible his humanity; or has he achieved permanent realiza­
tion, which goes beyond Ishmael's limits, in the recognition that 
because society is man-made, man can make a better one? 
VI 
Invisible Man's search for a brotherhood is a social variation on 
Ishmael's metaphysical struggle for a focus that will engage his 
subjectivity. Robert Bone calls Ellison's heritage picaresque and In­
visible Man's journey not a "religious quest or pilgrimage, but a 
journey toward experience, adventure, personal freedom":44 
In the South everyone knew you, but coming North was a jump into 
the unknown. . . . You could actually make yourself anew. . . . All 
boundaries down, freedom was not only the recognition of necessity, it 
was the recognition of possibility. And sitting there trembling I 
caught a brief glimpse of the possibilities posed by Rinehart's multiple 
personalities and turned away. It was too vast and confusing to con­
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template. Then I looked at the polished lenses of the glasses and 
laughed. I had been trying simply to turn them into a disguise but 
they had become a political instrument instead, (p. 431) 
By wearing Rinehart's glasses, Invisible Man enacts his invisibility; 
he is taken for someone he is not. His own invisibility, his greatest 
mask, becomes his political instrument; his personal freedom lies in 
the ability to be a phantom. What society does not recognize, it 
cannot control; and it does not recognize an invisible man. 
Invisible Man thus affirms invisibility because he has trans­
formed it, underground, and by his art, from a symptom of personal 
disorder to a symbol of social rebellion;45 it becomes his modus viv­
endi, where the self may correspond to no definition of identity but 
its own.46 This affirmation leads to his personal transcendence of 
social problems but fails to link his new identity as an invisible man 
with a program for social behavior. How does naming oneself or 
pointing out moral issues ease his reintegration? Where is the social 
potential and the ontological realism of "symbolic action"? 
This is the question with which the novel ends. And, without an 
answer to it, Invisible Man remains underground. In Shadow and 
Act, Ellison talks about "that intensity of personal anguish . . . any 
and everything in this life which plunges the talented individual 
into solitude while leaving him the will to transcend his condition 
through art" (p. 130): "My goal was not to escape, or hold back, but 
to work through; to transcend, as the blues transcend the painful 
conditions with which they deal. . .  . if there is anything 'miracul­
ous' about the book it is the result of hard work undertaken in the 
belief that the work of art is important in itself, that it is a social 
action in itself" (p. 137).47 Ellison asserts that art is social action by 
implicitly recognizing that the vision of the artist and the vision of 
the stigmatized are intimately related. 
The "joke" at the center of Invisible Man is the conclusion that, in 
order for the narrator to achieve integration with his society, he 
must become visible again. By enacting invisibility, he resumes the 
stigma that originally protected him against lynching. But his new 
visibility would be self-conscious strategy. "Before that I lived in the 
darkness into which I was chased, but now I see. I've illuminated the 
blackness of my invisibility—and vice versa. And so I play the invis­
ible music of my isolation.. . . Could this compulsion to put invisibil­
ity down in black and white be thus an urge to make music of 
invisibility?" (p. 16). His experience as a discreditably invisible man 
gives him the "second sight" of the visibly stigmatized and leads to 
his "attempt to write it down" (p. 497). 
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Out of invisibility comes the artist's vision. In the closing scene, 
Invisible Man in a waking dream sees himself castrated by Jack, 
Emerson, Bledsoe, and Norton. 
But now they came forward with a knife, holding me; and I felt the 
bright red pain and they took the two bloody blobs and cast them over 
the bridge. . . . 
And I looked up through a pain so intense now that the air seemed 
to roar with the clanging of metal, hearing, HOW DOES IT FEEL TO 
BE FREE OF ILLUSION, (pp. 492-93) 
The image of the "bloody blobs" develops the image of Jack's "two 
eyes in the bottom of a glass" and the full impact of blinding-as-
castration fills the dream. At the same time, his castration becomes 
Jack's blinding as well as his own, and he shouts, 
"there hang not only my generations wasting upon the water—. . . 
But your sun . . . 
And your moon . . . 
Your universe, and that drip-drop upon the water you hear is all the 
history you've made, all you're going to make. Now laugh, you scien­
tists. Let's hear you laugh!" 
And I awoke in the blackness, (pp. 493-94) 
Invisible Man resembles White-Jacket here in his realization that, 
without his straitjacket, he can "see" more. And, as Earl Rovit 
writes, "In accepting himself as the Invisible Man he assumes the 
historic role which Emerson unerringly assigned to the American 
poet; he becomes 'the world's eye'—something through which one 
sees, even though it cannot itself be seen."48 From his position as a 
man-of-war, a man-at-war, upon his arrival in the North, he be­
comes "the world's eye." 
But out of vision comes visibility, and in this transformation art 
becomes social action. This is the "compulsion to put invisibility 
down in black and white"—the compulsion to make it visible and 
symbolically act it out in order to externalize it, then transcend it. 
As the black woman in the Prologue redefines freedom, "'I guess 
now it ain't nothing but knowing how to say what I got up in my 
head. But it's a hard job, son. Too much is done happen to me in too 
short a time. Hit's like I have a fever'" (p. 14). The myth of the road 
North is gone; Brother Tarp's physical flight to freedom is no longer 
an option for Invisible Man. "Knowing how to say" replaces the file 
as the narrator's political instrument. Unlike Ahab,Invisible Man 
need not destroy the evil that is white in order to strike through the 
mask. Like Ishmael, he reconstructs his journey to omniscient in­
visibility and begins to create a new myth. 
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To reconstruct mystery is to take possession of the powers of lan­
guage: "Stephen's problem, like ours, was not actually one of creat­
ing the uncreated conscience of his race, but of creating the un­
created features of his face. Our task is that of making ourselves 
individuals. The conscience of a race is the gift of its individuals who 
see, evaluate, record" (p. 307).49 Such creation is possible in fiction, 
which formulates experience. As Ellison writes, "the function, the 
psychology of artistic selectivity is to eliminate from art form all 
those elements of experience which contain no compelling signifi-
cance."50 Ellison's fiction marks this "compelling significance" and, 
like the scapegoat, brings to visibility hidden human truths, not to 
conform to reality, like The Scarlet Letter, but to reform it. Thus the 
fiction writer usurps the power of the social group—he stigmatizes 
for his own ends, destroying the Light and Power Monopoly of the 
lynch mob by stealing its catharsis. At the same time he provides a 
formula for reconstructing reality. For Ellison, the search for iden­
tity "is the American theme." In art, "the identity of fictional 
characters is determined by the implicit realism of the form, not by 
their relation to tradition; they are what they do or do not do. Ar­
chetypes are timeless, novels are time-haunted."51 In Invisible Man, 
where identity is a problem, to take control of the creation of realism 
would be to alter reality in the process, and the novel is "implicitly 
realistic" because the narrator's choice of allegory has been socially 
determined: the escaping slave is an archetype; an invisible man is a 
new creation, or at least a new reconstruction. But Ellison avoids 
strict literary realism. At the end, his narrator does not say much 
about what it means to be an American. Perhaps his greatest ac­
complishment is his attempt, in the tradition of his predecessors, to 
write "the great American novel." For it is the attempt that defines 
what is American about this book.52 "As Henry James suggested, 
being an American is an arduous task, and for most of us, I suspect, 
the difficulty begins with the name."53 
The final solution to the narrator's dilemma remains the reader's 
acceptance of his own responsibility. It is not up to Invisible Man to 
emerge from his hole; we must join him there. The artist and the 
minority member confront the whole world. Until illumination be­
comes universal, we shall all be on the same train; and like Mr. 
Norton's, ours does not get to Centre Street without passing through 
the Golden Day. Invisible Man is Ellison's attempt to turn the liter­
ary mark into social password. By asserting that "black is beauti­
ful," the formerly stigmatized minority member gains control of his 
own stigma. "I carried my sickness, and though for a long time I 
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tried to place it in the outside world, the attempt to write it down 
shows me that at least half of it lay within me" (p. 498). For the 
narrator, writing eases his condition by revealing to him his own 
position; and, even if that position is not yet affirmed "outside" his 
hole, "in spite of myself, I've learned some things" (p. 501). 
Ellison talks about the "special role" American fiction has played 
"in the development of the American nation. It had had to play that 
role, had had to concern itself with certain uniquely American tasks 
even in those instances in which it was not read (or not widely read, 
and I think here of Moby-Dick). And this for a number of reasons. 
One, as a literary form the novel has been primarily concerned with 
charting changes within society and with changes in personality as 
affected by society. . . ,"54 In this quotation, Ellison implies that the 
classic American novelist supposes an ideal reader, as by writing a 
book for such an individual might, should the book acquire readers, 
create an entire society of such people. The novelist changes the 
world the novel portrays, then, by changing the novel. He or she 
does this, I have tried to argue throughout this book, because the 
making of fictions, as Hawthorne, Melville, and Faulkner all knew, 
makes things visible that might have remained hidden. Fiction is 
Ellison's new "mark," both the vehicle of his discovery and the rec­
ord of its accomplishment; the "second sight" of the stigmatized and 
the "inner vision" of the artist become yoked towards new integra­
tion. 
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Postscript 
I state somewhat facetiously at the end of my first chapter that the 
logical question with which to end this study involves some un­
derstanding of the concept of non-marked characters in American 
fiction. To phrase the question another way would be to conclude a 
study of social stigma with a study of the similarities that connect 
nonstigmatized individuals in American fictional communities. If 
American writers could make fictions without marking, in the spe­
cial sense in which I have defined the term, then our literature 
would not reflect the way the Puritans conceived our world and the 
way the transcendental imagination retains their habit of mind. 
Analogously, if we could get at the ways in which we are alike 
without assigning stigma, then we would become a different culture 
and we would have a different literature. 
Marking in my own approach to American literature is both an 
interpretative epistemology and a focus or vehicle, a "mantra" of 
sorts, for which I have examined these classic works of American 
fiction. I have read the works in this study by marking their signifi­
cance, and in every case, what has pointed the significance of the 
work is, itself, a mark of some kind. Therefore I have marked or 
noticed what it is in these novels that the narratives themselves 
mark or notice about the world they portray. I believe that in the 
self-conscious application of the very principle of Puritan inner 
scrutiny to literary works, I have been able to show how Hawthorne, 
Melville, Faulkner, and Ellison, in spite of their Puritan heritage, 
demonstrate a way of seeing that Puritanism obscured. 
As Charles Feidelson writes of the Puritans, "the symbolizing 
process was constantly at work in their minds. . . . Every passage 
of life, enmeshed in the vast context of God's plan, possessed a dele­
gated meaning."1 Since it was the very intention of Puritan medita­
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tion to make things manifest, perhaps we might conclude that 
America's "manifest destiny" has covered over vital aspects of our 
culture. However, as the four authors in my study indicate in their 
work, in spite of this fact, or perhaps because of it, the destiny of 
American fiction has become the necessity to reveal those non-
manifest mysteries that symbolize the essence of who we are. The 
act of marking or stigmatizing, which our history has shown to be so 
destructive in our social behavior, is constructive in fiction because 
it throws into relief the existence of those mysteries. American fic­
tion points the meaning of our nonmanifest destiny. 
It is understandable that the four authors whose works have been 
the subject of this book should characterize so large a movement in 
our literature. The experience of living outside a community one has 
drawn his identity from creates a sense of dislocation, leads to 
Goffman's discreditability. And the single central fact in each of 
these men's lives is social exclusion, whether by chance or by choice. 
Hawthorne was indeed "guillotined" as Surveyor of the Customs; 
Melville did test his own "landlessness" before he became a fiction 
writer; Faulkner inhabited a region that had marked itself in civil 
war and was an eccentric within that region; and Ellison has experi­
enced what it means to be black in America. The fact that eccentrics 
or members of one minority group or another have created our best 
fiction suggests a truth that the Puritans did not know, namely, that 
social exclusion, more than strengthening the identity of the group, 
gives the scapegoat vision. At the same time, ironically, it is the 
very process of exclusion that defines what is American. The Puri­
tans therefore, like Faulkner's Indians in "Red Leaves," taught us 
how to define ourselves by the things we are not. Feidelson writes, 
"The intellectual stance of the conscious artist in American litera­
ture has been determined very largely by problems inherent in the 
method of the Puritans. The isolation of the American artist in 
society, so often lamented, is actually parallel to the furtive and 
unacknowledged role of artistic method in the American mind; both 
factors began in the seventeenth century with the establishment of 
Puritan philosophy and of a society that tried to live by it."2 
What Feidelson terms the "symbolistic imagination" and what I 
have described as the process of marking that characterizes the 
"transcendental imagination" are analogous ideas. Certainly sym­
bol making involves marking, and what a fiction writer marks in his 
narrative easily becomes symbolic. What the concept of marking 
further demonstrates is the congruence of seemingly different but 
actually related mental acts, all of which form a series of analogies 
by which our fiction writers portray the American experience. The 
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Puritan meditation of inner scrutiny, their practice of social exclu­
sion, the transcendentalists' metaphysics, Calvinist theology, the 
lynching of Negroes in the South, and the literary method of our 
classic fiction writers all share a common epistemology. Marking 
does more than reflect the resonances of a symbol within a literary 
work or a culture; it is not metaphor but methodology that links 
American literature and society. 
Ralph Ellison sums it all up neatly in his "Conversation" with 
Ishmael Reed: 
The people who won their revolution by throwing the British off 
their backs and who declared that they were rejecting the hierarchical 
divisions of the past in the name of democracy began their experiment 
loaded down with hypocrisy and wrapped up to their wigs in facile 
self-righteousness. 
They declared themselves the new national identity, "American," 
but, as social beings, they were still locked in the continuum of his­
tory, and as language-users they were still given to the ceaseless 
classifying and grading of everything from stars and doodle bugs to 
tints of skin and crinks of hair, they had to have a standard by which 
they could gauge the extent to which their theories of democracy were 
being made manifest, both in the structure of the new society and in 
the lives of its citizens. 
Theoretically, theirs was a "classless" society, so what better (or 
easier) way of establishing such a standard than to say, "Well, now 
here we have all these easily identifiable blacks who're already below 
the threshold of social mobility—why not use them? They're not even 
human by our standards, so why not exploit them as the zero point on 
our scale of social possibility? Why not designate to them the negative 
ground upon which our society shall realize its goals? . . ." 
This is to telescope a hell of a lot of history and sociology, but you 
can see what I'm driving at. . . .3 
In this study of social stigma, I have tried to do the same, to 
telescope (literary) history and sociology. In the process I have ar­
ticulated one model of American thought. If at times my model 
interferes with the reader's appreciation of the literary work, I can 
only claim the good intention of trying to elucidate familiar litera­
ture in a way that will encourage yet another rereading. With the 
discipline of a meditator, I have tried to return again and again to 
my focus on the mark with only one goal in mind: that I, like 
Hawthorne, Melville, Faulkner, and Ellison, might transcend my 
own finite ability to look for America, might allow these great ar­
tists, as Doc Hines prophesies God will do for Joe Christmas, to "put 
on" their knowledge and share their vision of our "non-manifest" 
destiny. 
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Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 78-79. 
2. Ibid., p. 89. 
3. New York Times, July 9, 1977, p. C-17. 
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